Blockade Law

Author(s):  
Phillip Drew

Grounded almost entirely in customary international law, the law of maritime blockade has defied several attempts at codification over the past century and a half. Although there is general agreement on the elements required to establish a blockade (declaration, notification, effectiveness, equal application, and non-interference with neutral ports) there is virtually no guidance in the law that outlines the requirements and responsibilities for parties to the conflict to mitigate potential harm to civilians affected through starvation and/or the deprivation of other humanitarian items. This chapter examines the current state of the law and concludes that in light of the significant discordance over the issue of humanitarian access, there is no settled customary law on these aspects of blockade law.

1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman

The law of the sea has changed, for good or for ill. The Revised Single Negotiating Text (hereinafter RSNT) issued in the spring of 1976 may prove to be the single most important document regarding the law of the sea since the 1958 Geneva Conventions in terms of its influence on state practice, whether by way of an ultimate treaty or otherwise. Important differences will exist regarding the extent to which portions of the text are declaratory of emerging customary international law and regarding the extent to which the text must be changed to be acceptable as a universal treaty or as customary law. Indeed, difficult questions of implementation of its principles in bilateral and other arrangements are already arising. Positions taken at multilateral conferences may differ from the positions taken in other contexts. But the text will not be ignored.


1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 553-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudolf Dolzer

The continuous stream of resolutions of the UN General Assembly and much academic writing on the subject notwithstanding, the present state of customary international law regarding expropriation of alien property has remained obscure in its basic aspects; this is true in particular for expropriations in the context of North-South (still better described as “West-South”) relations, to which this article is primarily, but not exclusively, addressed. International courts have had no occasion to rule on fundamental issues of expropriation law in the past decades, even though these issues have been relevant to various disputes settled out of court. Eventually, however, the courts will be confronted with cases involving expropriation of alien property: given the continuing and rising importance of foreign investment, the parties involved probably will not invariably prefer negotiated settlements. It must also be recalled here that customary law has occasionally served as a reference standard in treaties and contracts. If an expropriation case were brought before an international tribunal, it could not simply rule that the law governing expropriation of alien property is in dispute and therefore no law at all is applicable. The very notion of international law precludes an argument that acknowledges the existence of “gray areas” in that law: a court could not rule that some law exists, but that it cannot be identified by judicial means.


1999 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 213-253
Author(s):  
Avril McDonald

Nineteen ninety-nine was a year of taking stock. For humanitarian lawyers, this was facilitated by the fact that it was a year of anniversaries. As well as being the final year of the decade of international law, it was also the centenary of the first Hague peace conference and the first Hague Convention and the fiftieth anniversary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, providing ample occasion for reflection on the successes and failures of this branch of international law over the past century. The tone of the various commemorative meetings was chastened rather than celebratory. As one commentator noted: ‘At the end of a century which has seen so much of war and in which the laws of war have proven so comparatively ineffectual, it seems obvious that that law must be seen as deficient and the record of the last hundred years be adjudged one of failure rather than achievement. (…) Yet the principle conclusion is not that the world needs new law, or different law, but that the law which we have needs to be made more effective.’The major developments in international humanitarian law have closely tracked a century that has seen society and the nature and aims of warfare change dramatically. Developments in the law have been reactive rather than anticipatory and have built on a model that was designed in response to imperatives that were different than those faced today and those that will be faced in the future. The time has long since passed in many countries when the state has a monopoly on violence. Entire societies have been militarised, and in many areas war has been ‘privatised’ as ‘mercenaries, rebels, mutinous gangsters emerge to exploit the decline of the state’.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-339
Author(s):  
Ole W. Pedersen

AbstractThe question of what status the precautionary principle enjoys in international law has once again reared its head, most recently in the Indus Waters Treaty dispute between India and Pakistan before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This article assesses the current state of play in respect of the precautionary principle and its status in international law. It identifies what it terms the two camps of custom – the custom camp and the no-custom camp – which find themselves on opposing sides in the debate. The article argues that the two camps are equally guilty of misunderstanding the precautionary principle and the nature of customary international law, though for different reasons. In so doing, the article shows that one side is guilty of ‘precaution spotting’, whereas the other ignores the implications of the ‘rule v. standard’ dialectic. These two concepts help us to understand the different claims advanced by the two camps. They also alert us to the fact that it is possible to conceptualize customary international law along two separate lines of inquiry: one lending emphasis to state practice and one relying on statements and declarations of rules. In pursuing these arguments, the article compares the precautionary principle with (other) norms of customary law, such as the ‘no-harm rule’ and the rules on cross-border environmental impact assessment, and argues that customary international law is best understood if we come to accept that there are multiple ways of identifying customary international rules.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agata Kleczkowska

Summary The paper explores the problem of the formation of the ‘(quasi-) customary law’, as a source of law created by, or contributed to by armed non-state actors (ANSAs). It argues that, despite some views presented in the doctrine of international law, claims of a quasi-customary international law are without foundation in the current state of international law. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part presents the views of legal doctrine concerning the customary law as contributed/created by non-state actors. The second section argues that ANSAs do not form practice and opinio juris which would allow them to create their ‘own’ customary law. The final part presents the possible challenges and consequences of including ANSAs in the process of formation of customary international law as created by States. In summary the conclusions posit that it could be potentially very harmful for international humanitarian law and the protection of human rights.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (41) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Macedo ◽  
Marinês Assmann

