Contexts in Asia

2019 ◽  
pp. 675-787
Author(s):  
Uwe Kischel

This chapter studies the Asian legal context. There is no single uniform context in the Asian region. Its cultural, religious, historical, and political systems are too diverse, as are the foreign and domestic influences on legal systems in the region. Nevertheless, it is possible to single out individual legal systems and groups of systems in Asia which are clearly distinguishable in their respective contexts, but which cumulatively open up the legal world that is Asia and can thus serve as a blueprint for understanding all Asian legal systems. The chapter specifically looks at the People's Republic of China and the free-market democracies in Southeast Asia. India could be regarded largely as a common law country, the chapter states. Finally, the chapter argues that Indonesia is the world's fourth largest country by population, with a culturally mixed population, a civil law influenced state legal system, a system of indigenous customary law which partially survives, and considerable Islamic influence.

Global Jurist ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Terranova

AbstractLegal transplants are considered a significant factor in the evolution of legal systems. One example of transplant of a legal institution through its prestige is the diffusion of the trust from the English legal system to other common law systems and to many civil law countries. One of these is China that in 2001 enacted the Trust Law of the People’s Republic of China. This paper wants to analyse the trust under the Trust Law and to compare it with the original model in the English legal system, understanding how far or how close it is from the original one.


Author(s):  
Dana Pugach ◽  
Michal Tamir

The juxtaposition of two major recent legal developments—the emergence of victims’ rights, and the increasing prevalence of plea bargains in the criminal process—raises profound dilemmas. Ever since the end of the 18th century, criminal proceedings have been conducted by states against defendants, based on the traditional view that crime is an offense against the state. Hence, victims’ participation has been curtailed under different legal systems. In adversarial (Anglo-American) systems, based on common law, the parties dominate the proceeding, and the onus is on the prosecution to prove its case; while in inquisitorial systems (continental), the judge dominates the proceedings, thus reducing the responsibilities of the parties. Although most states display mixed adversarial and inquisitorial characteristics, three systems exemplify different approaches to victims’ rights in plea agreements. The federal US system—the adversarial legal system in which the victim movement began its first steps; the French system—a civil law system, where victims are allocated a formal, albeit limited role; and the Israeli system—a juryless common-law-based system, where professional judges make both legal and evidentiary decisions. In the Anglo-American systems, victims were marginalized, and this lack of standing resulted in one of the more important legal developments of the 20th century—the struggle for victims’ rights. The victims’ movement is a grassroots movement, a social phenomenon that has led to significant legal changes. Consequently, a new perception has seemingly been incorporated into adversarial criminal law systems, whereby victims’ interests should be taken into account. The federal U.S. law enshrined victims’ rights in 2004, and in Israel the major legislation of victims’ rights took place in 2001. In the French system, since the early 20th century, victims have been formally recognized as partie civile—the civil side to the criminal process. The victims have a standing and they can claim compensation. The question of victims’ role in plea agreements is of particular importance, since in recent years, plea agreements have become the rule rather than the exception in Anglo-American criminal proceedings. In 2004, the French law also created a mechanism akin to plea agreements. In the federal U.S. system, victims can express their opinion regarding a plea agreement, and they can apply for a writ of mandamus, should any of their rights be disregarded by the prosecution. Under the Israeli system, victims of severe sexual and violent offenses may speak to the prosecutor and express their views, albeit not in court. In the French system, the victims’ role in plea agreements is limited to claiming compensation. Despite these developments, victims’ rights in plea agreements may still be partial or ineffective. For example, under both U.S. and Israeli law, the victims’ objection to such an agreement may have a very limited effect on the criminal process. Moreover, the prosecution has been granted immunity from any civil lawsuit following infringement upon victims’ rights. Under the French system, the victims’ involvement is limited to an appeal regarding the compensation she has been awarded.


Obiter ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nomthandazo Ntlama

The recent judgment by the Mthatha High Court in Dalisile v Mgoduka ((5056/2018) [2018] ZAECMHC (Dalisile)) has elicited much jubilation over the permeation of customary-law principles into the judicial resolution of disputes that emanate from a customary-law context. The judgment comes at a time when common-law principles appear to have infiltrated the resolution of disputes that originate from customary law. This case paves the way and provides a foundation for the resolution of customary-law disputes within their own context. It reinforces arguments that have long been canvassed to constitutionalise customary law within its own framework. It endorses the envisioned commitment to translate into reality the “healing of the divisions of the past” as envisaged in the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. Section 211(3) of the Constitution is distinct and prescriptive on the obligations of the courts relating to the application of customary law. Section 211(3) is in the context of pursuing the advancement of a constitutionalised system of customary law that seeks to equate the applicable laws of the Republic.This case has filled a lacuna in the application and interpretation of customary law, which has been clouded by the prism of common law. The gap was acknowledged by the court in Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community (2003 (12) BLCR 1301 (CC). In Alexkor, customary law was affirmed as an independent and legitimate source of law that is empowered to regulate its own affairs within the framework of the Constitution. It does not have to be legitimised and validated by common-law principles in addition to the Constitution.Resolving disputes arising from customary law has been a great cause for concern. The courts have delivered many disappointing judgments in the area of resolving customary-law disputes. These judgments appear to lean towards importing common-law principles into the resolution of disputes that arise from the system of customary law. This case note does not intend to discuss these judgments in any depth as they have been dealt with elsewhere.It is thus not the purpose of this case discussion to delve into the history of customary law. Its intended focus is limited to the significant stride made by the court in Dalisile in uprooting the dominance of the application of common-law principles in the resolution of disputes that arise from the system of customary law. The objective is to generate debate on the contribution that the judgment makes to the incorporation of Africanised principles into the broader constitutional framework of the jurisprudence of our courts. The note argues that it is the Constitution that is the dominant authority over all the legal systems that are applicable in the Republic, including customary law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-87
Author(s):  
Bruce Avery Lasky ◽  
Shuvro Prosun Sarker

This article began with a consideration of the history and an evaluation of CLE in the United States, and it now moves on to evaluate the characteristics of CLE in Asia. However, using the term ‘Asian characteristic’ is somewhat amorphous. It can be quite vexing to try to define what is meant by Asia, as it is a broad continent with many nationalities, religions, ethnicities, languages and cultures. The same can be said for Asian legal systems, which possess a mixture of common law, civil law, Sharia law and customary law structures, often with a number of these structures existing within a single nation state. These legal systems have a multitude of roots and origins, with some dating back centuries and others having a more recent strong colonialist influence.


