Is It Rational to Be Moral?

2021 ◽  
pp. 211-226
Author(s):  
Shaun Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Challenging Question ◽  
Primary Form ◽  
Rule Representation ◽  
Normative Judgments

Why should all rational agents be moral? This is one ancient and challenging question about moral motivation. But there is another perhaps more tractable question about moral motivation. Why as a matter of fact are most of us motivated by moral considerations? What is it about the kind of creature I am that inclines me to be moral? Moral judgments (e.g. that it’s right to give to a certain charity) seem to be directly motivating. This chapter argues that even non-moral normative judgments often are directly motivating. A primary form of rule representation automatically carries with it motivation force.

scholarly journals Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toby Svoboda
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Better Than

Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality (Richard Garner), adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality (Richard Joyce), and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged (Jonas Olson). I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral error. Moreover, revisionary expressivism has the theoretical resources to retain many of the useful features of morality, such as moral motivation, moral disagreement, and moral reasoning. Revisionary expressivism fares better than the three major alternatives in both avoiding moral error and preserving these useful features of morality. I also show how this position differs from the “revolutionary expressivism” of Sebastian Köhler and Michael Ridge.

Values and Normative Judgment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bosko Tripkovic
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Normative Judgment ◽  
Normative Judgments

The chapter develops an account of value and normative judgment by exploring the tension between the theoretical and practical perspective. The theoretical perspective explains moral values as contingent upon our evaluative attitudes, and the practical perspective presents values as independent from these attitudes. To overcome this tension, the chapter develops the notions of confidence and reflection. It describes how confidence in our practical perspective emerges through reflection: this process involves seeking greater coherence, introspection, and imagination to discover more authentic and self-definitional evaluative attitudes, and accommodation of other evaluative perspectives through openness, flexibility, tolerance, and persuasion. The chapter argues that values are both revealed and reshaped in this process, and that dynamics between confidence and reflection provides an apposite model for making normative judgments, including judicial moral judgments.

Representing and Caring that Pain is Bad

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Marshall
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Partial Analysis ◽  
Judgment Internalism ◽  
Present View

This chapter extends Compassionate Moral Realism with an eye towards the issue of judgment internalism, that is, whether moral representation is necessarily connected to motivation. The challenges of giving a uniform account of the cognitive and motivational aspects of moral judgment are illustrated, and the possibility of a non-uniform, pluralist view is considered. After noting Compassionate Moral Realism’s compatibility with judgment pluralism, accounts are offered of both emotionally hot and emotionally cool moral judgments, using Chapter 12’s partial analysis of objective badness. In each case, a necessary connection to moral motivation is identified. For emotionally cool judgments, an agent who is not motivated is epistemically lacking by a standard that she acknowledges in that very judgment. Finally, it is explained how the present view can offer an attractive understanding of moral perception, as understood by Lawrence Blum and others.

Rationality, Moral Motivation and Psychopathology

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 42-59
Author(s):  
Karolina Jasser
Keyword(s):  
Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Personality Disorder ◽  
Personality Disorders ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Direct Proof ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Psychopathic Personality ◽  
Motivational Internalism

Motivational internalism is a view according to which moral judgments are necessarily motivating. Rationalist internalism (RI) is the most popular version of this view; it limits internalism to people who are practically rational. Motivational internalism, including RI, has been criticized as being incompatible with research into certain personality disorder; in particular psychopathic personality and pathological personality which is the result of damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (shortened to VM damage). In this paper, I argue that many of the features of psychopathic personality and of VM damage, which some philosophers interpreted as direct proof against internalism, should be understood as having an effect on the practical rationality of the patients. This means that these personality disorders cannot be used as counter examples to RI and can, in fact, be seen as supporting RI to some extent . I begin by describing RI. I then turn to I describing the phenomenon of psychopathic personality and VM damage and their philosophically relevant features. Finally I discuss whether the features characterizing psychopathy and VM damage influence the degree to which these disorders can serve as counterexamples to internalism of the rationalist variety.

Moral psychology, empirical work in

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Empirical Methods ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Interdisciplinary Study

How do we form our moral judgments, and how do they influence behaviour? What ultimately motivates kind versus malicious action? Moral psychology is the interdisciplinary study of such questions about the mental lives of moral agents, including moral thought, feeling, reasoning and motivation. While these questions can be studied solely from the armchair or using only empirical tools, researchers in various disciplines, from biology to neuroscience to philosophy, can address them in tandem. Some key topics in this respect revolve around moral cognition and motivation, such as moral responsibility, altruism, the structure of moral motivation, weakness of will, and moral intuitions. Of course there are other important topics as well, including emotions, character, moral development, self-deception, addiction, well-being, and the evolution of moral capacities. Some of the primary objects of study in moral psychology are the processes driving moral action. For example, we think of ourselves as possessing free will, as being responsible for what we do; as capable of self-control; and as capable of genuine concern for the welfare of others. Such claims can be tested by empirical methods to some extent in at least two ways. First, we can determine what in fact our ordinary thinking is. While many philosophers investigate this through rigorous reflection on concepts, we can also use the empirical methods of the social sciences. Second, we can investigate empirically whether our ordinary thinking is correct or illusory. For example, we can check the empirical adequacy of philosophical theories, assessing directly any claims made about how we think, feel, and behave Understanding the psychology of moral individuals is certainly interesting in its own right, but it also often has direct implications for other areas of ethics, such as metaethics and normative ethics. For instance, determining the role of reason versus sentiment in moral judgment and motivation can shed light on whether moral judgments are cognitive, and perhaps whether morality itself is in some sense objective. Similarly, evaluating moral theories, such as deontology and utilitarianism, often relies on intuitive judgments about what one ought to do in various hypothetical cases. Empirical research can again serve as an additional tool to determine what exactly our intuitions are and which psychological processes generate them, contributing to a rigorous evaluation of the warrant of moral intuitions.

Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation

1995 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 187-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Arbitrary System ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Internal Connection ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do The Right Thing

'Internalism’ in ethics is a cluster of views according to which there is an ‘internal’ connection between moral obligations and either motivations or reasons to act morally; ‘externalism’ says that such connections are contingent. So described, the dispute between internalism and externalism may seem a technical debate of minor interest. However, the issues that motivate it include deep problems about moral truth, realism, normativity, and objectivity. Indeed, I think that some philosophers view externalism as undermining the ‘dignity’ of morality. They might say that if morality needs an ‘external sanction’ - if the belief that one has an obligation is not sufficient motive or reason to do the right thing- then morality is debased in status. Even an arbitrary system of etiquette could attract an external sanction under appropriate conditions.Although I believe that the more interesting internalist theses are false, there are important truths that internalism is attempting to capture. The most important of these is the fact that moral judgments are intrinsically ‘normative’ or ‘choice-guiding,’ that they are, very roughly, relevant to action or choice because of their content.

scholarly journals Humean Externalism and the Argument from Depression

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Swartzer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
General Assumption ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
General Argument ◽  
Level Of Abstraction ◽  
Motivational States

Several prominent philosophers have argued that the fact that depressed agents sometimes make moral judgments without being appropriately motivated supports Humean externalism – the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are distinct from or “external” to an agent’s motivationally inert moral judgments. This essay argues that such motivational failures do not, in fact, provide evidence for this view. I argue that, if the externalist argument from depression is to undermine a philo-sophically important version of internalism, it must make use of a general assumption about motivational states. However, at a reasonable level of abstraction, the needed assumption also implies that even desires could not be effective sources of motivation. For, just as depressed agents might sometimes lack motivation to act consistently with their moral judgments, they also sometimes lack motivation to pursue their desires. Moreover, the most plausible responses that Humeans can give to this general argument undermine the externalist case against internalism. Thus, there is a deep tension between the argument from depression for externalism and a fundamental Humean commitment.

Internalism and the part-time moralist

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-271
Author(s):  
Mirko Bagaric
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Consciousness ◽  
Part Time ◽  
Relative Concept

This paper contends that internalism with respect moral motivation (the view that we are always moved to act in accordance with our moral judgments) is wrong. While internalism can accommodate amoralists, it cannot explain the phenomenon of ‘part-time moralists’ — the person who is (ostensibly at least) moved by some of his or her moral judgments but not others — and hence should be rejected. This suggests that moral judgments are beliefs (or conscious representations) as opposed to desires. It is contended that morality consists of the set of principles which will maximise happiness and that our moral consciousness is motivated when a desire to maximise happiness is copresent with such a belief. Finally, it is argued that this does not entail that morality is a subjective or relative concept.

Moral psychology, empirical work in

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Empirical Methods ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Additional Tool ◽  
The Social ◽  
Interdisciplinary Study

How do we form our moral judgments, and how do they influence behaviour? What ultimately motivates kind versus malicious action? Moral psychology is the interdisciplinary study of such questions about the mental lives of moral agents, including moral thought, feeling, reasoning and motivation. While these questions can be studied solely from the armchair or using only empirical tools, researchers in various disciplines, from biology to neuroscience to philosophy, can address them in tandem. Some key topics in this respect revolve around moral cognition and motivation, such as moral responsibility, altruism, the structure of moral motivation, weakness of will, and moral intuitions. Of course there are other important topics as well, including emotions, character, moral development, self-deception, addiction, and the evolution of moral capacities. Some of the primary objects of study in moral psychology are the processes driving moral action. For example, we often think of ourselves as possessing free will, which undergirds our being responsible for what we do; we often believe we can be ultimately concerned for the welfare of another; and so on. Yet these claims can be tested by empirical methods to some extent in at least two ways. First, we can determine what in fact our ordinary thinking is. While many philosophers investigate this through rigorous reflection on concepts, the empirical methods of the social sciences are at least an additional tool to bring to bear on the issue. Second, we can investigate empirically whether our ordinary thinking is correct. This typically involves checking the empirical adequacy of philosophical theories, assessing directly any claims made about moral cognition, motivation, and so forth. Understanding the psychology of moral individuals is certainly interesting in its own right, but it also often has direct implications for other areas of ethics, such as metaethics and normative ethics. For instance, determining the role of reason versus sentiment in moral judgment and motivation can shed light on whether moral judgments are cognitive, and perhaps whether morality itself is in some sense objective. Similarly, moral theories, such as deontology and utilitarianism, often rely on intuitive judgments about what one ought to do in various hypothetical cases. Empirical research can again serve as an additional tool to determine what exactly the intuitions are and which psychological processes generate them.

Reasons for emotion and moral motivation

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 805-827
Author(s):  
Reid Blackman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Rational Agents

AbstractInternalism about normative reasons is the view that an agent’s normative reasons depend on her motivational constitution. On the assumption that there are reasons for emotion I argue that (a) externalism about reasons for emotion entails that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated and (b) internalism about reasons for emotion is implausible. If the arguments are sound we can conclude that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated. Resisting this conclusion requires either justifying internalism about reasons for emotion in a way hitherto unarticulated or giving up on reasons for emotion altogether.

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