RESUMOEstabelecido no artigo 51 da Carta das Nações Unidas, o direito à legítima defesa não é absoluto, devendo o Estado-vítima de ataque armado respeitar os requisitos pré-determinados pela estrutura legal internacional. Os princípios da necessidade e proporcionalidade da defesa exercem função primordial nesse sentido, uma vez que, segundo o direito costumeiro internacional, o Estado deve conformar sua conduta a eles. O presente trabalho tem por objetivo estabelecer o atual estado da arte no que respeita à necessidade e à proporcionalidade, como limitadoras do direito à legítima defesa no direito internacional público. Os mencionados princípios, apesar de bem consolidados e de fazerem parte do direito consuetudinário internacional, não têm seus contornos bem delimitados, causando discordâncias entre a prática estatal e a doutrina. PALAVRAS-CHAVEDireito internacional público. Legítima defesa. Necessidade. Proporcionalidade. ABSTRACTThe right to self-defense, established in the article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, is not absolute, and the State victimized by an armed attack must comply with the requirements determined by the international legal framework. In this sense, the principles of necessity and proportionality of the defense play a primary role since, according to customary international law, the State must shape its conduct to these principles. The present work aims to outline the current state of the art of necessity and proportionality as limits to the right to self-defense in public international law. These principles, although well-established and part of international customary law, do not have their boundaries well-defined, causing disagreements between State practices and doctrine. KEYWORDSPublic international law. Self-defense. Necessity. Proportionality.


This book offers an analysis of the law of treaties as it emerges from the interplay between the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary international law. It revisits the basic concepts underlying the provisions of the Vienna Convention, so as to determine the actual state of the law and its foreseeable development. In doing so, it examines some of the most controversial aspects of the law of treaties. The book first explores the influence exerted by the Vienna Convention on pre-existing customary law. Certain rules of the Convention which, at the time of its adoption, appeared to fall within the realm of progressive development, can now be regarded as customary international rules. Conversely, a number of provisions of the Convention, in particular those which have been the subject of subsequent codification work by the International Law Commission, have become obsolete. It then examines the impact exerted by the Vienna Convention on the development of other fields of international law, such as the law of international responsibility and the law of international organizations. The last section of the book is devoted to cross-cutting issues, with particular reference to the notion of jus cogens — a concept first used in the Vienna Convention in connection with the problem of the validity of treaties and which, afterwards, has acquired a legal significance going well beyond the Convention.


2017 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jutta Brunnée ◽  
Stephen J Toope

AbstractCan a few primarily Western States expand the right to self-defence against non-State actors, incorporating the unwilling or unable standard? Even on a traditional reading of customary law formation, the answer is no because proponents have failed to attract consistent and widespread support. What is more, using our interactional international law approach, we show that efforts to date have not been successful because they have failed to address fundamental rule of law concerns. The current state of world politics has perhaps caught proponents of the unwilling or unable standard in a difficult bind. We suggest how proponents might carefully develop the law on self-defence against non-State actors.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lefkowitz

As traditionally conceived, the creation of a new rule of customary international law requires that states believe the law to already require the conduct specified in the rule. Distinguishing the process whereby a customary rule comes to exist from the process whereby that customary rule becomes law dissolves this chronological paradox. Creation of a customary rule requires only that states come to believe that there exists a normative standard to which they ought to adhere, not that this standard is law. What makes the customary rule law is adherence by officials in the international legal system to a rule of recognition that treats custom as a source of valid law. Confusion over this distinction arises because in the international legal system the same agents whose beliefs give rise to a customary rule are the legal officials whose adherence to the rule of recognition leads them to deem that rule legally valid. The proposed solution to the chronological paradox employs H.L.A. Hart’s analysis of the concepts of law and a legal system, and in particular, the idea of a rule of recognition. Yet Hart famously denies the existence of a rule of recognition for international law. Hart’s denial rests on a failure to distinguish between the ontological and authoritative resolution functions of a rule of recognition, however. Once such a distinction is drawn, it can be argued that customary international law rests on a rule of recognition that serves the ontological function of making customary norms legal, though not the authoritative resolution function of settling disputes over the alleged legality of particular norms.


2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-149
Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón

AbstractScholars have debated the meaning of the foreign-relations clauses in the U.S. Constitution. This essay attempts to outline the foreign-relations clauses that an ideal constitution should have. A liberal constitution must enable the government to implement a morally defensible foreign policy. The first priority is the defense of liberty. The constitution must allow the government to effectively defend persons, territory, and liberal institutions themselves. The liberal government should also contribute to the advancement of global freedom, subject to a number of conditions, especially cost. The essay recommends improved methods to incorporate treaties and customary international law into the constitutional structure. Treaties should be approved by the whole legislature and should generally be self-executing. Customary law should be genuine, not fake, and consistent with liberal principles. Finally, based on economic theory and evidence, the essay recommends that liberal constitutions prohibit the government from erecting trade barriers. It concludes by tentatively proposing concrete constitutional language to implement these recommendations.


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