Regulation

Author(s):  
Anna Chadwick

Chapter 4 analyses the new regulations introduced in the US and in the EU to respond to ‘excessive’ levels of speculation in commodity derivative markets. First, the chapter recalls the events of the global financial crisis and relates how concerns about the role that derivatives played in bringing it about have motivated reform. The chapter then outlines the new US and European regulations for over-the-counter derivatives focusing on those provisions with the potential to address concerns about food commodity speculation. After discussing a number of challenges that threaten the regulatory project, the author exposes a number of deeper, structural limitations of the Dodd Frank Act and EMIR-MiFID II reforms. The regulations are revealed to be predicated on a problematic ‘Neoliberal-Neoclassical’ understanding of how financial markets function that fundamentally fails to account for dynamics of price formation in contemporary markets.

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoo-Duk Kang ◽  
Kyuntae Kim ◽  
Tae Hyun Oh ◽  
Cheol-Won Lee ◽  
Hyun Jean Lee ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Steven L Schwarcz

Securitisation represents a significant worldwide source of capital market financing. European investors commonly invest in asset-backed securities issued in U.S. securitisation transactions, and vice versa One of the key goals of the European Commission's proposed Capital Markets Union (CMU) is to further facilitate securitisation as a source of capital market financing as a viable alternative to bank-based finance for companies operating in the EU. To that end, this chapter explains securitisation and attempts to put its rise, its decline after the global financial crisis, and its recent CMU-inspired revival into a global perspective. It examines not only securitisation's relationship to the financial crisis but also post-crisis comparative regulatory approaches in the EU and the United States.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 557-591
Author(s):  
Andri Fannar Bergþórsson

In response to the global financial crisis, the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) was created in 2010. Supranational bodies were established for different financial sectors to act as supervisors of sorts for national-level supervisors in EU Member States. This article focuses on how the system was adapted to three EFTA States that are not part of the EU but form the internal market along with EU Member States through the EEA Agreement – Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein (EEA EFTA States). The aim is to clarify how ESFS has been incorporated into the EEA agreement and to discuss whether this a workable solution for the EEA EFTA States that have not transferred their sovereignty by name in the same manner as the EU Member States. One issue is whether the adaptation has gone beyond the limits of the two-pillar structure, as all initiative and work stem from the EU supranational bodies and not the EFTA pillar.


2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd Bridgman

The global financial crisis (GFC) which began in 2007 with a liquidity squeeze in the US banking system and which continues to play out today has affected us all, whether through the collapse of the finance company sector, rising unemployment, falling housing prices or the recession which followed the initial market crash. The speed and scope of the crisis surprised most experts – policy makers included. Specialists from a myriad of disciplines, from economics and finance to risk management, corporate governance and property, are trying to make sense of what happened, why it happened and what it means for us now and into the future. Members of the public rely on the news media to keep them informed of the crisis as it unfolds and they rely on experts to translate these complex events into a language which they can understand. The GFC is educating us all, and it is important that we all learn from it to avoid making the same mistakes again. 


Author(s):  
Michael Schillig

The chapter provides an overview of the current state of the reform efforts in the jurisdictions under consideration with a focus on the institutional architecture, banking regulation, shadow banking, and financial market infrastructure. It briefly reviews the generally accepted causes of the global financial crisis and the eurozone crisis, as well as the reform agenda at global/international level. It summarizes the reform efforts in the EU and the US that are of particular relevance for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. These reform efforts form the context in which the new recovery and resolution regime must be viewed.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig

This chapter traces the development of what is now the EU. It first describes the origins of ideas of European unity. It then discusses the various treaties that paved the way towards broader European integration. These include the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of 1951,the Single European Act 1986, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992, and the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. Next, the chapter turns to the impact of the global financial crisis on the EU and considers several theories of integration.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Aikman ◽  
Jonathan Bridges ◽  
Anil Kashyap ◽  
Caspar Siegert

How well equipped are today’s macroprudential regimes to deal with a rerun of the factors that led to the global financial crisis? To address the factors that made the last crisis so severe, a macroprudential regulator would need to implement policies to tackle vulnerabilities from financial system leverage, fragile funding structures, and the build-up in household indebtedness. We specify and calibrate a package of policy interventions to address these vulnerabilities—policies that include implementing the countercyclical capital buffer, requiring that banks extend the maturity of their funding, and restricting mortgage lending at high loan-to-income multiples. We then assess how well placed are two prominent macroprudential regulators, set up since the crisis, to implement such a package. The US Financial Stability Oversight Council has not been designed to implement such measures and would therefore make little difference were we to experience a rerun of the factors that preceded the last crisis. A macroprudential regulator modeled on the UK’s Financial Policy Committee stands a better chance because it has many of the necessary powers. But it too would face challenges associated with spotting build-ups in risk with sufficient prescience, acting sufficiently aggressively, and maintaining political backing for its actions.


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