Relational Equality Between Age Groups
This chapter makes the case that synchronic equality can have value beyond its derivative impact on complete-lives equality and lifespan prudence. It proposes to draw on relational egalitarianism to explain what is wrong with a variety of intuitively troubling cases of synchronic inequality. While reasons of distributive fairness naturally give traction to the diachronic approach, there is no such pull to focus on complete lives when approaching inequalities relationally. Relational reasons can thus explain our reluctance to accept some troubling cases of synchronic inequalities better than competing views. When deciding whether an inequality between young and old is acceptable, the chapter argues, their relationships should be investigated for hierarchies in status, standing, respect, and power. The synchronic relational principle proposed in this chapter illuminates important social issues that have been under-discussed by philosophers—as illustrated by the case of infantilization by age—and has important policy implications.