III. Minobe's Constitutional Theory: Methodology and General Theory of Law and the State

1965 ◽  
pp. 43-72
Lex Russica ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 62-70
Author(s):  
A. V. Savinskiy

The paper is devoted to an actual problem of the legal theory and practice, namely: the institution of circumstances excluding criminal nature (criminality) of an act (Chapter 8 of the Russian Criminal Code). As a manifestation of criminal and legal compromise steadily strengthening its position in domestic criminal legislation, this legal phenomenon is intended to encourage citizens to commit actions that contribute to localization or minimization of threats to the interests of the individual, society and the state protected by the law. At the same time, despite seemingly clear legislative enactment, the institution of circumstances precluding the criminal nature of an act evokes hot scientific debates. Among forensic scientists there is no uniform opinion concerning the legal nature of the criminal law institution as a whole and some of the individual types of circumstances constituting the institution under consideration, in particular. The legal literature substantiates the idea of the need to expand the legislative list of such circumstances. Investigators and judges often face difficulties in practical application of the rules enshrined in articles of Chapter 8 of the Criminal Code (especially provisions concerning necessary defense, extreme necessity, reasonable risk). The reasons for theoretical and practical problems related to the circumstances excluding the criminal nature of the act are largely preconditioned by the insufficient research of the institution under consideration in the general theory of law. This fundamental theoretical legal science lacks general legal equivalents of the criminal law concepts “criminality of the act”, “circumstances excluding criminality of the act.” It is proposed to introduce into scientific circulation the general legal equivalent of the concept “criminality of the act” — “delinquency of the act”, representing the set of such features of the offense as public harm, wrongfulness, culpability and punishability. This new legal design will allow us to investigate the phenomenon of circumstances excluding criminality of the act in the light of a general theory of law, to determine the possibility and limits of their subsidiary application in various branches of law. Thus, categories of circumstances excluding criminal, administrative, civil. disciplinary delinquency of acts will acquire the right to exist in differnt legal sciences and relevant branches of law. This, in turn, will contribute to improving the effectiveness of protection of rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the individual, ensuring the interests of the society and the state.


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen Kennedy

Der Krieg ist durchaus nicht Ziel und Zweck oder gar Inhalt der Politik, wohl aber ist er die als reale Möglichkeit immer vorhandene Voraussetzung, die das menschliche Handeln und Denken in eigenartiger Weise bestimmt und dadurch ein spezifisch politisches Verhalten bewirkt.In an early review of the Verfassungslehre (1928), Margit Kraft-Fuchs criticizes Carl Schmitt's argument as circular and illogical. While claiming to establish an entirely new constitutional theory, not a general theory of the state, Schmitt in fact relies on a tautology and derives “an is from an ought”. Quoting Schmitt's argument in Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen (1914) that “The mere actuality of power at no point provides a justification unless it assumes a norm by reference to which its claim is legitimated”, Kraft-Fuchs concludes that it is “astonishing he has forgotten this basic logical insight between 1914 and 1928.”


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (16) ◽  
Author(s):  
Agata C. Amato Mangiameli (Universidade de Roma – Tor Vergata)

This paper aims investigate the general theory and the elements of the computer crimes as well it social engineering, because as technology advances, more and more people use it according to their needs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-199
Author(s):  
Omer Y. Pelled

Abstract Judges and juries often make factual decisions even if the facts are disputed and there is no clear-cut evidence available. Despite this common state of uncertainty, verdicts are thought of as having clear winners and losers––either the plaintiff wins and receives a full remedy, or the defendant wins and the plaintiff gets nothing. In private disputes, factfinders base their binary factual determinations on the preponderance of the evidence. There are, however, several doctrines that allow for partial remedy, discounted by the probability that the facts support the plaintiff’s case, given the available evidence (proportional liability). This Article offers a general theory for proportional liability in private law. It identifies three types of factual uncertainty—mutual uncertainty, unilateral uncertainty, and institutional uncertainty—and shows that legal economists should support proportional liability when the state of uncertainty is shared by the parties and the court (mutual uncertainty), and they should adopt an all-or-nothing rule whenever the information is observable but unverifiable (institutional uncertainty). In cases where one party holds private information (unilateral uncertainty), proportional liability is sometimes, but not always, superior to an all-or-nothing rule.


Author(s):  
Yulia Fanilevna Aitova ◽  

The article analyzes the issue of determining the legal status of the individual management body of a limited liability company. The author begins his research with the concept of legal status existing in the general theory of law, and then proceeds to consider the issue from the point of view of philosophical categories. In addition, the work explores the diversity of points of view existing in the doctrine regarding the legal status of the individual management body of economic societies.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emad H. Atiq

Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, ForthcomingLegal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific — morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive view of the kinds of moral properties that ground legality results in a form of anti-positivism that can accommodate any legal rule consistent with positivism, including the alleged counterexamples. I articulate an ‘inclusive’ form of anti-positivism that is not just invulnerable to extensional challenge from the positivist. It is the only account that withstands extensional objections, while incorporating, on purely conceptual grounds, a large part of the content of morality into law.


Author(s):  
Iuliia Rossius

The goal of this article consists in demonstration of the impact of research in the field of history and theory of law alongside the hermeneutics of Emilio Betti impacted the vector of this philosophical thought. The subject of this article is the lectures read by Emilio Betti (prolusioni) in 1927 and 1948, as well as his writings of 1949 and 1962. Analysis is conducted on the succession of Betti's ideas in these works, which is traced despite the discrepancy in their theme (legal and philosophical). The author indicates “legal” origin of the canons of Bettis’ hermeneutics, namely the canon of autonomy of the object. Emphasis is placed on the problem of objectivity in Betti's theory, as well as on dialectical tension between the historicity of the interpreted subject and strangeness of the object that accompanies legal, as well as any other type of interpretation. The article reveals the key moment of Betti's criticism of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Regarding the question of historicity of the subject of interpretation. The conclusion is made that the origin of the general theory of interpretation lies in the approaches and methods developed and implemented by Betti back in legal hermeneutics and in studying history of law.   Betti's philosophical theory was significantly affected by the idea on the role of modern legal dogma in interpretation of the history of law. Namely this idea that contains the principle of historicity of the subject of interpretation, which commenced  the general hermeneutical theory of Emilio Betti, was realized in canon of the relevance of understanding in the lecture in 1948, and later in the “general theory of interpretation”. The author also underlines that the question of objectivity of understanding, which has crucial practical importance in legal hermeneutics, was transmitted into the philosophical works of E. Betti, finding reflection in dialectic of the subject and object of interpretation.


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