scholarly journals Appealing the Judgments Issued in Criminal Trial with the Participation of Lay Judges in Poland and Jury in England

2019 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-96
Author(s):  
Dariusz Kużelewski

Abstract The objective of the paper is to present the differences in the grounds of appeal and the appeal proceedings against judgments issued by a court composed of representatives of the public in a criminal trial at first instance. At present, citizens are allowed to adjudicate most often in one of three forms: persons adjudicating independently without the participation of a professional factor, who are not professionals in the field of law and criminal procedure (e.g. judges of the peace in the common law system); a jury composed of citizens and adjudicating mostly on guilt of the accused; or lay judges adjudicating all aspects of the case in one panel together with professional judges. However, the participation of laymen in adjudication is not a prevailing rule. Many countries legal systems do not allow the citizens to co-decide in criminal cases. The paper also indicates the arguments for the democratization of the judiciary through a wider admission of citizens to participate in criminal justice. This issue has been examined on the background of three aspects of democracy: representative, deliberative and participatory.

2013 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Arenson

Despite the hackneyed expression that ‘judges should interpret the law and not make it’, the fact remains that there is some scope within the separation of powers doctrine for the courts to develop the common law incrementally. To this extent, the courts can effectively legislate, but only to this limited extent if they are to respect the separation of powers doctrine. On occasion, however, the courts have usurped the power entrusted to Parliament, and particularly so in instances where a strict application of the existing law would lead to results that offend their personal notions of what is fair and just. When this occurs, the natural consequence is that lawyers, academics and the public in general lose respect for both the judges involved as well as the adversarial system of criminal justice. In order to illustrate this point, attention will focus on the case of Thabo Meli v United Kingdom in which the Privy Council, mistakenly believing that it could not reach its desired outcome through a strict application of the common law rule of temporal coincidence, emasculated the rule beyond recognition in order to convict the accused. Moreover, the discussion to follow will demonstrate that not only was the court wrong in its belief that the case involved the doctrine of temporal coincidence, but the same result would have been achieved had the Council correctly identified the issue as one of legal causation and correctly applied the principles relating thereto.


Author(s):  
Armando Saponaro

This chapter outlines the “conflict” and “peace-keeping” victim-oriented justice paradigms. The latter empowers the victims of crime, putting them at the center of an encounter and using interindividual mediation or collective circles to address conflict resolution. Two models are critically discussed in the conflict victim-oriented justice paradigm. The European continental “visible victim” model structures the role of the victim as a full-fledged processual party together with the public prosecutor and offender. In this model, the victim has the same rights and powers of the defendant. The “invisible victim” common law model views the victim as a trial witness, participating, for example, through a victim impact statement (in the United States) or victim personal statement (in the United Kingdom) at the sentencing stage. The visible victim conflict paradigm model enhances a victim's role and involvement in the criminal justice system, offering a solution to existing controversial and critical common law system issues.


1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 169-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham S. Goldstein

It is becoming increasingly apparent to criminal justice scholars that single theory models of criminal procedure — whether termed inquisitorial or adversarial — are being stretched beyond their capacity by the phenomena they are designed to control. Virtually everywhere, formal systems of charge and adjudication cannot possibly be enforced in accordance with the premises underlying them. There are simply too many offenses, too many offenders and too few resources to deal with them all. One result has been a steady movement towards a convergence of legal systems — towards borrowing from others those institutions and practices that offer some hope of relief.In this transnational effort to cope with system overload, two issues have emerged as more than ordinarily significant: The first is the desirability of abandoning the principle of obligatory prosecution, so common in Continental Europe, and turning instead to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The second is the question whether the ban on guilty pleas and plea bargains should be lifted, as in adversarial systems.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 47-77
Author(s):  
Hanna Kuczyńska

In this article the position of the accused as a source of personal evidence in three different European legal systems: Poland, Germany, and England, will be presented. This analysis will be oriented to understand the way of functioning of the two different models of giving statements of fact by the accused at a criminal trial. The main difference is that in the common law model of criminal trial the accused may only present evidence by testifying as a witness speaking about what happened, whereas in the continental model the accused gives a specific personal type of evidence (that in the Anglo-Saxon literature is rather described as “oral evidence”) that is known as explanations. From this differentiation several consequences arise: among others, the possibility of presenting untruthful explanations and presenting many versions of events in the continental model which have to be assessed by the judges. At the same time, the same right of the accused to silence and not to give incriminating evidence applies in both models of criminal trial – however, in two different shapes and with different types of limitations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 209
Author(s):  
Ahmad Torabi

This paper focuses on the situation of doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil” in the current Iranian legal system especially in the Iranian Commercial Code and in the Iranian Civil Code. The author discusses the ambiguities and legal challenges which arise, directly or indirectly, from implementation of these challenges. There is also a comparative study of the doctrine with the common law system. The paper aims to highlight the defects of this doctrine in the Iranian law system and provides suggestions to improve it.


