Acquaintance

Acquaintance ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 245-259
Author(s):  
Richard Fumerton
Keyword(s):  
Direct Acquaintance

I critically evaluate the question of whether direct acquaintance should be viewed as the foundation not only of all knowledge, but of all thought. In exploring that issue I also underscore a critical ambiguity between two views that endorse quite different versions of an acquaintance theory of foundational thought.

The Transfer of Power, 1947

1982 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. H. Morris-Jones
Keyword(s):  
Title I ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
The World ◽  
The Spectator ◽  
The Way

Those who kindly invited me to give this lecture showed some resistance to its sub-title. I insisted on ‘a view from the sidelines’ because I wished to emphasize that my remarks would be based on my own presence at the events of 1947 and confined to those matters with which I had direct acquaintance. This is still largely true: mine is in part an undisguisedly personal tale. But the matter is rather more complicated. For one thing, while I was certainly a spectator I was also able for a couple of months in 1947 to scamper on to a segment of New Delhi's field of fateful play, even to get a touch or two of the ball, before returning to my place on the terraces. But for the purpose of this lecture I could not content myself with recollections; I have, as it were, examined the slow re-plays of the television cameras. In trying to match my memories, diaries and letters from 1947 with the files at India Office Records, there have, I confess, been phases of bewilderment on the way to such modest and provisional enlightenment as I can offer. It is not simply that in the 34 years the world has moved on, the perspective has changed; that is a problem which the historian's whole skill is devoted to overcome. The difficulty is aggravated when the spectator cum minor actor in the drama of yesteryear puts on the historian's robe; for not only the world but he with it has changed.

Islamic Literature in Translation

1972 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-43
Author(s):  
Lois Giffen
Keyword(s):  
Literary History ◽  
Time Span ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
Great Books ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
The Way ◽  
Islamic Literature

This course of one semester for undergraduates samples the literature—broadly defined—of the Arab, Persian and Turkish peoples and a time span of from just before the rise of Muhammad to modern times. It is literature-centered, i.e., the attention is on the reading and discussion of certain works or selections from works, rather than on literary history. Conceived more on the style of a Great Books course, its aim is to give the student as much direct acquaintance as possible in a few weeks with the thought, and the literary sensibilities of a great civilization. An alternative title would be Islamic Humanities, taking a cue from the more inclusive Oriental Humanities courses and the successful Western Humanities courses which led the way for them.

How Can We Seize the Past?

Philosophy ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 64 (247) ◽  
pp. 67-78
Author(s):  
Christopher Cherry
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of History ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
Historical Events ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Past ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
Real People ◽  
Intelligible World ◽  
Historical Past

My concern is to understand how it is that contemplation of the past— better, of this or that preferred past—evokes in some people an impression which is distinctively weird. It is unmistakable; and anyone who has felt it will soon know what I am talking about. What is the impression, and whence the impressionability?To help identify my concern (and make it seem less eccentric) I shall let it emerge from some highly selective remarks about an issue in philosophy of history which is, by contrast, familiar and respectable: the debate between constructionists and realists. We cannot conceivably have direct acquaintance with, direct access to, the past; by their very nature, past events are over and done with and so unavailable for inspection. This much both camps agree on. However, they differ massively over what follows from this truth. For the constructionist concludes that what he calls the ‘real past’, what actually happened, can play no part whatsoever in historical thought. It is necessarily hidden, and we can have no inkling of it. What, and all, the historian can sensibly claim to know is the ‘historical past’, something which is constituted by and exists only in relation to his thought. Against this, the realist maintains that of course historians do not, necessarily or even typically, constitute the past; rather, they construct accounts of it which will be true if they conform to it as it actually was and false if they do not. And he charges his opponent with a number of fundamental confusions: mistaking accounts of historical events for the events themselves, confusing epistemological matters with ontological, and worst of all equating knowledge with direct perceptual awareness. Now, the realist is, in basics at least, fairly obviously right. And his criticisms are reinforced when we note that constructionists tend to combine with their vision of the impenetrability of the ‘real’ past the thesis that we undoubtedly know that there is a real past, with real people and real events. However, this piece of knowledge must for him, like that of an intelligible world for Kant, ever remain contentless, ‘factually vacuous’.

