Logic, Rhetoric, and Philosophy
This chapter examines the process by which Hobbes, in the 1630s and early 1640s, began to establish a strong contrast between eloquence on the one hand and the procedure he terms ‘logic’ on the other. It argues that the contrast did not involve a wholesale rejection of rhetoric, but was, rather, an attempt to point up the necessity for philosophical discovery of the new logic Hobbes was currently attempting to develop. There was, for Hobbes, nothing wrong with rhetoric as such; the problem lay in philosophy, which he saw as having failed to produce certain knowledge (scientia) because of its reliance on the procedures of rhetorical argumentation (in particular, the enthymeme). The chapter argues for the significance, in his philosophical development, of Hobbes’s search for certain knowledge of ethics through close study of Aristotle’s account of the passions in the second book of his Rhetoric.