Author(s):  
Dana Pugach ◽  
Michal Tamir

The juxtaposition of two major recent legal developments—the emergence of victims’ rights, and the increasing prevalence of plea bargains in the criminal process—raises profound dilemmas. Ever since the end of the 18th century, criminal proceedings have been conducted by states against defendants, based on the traditional view that crime is an offense against the state. Hence, victims’ participation has been curtailed under different legal systems. In adversarial (Anglo-American) systems, based on common law, the parties dominate the proceeding, and the onus is on the prosecution to prove its case; while in inquisitorial systems (continental), the judge dominates the proceedings, thus reducing the responsibilities of the parties. Although most states display mixed adversarial and inquisitorial characteristics, three systems exemplify different approaches to victims’ rights in plea agreements. The federal US system—the adversarial legal system in which the victim movement began its first steps; the French system—a civil law system, where victims are allocated a formal, albeit limited role; and the Israeli system—a juryless common-law-based system, where professional judges make both legal and evidentiary decisions. In the Anglo-American systems, victims were marginalized, and this lack of standing resulted in one of the more important legal developments of the 20th century—the struggle for victims’ rights. The victims’ movement is a grassroots movement, a social phenomenon that has led to significant legal changes. Consequently, a new perception has seemingly been incorporated into adversarial criminal law systems, whereby victims’ interests should be taken into account. The federal U.S. law enshrined victims’ rights in 2004, and in Israel the major legislation of victims’ rights took place in 2001. In the French system, since the early 20th century, victims have been formally recognized as partie civile—the civil side to the criminal process. The victims have a standing and they can claim compensation. The question of victims’ role in plea agreements is of particular importance, since in recent years, plea agreements have become the rule rather than the exception in Anglo-American criminal proceedings. In 2004, the French law also created a mechanism akin to plea agreements. In the federal U.S. system, victims can express their opinion regarding a plea agreement, and they can apply for a writ of mandamus, should any of their rights be disregarded by the prosecution. Under the Israeli system, victims of severe sexual and violent offenses may speak to the prosecutor and express their views, albeit not in court. In the French system, the victims’ role in plea agreements is limited to claiming compensation. Despite these developments, victims’ rights in plea agreements may still be partial or ineffective. For example, under both U.S. and Israeli law, the victims’ objection to such an agreement may have a very limited effect on the criminal process. Moreover, the prosecution has been granted immunity from any civil lawsuit following infringement upon victims’ rights. Under the French system, the victims’ involvement is limited to an appeal regarding the compensation she has been awarded.


Author(s):  
Richard Glover

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the uses and development of character evidence from the common law through to the codification provided by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The second section deals with evidence of character in civil cases, covering defamation cases; evidence of good character; and evidence of bad character. The third section focuses on evidence of good character in criminal cases, including the important case of Hunter [2015] 1 WLR 5367, and covers admissibility and methods of proof; kinds of evidence permitted; rebuttal of evidence of good character; and evidential value of evidence of good character.


Author(s):  
Richard Lippke

This chapter examines the fundamental values that ought to inform criminal procedure. More specifically, it considers what we ideally should want from the rules and procedures that exist in legal jurisdictions throughout the world. Three fundamental values are discussed—human dignity, truth, and fairness—and the ways in which they can be upheld or subverted by criminal justice practices. Illustrations are drawn primarily from the United States, but reference is also made to criminal procedure in other countries, including those in the civil law tradition. The article concludes by analyzing two further candidates for inclusion on the list of fundamental values of criminal procedure: the “effectiveness” of criminal procedure and the value of “expertise” that highlights the distinction between the common law and civil law traditions.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mashood A. Baderin

There is today a general perception that the traditional differences between the Common Law and Civil Law systems have shrunk greatly and that both, being secular “Western” systems, should be able to accommodate one another and impact on one another easily and positively. It is the Shar_‘ah system, being based on divine law, that is often perceived as being radically different and possibly not having anything in common with either the Common Law or the Civil Law systems respectively. Our analysis of administration of justice in this paper however demonstrates that the jurisprudence of the three legal systems have evolved along similar lines and that under each of the systems the relevant theories and principles of administration of justice have been  influenced by reasonableness and expediency which gives room for the necessary flexibility to ensure the realisation of substantive justice under each one of the three legal systems, if there is the political and judicial will to do so on the part of the ruling authority, the judiciary and other relevant institutions of administration of justice respectively. In view of the continuing interaction between the three legal systems in different countries of the world today, there is a need to continue promoting a better understanding of the systems to enhance an effective administration of justice across the legal systems globally.


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