Values and Normative Judgment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bosko Tripkovic
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Normative Judgment ◽  
Normative Judgments

The chapter develops an account of value and normative judgment by exploring the tension between the theoretical and practical perspective. The theoretical perspective explains moral values as contingent upon our evaluative attitudes, and the practical perspective presents values as independent from these attitudes. To overcome this tension, the chapter develops the notions of confidence and reflection. It describes how confidence in our practical perspective emerges through reflection: this process involves seeking greater coherence, introspection, and imagination to discover more authentic and self-definitional evaluative attitudes, and accommodation of other evaluative perspectives through openness, flexibility, tolerance, and persuasion. The chapter argues that values are both revealed and reshaped in this process, and that dynamics between confidence and reflection provides an apposite model for making normative judgments, including judicial moral judgments.

scholarly journals Sacrificing Oneself or Another: The Difference Between Prescriptive and Normative Judgments in Moral Evaluation

2020 ◽  
pp. 003329411989606
Author(s):  
Štěpán Bahník ◽  
Emir Efendic ◽  
Marek A. Vranka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Normative Judgment ◽  
Question Wording ◽  
Judgment Type ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Sacrifice ◽  
Normative Judgments

When asked whether to sacrifice oneself or another person to save others, one might think that people would consider sacrificing themselves rather than someone else as the right and appropriate course of action—thus showing an other-serving bias. So far however, most studies found instances of a self-serving bias—people say they would rather sacrifice others. In three experiments using trolley-like dilemmas, we tested whether an other-serving bias might appear as a function of judgment type. That is, participants were asked to make a prescriptive judgment (whether the described action should or should not be done) or a normative judgment (whether the action is right or wrong). We found that participants exhibited an other-serving bias only when asked whether self- or other-sacrifice is wrong. That is, when the judgment was normative and in a negative frame (in contrast to the positive frame asking whether the sacrifice is right). Otherwise, participants tended to exhibit a self-serving bias; that is, they approved sacrificing others more. The results underscore the importance of question wording and suggest that some effects on moral judgment might depend on the type of judgment.

The logical component of thinking as a predictor of decision-making about the presence of corruption risk in a situation

2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 25-34
Author(s):  
I. N. Pogozhina ◽  
◽  
M. V. Sergeeva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Emotional Intelligence ◽  
Correlation Analysis ◽  
University Students ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Diagnostic Tools ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Decision Making System

The links between elements of the decision-making system on the presence of corruption risk (CR) in a situation with the logical component of thinking as a predictor are considered. The hypothesis of the role of logical reasoning component as a predictor of (1) perceptions of corruption, (2) indicators of emotional intelligence and (3) moral judgement was tested on a sample of Moscow university students (N=134; M=35±11 years old). The following diagnostic tools were used: (1) the author's test for recognising CR situations, (2) the method for assessing the content of ideas about corruption (Pogozhina, Pshenichnyuk, Sergeyeva), (3) D. Lucin’s EmIn questionnaire, (4) Molchanov's Justice-Care technique. Correlation analysis and structural modeling were used to process the data. The logical component of thinking was a significant positive predictor of the level of development of perceptions of corruption and understanding one’s own emotions and those of others. Also, the logical component significantly negatively predicted moral judgments based on instrumental individualism, reflexive empathic orientation and unconscious but internalized moral values. The findings suggest that the logical component will play a leading role in the CR decision-making system and should be specifically shaped.

Nietzsche’s Anti-Realism about Value

2019 ◽  
pp. 17-48
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Moral Philosophers ◽  
Moral Facts

Nietzsche defends the metaphysical thesis that there are no objective (i.e. mind-independent) facts about values, including moral values. His primary arguments for his moral anti-realism are “best explanation” arguments: the best explanation of our moral judgments, indeed of the two-millennium long disagreements among moral philosophers, make no reference to objective moral facts. The details of an “inference to the best explanation” are laid out, and illustrated with Nietzsche’s own texts. Contemporary attempts to defend the explanatory role of moral facts are critiqued, and the radical implications of the argument from disagreement among philosophers considered and defended.