2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-340
Author(s):  
Mirjam Künkler ◽  
Yüksel Sezgin

The articles assembled in this symposium share their roots in a workshop we organized at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law (IISJ) in Onati, Spain, in June 2011. The workshop, titled “Legal Pluralism and Democracy. When Does Legal Pluralism Enhance, When Does It Erode Legitimacy of and Trust in Democratic Institutions?” examined the consequences of legal pluralism for various facets of democracy, from human rights and political equality to issues of stateness, legitimacy, and self-determination. Half of the papers discussed the application of customary law in pluri-legal systems, particularly in Africa and South America, while the other half dealt with the application of religious law, especially in Muslim-majority countries as well as Israel and India.Other papers presented at the workshop have been published in the IISJ's “Oñati Socio-Legal Series” on the Social Science Research Network and are available for download at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=1605943.The three articles featured in this symposium address how the law may take account of diversity in the face of the democratic promise of universal rights standards: they probe the question of how to accommodate cultural particularity while also delivering upon the promise of universal and equal citizenship. Both are crucial sources of legitimacy of and trust in democratic political systems, even while they are also often mutually exclusive standards.


Author(s):  
Fatima Osman

In pluralistic legal systems, the regulation of non-state law through statute carries the risks associated with codification; namely the ossification and distortion of law. This article examines the effects of statutory regulation on unwritten systems of law in the South African legal context. It argues that the constitutional recognition of customary law in South Africa has forced the state to legislate in this arena, the most notable enactments being the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. The enactments' attempt to align customary law with constitutional values have imported significant portions of the common law to regulate the customary law of marriage and succession. This has resulted in a distortion of customary law to reflect common law values and rules. Furthermore, it is argued that significant lacunae in the enactments have necessitated litigation and resulted in the judiciary playing a significant role in shaping customary law. Finally, despite the incorporation of living customary law into the enactments, the implementation thereof by courts and in practice has – and perhaps inevitably so – ossified and distorted portions of the law. Nonetheless, the article argues that legislation is critical to regulate customary law. It advocates that the shortcomings identified in the article are addressed to ensure a more accurate portrayal of customary law in legislation and the successful implementation thereof.


2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 749-780 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach ◽  
Willemien du Plessis

South Africa has a mixed legal system comprised of transplanted European laws (the core being Roman-Dutch law, subsequently influenced by English common law) and indigenous laws, referred to as customary law. This mix is also evident in South Africa’s marriage laws, which can roughly be divided into two categories: civil marriages or unions, and African customary marriages. Since 1994, the developments in these two categories of marriage have been revolutionary. The case law reads like a jurisprudential chronicle of factual situations never contemplated by the legislator, and the judiciary must resort to innovation to solve the intricacies of a constitutionalized mixed legal system. To deal with the challenges posed by the interaction of two seemingly equal legal systems in one legal sphere, the courts have followed a variety of approaches including legal positivism, the application of common law principles, and, more recently, the notion of transformative constitutionalism. The primary aim of this essay is to discuss the sometimes innovative and at other times confusing approaches followed by the judiciary in dealing with the complexities created by a mixed legal system, especially with regard to marriages between Africans.


2019 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-96
Author(s):  
Dariusz Kużelewski

Abstract The objective of the paper is to present the differences in the grounds of appeal and the appeal proceedings against judgments issued by a court composed of representatives of the public in a criminal trial at first instance. At present, citizens are allowed to adjudicate most often in one of three forms: persons adjudicating independently without the participation of a professional factor, who are not professionals in the field of law and criminal procedure (e.g. judges of the peace in the common law system); a jury composed of citizens and adjudicating mostly on guilt of the accused; or lay judges adjudicating all aspects of the case in one panel together with professional judges. However, the participation of laymen in adjudication is not a prevailing rule. Many countries legal systems do not allow the citizens to co-decide in criminal cases. The paper also indicates the arguments for the democratization of the judiciary through a wider admission of citizens to participate in criminal justice. This issue has been examined on the background of three aspects of democracy: representative, deliberative and participatory.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-246
Author(s):  
R. Arif Muljohadi

One of the main goals of marriage is to connect offspring. But not all married couples can have children. The absence of children can be one of the triggers of disharmony in household relations. So as to maintain its integrity, husband and wife adopt children. In adoption, children will certainly have legal consequences. Moreover in Indonesian law, adoption is carried out according to Islamic law, Common law (the customary law referred to is Central Javanese Common law), and Civil law. Where the three legal systems will of course cause different legal consequences. The legal consequences are related to the position of adopted children which includes family relationships, guardianship relationships, inheritance relationships, and other relationships. Regarding inheritance relations, in Indonesia there is still pluralism including Islamic inheritance law, Customary inheritance law and inheritance law in the Civil Code. So with the variety of applicable inheritance law, also contributed to differences in the inheritance portion obtained by adopted children.


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