Who’s Afraid of Suprastate Constitutional Theory?

Legitimacy ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 182-205
Author(s):  
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh

This chapter is a reply to critics of attempts to ground the legitimacy of suprastate institutions in constitutionalism. More specifically, it responds to the objection that suprastate constitutionalism is idealistic due to the improbability of a demos beyond the state. Two points are made: first, the objection relies on a normative understanding of the idea of a demos that is itself potentially idealistic and, second, the objection assumes that idealism in normative theory is problematic, which might be doubted. The chapter concludes that we should be more sanguine about the contribution that constitutionalism in all its forms can make to addressing the challenges of legitimacy faced by contemporary suprastate law and governance.

Author(s):  
Blake Emerson

The Public’s Law is a theory and history of democracy in the American administrative state. The book describes how American Progressive thinkers—such as John Dewey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Woodrow Wilson—developed a democratic understanding of the state from their study of Hegelian political thought. G.W.F. Hegel understood the state as an institution that regulated society in the interest of freedom. This normative account of the state distinguished his view from later German theorists, such as Max Weber, who adopted a technocratic conception of bureaucracy, and others, such as Carl Schmitt, who prioritized the will of the chief executive. The Progressives embraced Hegel’s view of the connection between bureaucracy and freedom, but sought to democratize his concept of the state. They agreed that welfare services, economic regulation, and official discretion were needed to guarantee conditions for self-determination. But they stressed that the people should participate deeply in administrative policymaking. This Progressive ideal influenced administrative programs during the New Deal. It also sheds light on interventions in the War on Poverty and the Second Reconstruction, as well as on the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. The book develops a normative theory of the state on the basis of this intellectual and institutional history, with implications for deliberative democratic theory, constitutional theory, and administrative law. On this view, the administrative state should provide regulation and social services through deliberative procedures, rather than hinge its legitimacy on presidential authority or economistic reasoning.


2019 ◽  
pp. 249-274
Author(s):  
Bernadette Meyler

Its historical association with monarchical sovereignty has tarred pardoning with an illiberal brush. This Postlude examines Carl Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory, Political Theology and other writings to argue that the pardon resembles the sovereign decision on the state of exception. The vision of pardoning as opposed to liberal constitutionalism dates further back than Schmitt, however; it appears as well in the writings of Immanuel Kant, one of the foundational figures of modern liberalism. Only by disassociating pardoning from sovereignty can it be reconciled with constitutionalism. The Postlude concludes by turning to the work of Hannah Arendt as one source for a non-sovereign vision of pardoning.


Author(s):  
Luis I. Gordillo Pérez ◽  
Giuseppe Martinico

El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer una reflexión sobre el estado del Derecho constitucional europeo en el año del quincuagésimo aniversario de Van Gend en Loos, la histórica decisión del Tribunal de Justicia (TJ) que ha puesto las bases para la constitucionalización del Derecho de la Unión Europea. Para ello, y tras profundizar en la teoría del constitucionalismo comunitario, se analiza el proceso de constitucionalización de la UE a través de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Luxemburgo desde dos puntos de vista: constitucionalización como «federalización» y constitucionalización como «humanización».This article reflects on the state of the art of the EU Constitutional Law on the 50th anniversary of Van Gend en Loos, the founding constitutional decision of the ECJ. After analyzing the fundamentals of EU constitutional theory, the authors move towards the constitutionalization process of the EU through the case law of the ECJ from a double perspective: constitutionalization as federalization and constitutionalization as «humanization of EU Law».


Grotiana ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 396-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustaaf van Nifterik

AbstractAn important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war (and peace), since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae (around 1605), one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio (around 1615), and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis (around 1625).Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away.


2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 560-585
Author(s):  
Sinja Graf

This essay theorizes how the enforcement of universal norms contributes to the solidification of sovereign rule. It does so by analyzing John Locke’s argument for the founding of the commonwealth as it emerges from his notion of universal crime in the Second Treatise of Government. Previous studies of punishment in the state of nature have not accounted for Locke’s notion of universal crime which pivots on the role of mankind as the subject of natural law. I argue that the dilemmas specific to enforcing the natural law against “trespasses against the whole species” drive the founding of sovereign government. Reconstructing Locke’s argument on private property in light of universal criminality, the essay shows how the introduction of money in the state of nature destabilizes the normative relationship between the self and humanity. Accordingly, the failures of enforcing the natural law require the partitioning of mankind into separate peoples under distinct sovereign governments. This analysis theorizes the creation of sovereign rule as part of the political productivity of Locke’s notion of universal crime and reflects on an explicitly political, rather than normative, theory of “humanity.”


Author(s):  
Antonio Magdaleno Alegría

More than three decades after the approval of the Spanish Constitution and in spite of the big amount of studies and analysis that it has generated, there is still an important debate on the territorial distribution of power. This matter came to its highest point when the process to reform different Statutes of Autonomy started in 2003. As an answer to the aforementioned scenario, Professor Ruiperez’s book shows the need to elaborate a constitutional theory on the State of Autonomies. From this point of view he analyzes critically the difficulties and problems (both historic and politic) that has generated the current conceptual confusion on the matter, in order to determine the elements and pillars necessary to draw up a constitutional theory on the State of Autonomies.Pasadas más de tres décadas desde la aprobación de la Constitución española, y pese al importante número de estudios y análisis que la misma ha generado, lo cierto es que todavía existe una importante polémica en torno a la distribución territorial del poder. Cuestión que ha tenido su punto más álgido con el proceso de reforma de varios Estatutos de Autonomía iniciado a partir del año 2003. Precisamente, y en respuesta al citado panorama, el libro del Profesor Ruipérez pone de manifiesto la necesidad de elaborar una teoría constitucional del Estado de las Autonomías. Así, y desde esta perspectiva, analiza críticamente las dificultades y problemas (históricos, políticos, etc.) que ha generado el presente confusionismo conceptual en la materia; para determinar posteriormente los elementos y pilares necesarios en orden a formular una teoría constitucional del Estado de las Autonomías.


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde

The focus of this paper is not on the person, but on the work of Carl Schmitt, in particular the significance of Schmitt's concept of the political for an understanding of his legal and constitutional theory. Let me start with a short personal memory. When I was a third year law student, I read Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Theory. I came across the formulations that the state is the political unity of a people and that the rule of law component in a constitution is an unpolitical component. I was puzzled by these two remarks. I had learned from Georg Jellinek that the state, from a sociological perspective, is a purposeful corporative unit and, from a legal perspective, represents a territorially based corporation. I had also gathered some knowledge about “organic” state theories, especially that of Otto von Gierke who considers the state an organism and a real corporative personality rather than a mere legal fiction. On the basis of these theories, I felt unable to understand Schmitt's point that the state is the political unity of a people, because in those theories the political aspect is largely missing. It was only later that, by reading and studying Carl Schmitt's essay The Concept of the Political, I gradually learned to make sense of the above remarks. Thus I have discovered that that essay, and the understanding of the political elaborated in it, contains the key to understanding Carl Schmitt's constitutional theory in general. I would now like to explain this.


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