Moral relativism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Kölbel
Keyword(s):  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Relativism ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Or Groups

In philosophical discussions, the term 'moral relativism' is primarily used to denote the metaethical thesis that the correctness of moral judgments is relative to some interesting factor, for example, relative to an individual’s or group’s moral norms. Outside philosophy, for example in anthropology, sociology or ethnology, 'moral relativism' can also denote the thesis that there is significant cross-cultural or inter-personal diversity as to the moral values that are accepted or adhered to – following Brandt (1967), this is often called 'descriptive moral relativism'. Also following Brandt, a further sense of 'moral relativism' is often distinguished and labelled 'normative moral relativism'. Unlike metaethical moral relativism, normative moral relativism is supposed to involve ethical and not just metaethical claims, such as, for example, that what an individual (or a group) considers morally right or wrong to do, is in fact right or wrong for them to do. Given the general implausibility of such claims, this sense of the term seems to be linked to the frequent polemical or derogatory use of the term, in which it is taken for granted that moral relativism is a position that ought to be avoided. Serious philosophical discussion of moral relativism has no need for the derogatory notion, and it is only indirectly concerned with empirical descriptive theses of cross-cultural or interpersonal divergence of moral views, namely in so far as they are sometimes adduced as evidence for metaethical moral relativism. Hence this article focuses on the metaethical thesis that the correctness of moral judgments is relative to, for example, individuals or groups, or their systems of value.

scholarly journals Edgcumbe. 2019 - The relationship between cognitive reflection and morality judgments are mediated by thinking dispositions.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Edgcumbe
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Thinking Dispositions ◽  
Intuitive Thinking ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Experiential Thinking ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract:Performance on Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is thought to predict moral judgments concerning the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). This relationship is hypothesised to be mediated by the tendency toward thinking dispositions such as actively open-minded thinking (AOT), rational (REI-R) and experiential thinking (REI-E), and religiosity. The relationship between cognitive reflection, intuitive thinking and moral judgments with thinking dispositions are examined. As the MFQ measures five types of moral judgments which include ‘individualising values’ – harm and fairness, and ‘binding values’ - loyalty, authority and purity it was hypothesised that performance on these moral foundations would be influenced by thinking dispositions and cognitive reflection. Results indicate that the relationship between cognitive reflection and moral judgments were mediated differently by thinking dispositions. Religious participants and intuitive thinkers alike scored highly on binding moral values. Analytic thinkers and non-religious participants scored highly on individualising moral values. The data is consistent with religiosity and intuition being inherently linked and suggests that moral values are influenced by individual differences in thinking dispositions and cognitive style.

Genealogy and Critique

2021 ◽  
pp. 11-48
Author(s):  
Bernard Reginster
Keyword(s):  
Moral Values ◽  
Functional Approach ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Epistemic Standing ◽  
Shed Light

The chapter examines the concept of a genealogy of morality and its critical significance. I consider and criticize interpretations of Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiries that take them to challenge the epistemic standing of moral judgments. I argue that genealogies aim instead to determine the function of these judgments by identifying what particular affective need they are suited to serve. This functional approach allows to shed light on the much-disputed role of history in genealogical inquiry, and to circumscribe what Nietzsche has in mind when he calls into question the “value” of moral values. In particular, I address two salient problems his functional approach poses for a functional critique of morality: respectively, the problem of dysfunctionality and the problem of multiple functionality.

Is It Rational to Be Moral?

2021 ◽  
pp. 211-226
Author(s):  
Shaun Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Challenging Question ◽  
Primary Form ◽  
Rule Representation ◽  
Normative Judgments

Why should all rational agents be moral? This is one ancient and challenging question about moral motivation. But there is another perhaps more tractable question about moral motivation. Why as a matter of fact are most of us motivated by moral considerations? What is it about the kind of creature I am that inclines me to be moral? Moral judgments (e.g. that it’s right to give to a certain charity) seem to be directly motivating. This chapter argues that even non-moral normative judgments often are directly motivating. A primary form of rule representation automatically carries with it motivation force.

Educational Development from the Point of View of a Normative Philosophy

1966 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Kaufmann
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Educational Development ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Normative Judgment ◽  
Rational Debate ◽  
Practical Proposal ◽  
Normative Judgments

Attacking the view that rational debate on normative judgments has no place in higher education,the author presents a canon of method for the consideration of values and then applies the canon to his own normative judgment. The article closes with a practical proposal for encouraging the discussion of valuative questions in our universities.

Practical Oomph: A Case for Subjectivism

2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (277) ◽  
pp. 657-677 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Bedke
Keyword(s):  
Normative Judgment ◽  
Normative Status ◽  
Normative Judgments

Abstract This paper examines the empirical and armchair evidence concerning the practical profiles of normative judgments. It then argues that the theory of normative judgment that best explains these practical profiles is a version of cognitivism: subjectivism. The preferred version says, roughly, i) each normative predicate is conventionally associated with a certain conative attitude, and ii) for S to judge that x has normative status N is for S to judge that x has a property picked out by the conative attitude associated with N. In short, having a normative judgment about x semantically necessitates having a conative attitude toward x's properties, to be contrasted with conceptual necessitation, metaphysical necessitation, rational necessitation, etiological necessitation, and other flavors of necessitation.

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