Zum 2. Korintherbrief: Drei wichtige Parallelen zur Qumrangemeinde (Gemeinde Gottes, neuer Bund und Neuschöpfung)

2019 ◽  
Vol 110 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-83
Author(s):  
Heinz-Wolfgang Kuhn
Keyword(s):  
New Covenant ◽  
New Creation ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
Paul's Letters ◽  
Qumran Community

Abstract In the Second Epistle to the Corinthians Paul uses three concepts, which have very close parallels in contemporary non-Christian texts only in the writings of the Qumran community (“the community of God”, “new covenant” and the idea of new creation already in the present). Since the concept of new creation in the so-called Community Songs of 1QHa is under discussion, a thorough interpretation is of great importance, esp. of 1QHa XI 22. The “new covenant” in Paul’s letters is more than the “renewed covenant” of the Qumran community. The background of ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ is Jewish even though Hellenistic-Roman associations and political assemblies have to be discussed concerning ἐκκλησία. There is no direct acquaintance of Paul with texts of the Qumran community. The relevance of these texts for understanding Paul is found in several respects.

Sir Oliver Lodge's British Association Address

1915 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin H. Hall
Keyword(s):  
School Reform ◽  
Elementary Science ◽  
Scientific Work ◽  
Well Being ◽  
British Association ◽  
The Public ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
School Text

The list of Sir Oliver Lodge's writings is long and varied, ranging from school text-books in elementary science through The Ether of Space, School Reform, Life and Matter, Reason and Belief, to The Survival of Man. With most of these writings I have no direct acquaintance, but on the mere evidence of their titles one may with reasonable safety venture certain particulars toward an estimation of their author. He must have intellectual vigor, he must have an instinct for vital questions, he must have the power of popular exposition, and, finally, he cannot be overcautious in the formation and expression of his opinions. All of these particulars would, I believe, be found also in any consensus of judgment that his fellows in science might pass upon his scientific work. This, if not unmixed praise, is much to say for a man, and it may be added that in general he speaks out from a sense of well-being natural to one of cheerful and sturdy temper who has achieved fame, station, ten children, and the confident hope of immortality for all of us. Is it then to be wondered at that he says things which multitudes are glad to hear, and holds a position almost unique in the esteem and confidence of the public at large?

Semantic Empiricism and Direct Acquaintance in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism

2000 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Audre Jean Brokes
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Content ◽  
Phenomenal Content ◽  
De Re ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
Logical Atomism

<p>In <i>The Philosophy of Logical Atomism</i>, Russell defends a version of semantic empiricism according to which direct acquaintance with logical atoms is the source of our semantic capacities. Previous commentators have construed Russellian acquaintance in one of two ways: either as an act of <i>de re</i> designation involving neither conceptualization nor propositional content, or as a species of belief <i>de re</i>, which does involve conceptualization or classification. I argue that two further, interim possibilities have been overlooked: that direct acquaintance involves purely phenomenal content or that direct acquaintance involves protoconceptual content. I conclude, however, that on none of the four interpretations considered, can direct acquaintance with logical atoms be the source of our semantic capacities.</p>

The Stream of Consciousness: XXIX. Does Consciousness Exist? (Second Part)

2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-84
Author(s):  
Thomas Natsoulas
Keyword(s):  
Essential Feature ◽  
Physical Object ◽  
The Sun ◽  
Stream Of Consciousness ◽  
Preceding Article ◽  
Critical Questions ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
Crucial Part

I continue to address W. James's intentions in his article of 1904 titled “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” (DCE), and to raise critical questions concerning the direction his theory takes after The Principles of Psychology. Here, as in the preceding article of this series, I closely examine his article for what it tells us concerning his new conception of the stream of consciousness. James holds it to be constituted of “pure experiences,” which are neither mental nor physical but may be taken to be either mental or physical. An essential feature of this new conception is one's having a direct acquaintance with one's experiences. James considers consciousness, in this basic sense, to be a crucial part of how one knows anything one does know. Knowledge of the sun, for example, has a basis in direct acquaintance with certain experiences; that is, one takes some of one's experiences to be a certain physical object, the sun itself, because of their occurrence in a context consisting of certain other experiences that, too, are objects of inner awareness.

Definition, Indian concepts of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sibajiban Bhattacharyya
Keyword(s):  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
Male Parent ◽  
Western Philosophy ◽  
Essential Property ◽  
Linguistic Expression ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
Group A ◽  
Way Of Knowing ◽  
Definition Of

Definitions in Indian philosophy are conceived very differently from definitions in Western philosophy. In Western philosophy and logic, it is usual to define a term or a linguistic expression. A definition here consists of a ‘definiens’, typically a longer expression, statement or proposal, and a ‘definiendum’, a shorter expression or term whose meaning is established by the definiens. Definitions permit the definiendum to be put in place of the definiens and are thus ‘abbreviations’ (for example, ‘father’ is an abbrevation of ‘male parent’). In India, definitions in the sense of abbreviations were regularly used in grammar from the earliest times, as in the work of Pāṇini (c.800 bc). In Indian philosophy, however, definitions are not conceived of as abbreviations. We may have direct acquaintance with an object; this is one way of knowing it. We may also know an object or many objects through their properties or features; this is another way of knowing them. These properties or features are the modes under which objects are cognized. If we know objects through the properties that belong to all of them and only to them, then the objects are collected together through their properties to form a group. A group is nothing real; it is a way of collecting objects by knowing them under one mode. When we know a group of objects through properties common to all of them and only to them, we may also want to know another set of properties or features which also belongs to all the objects and only to them. The second set of properties is the defining mark (lakṣaṇa), or, simply, the definition, of the objects collected together into a group by being known under one mode. The objects themselves are the definienda of the definition. The first set of properties through which the definienda are collected together to form a group is called ‘the limiting properties of being the definienda of the definition’. The defining mark, that is, the definition, is not an essential property of the definienda, but is only a property (or set of properties) common to all of them and only them.

Direct Realism and the Extended Mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Cognitive Representation ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
The World

Representationalism rightly treats perception as a type of cognitive representation. However, it wrongly proposes that perceptual content determines phenomenal character. Rather, it is the form, not the content, of a perceptual representation that constitutes phenomenal character. For direct realism is true: Perception is that form of cognition in which representation and represented are the same. Other forms of cognition recruit representations that are distinct from what they represent. In contrast, perceptual representation extends the mind's reach into the world by casting the very object perceived in the role of a self-referential demonstrative. By fusing representation and represented perception provides direct acquaintance with what is seen exactly as it is seen to be and thus determines phenomenal character.

What It Is Like To Perceive

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representation ◽  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Psychological State ◽  
Cognitive State ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Perceptual State ◽  
Cognitive Representation ◽  
Direct Acquaintance

Conscious perception is a distinctive mode of cognition marked by its manifestly sensuous phenomenal character. Why? An intentionalist may reply that perception is a kind of psychological state realized by an oddly contentful mental representation. A higher order theorist might alternatively answer that a perceptual state is sensuous since it is the content of a higher order cognitive state. Neither of these representationalists is right. It is not the content of any mental state that ensures perception's phenomenal character. Rather, the unique structure of a perceptual representation determines perception's sensuous side. For a perceptual representation is an extended mental representation of a peculiar sort. It is a representation in which the vehicle of reference is itself the very object to which that vehicle refers. Perceptual representation thus differs from all other forms of cognitive representation in a way that directly acquaints a perceiver with whatever real object she perceives. Perception is sensuous because it is unbrokered cognitive contact with something present. This confrontational mode of cognition owes its phenomenal character not to what it represents but rather to how it represents. What it is like to perceive is bluntly - but exactly - to represent something real that is really at hand. Conscious perception is just direct acquaintance with what's there.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document