Frege’s and Russell’s New Logic
This chapter discusses the background of Wittgenstein’s work in the logical methodologies of Frege and Russell. It outlines the dialectical context and background for the problems in the work of Frege and Russell discussed in chapters 2 and 3, and to which Wittgenstein responds in the Tractatus by developing further their philosophies of logic and logical methodologies. Key issues to be addressed are the notion of a logical language or a concept-script, the sense in which logic is not a branch of psychology, and Frege’s and Russell’s accounts of logic as a science. The final section 1.4 contextualizes the interpretation of the Tractatus proposed in subsequent chapters by situating it in the context of current scholarly disputes regarding the Tractatus, between the so-called resolute reading and traditional metaphysical interpretations that attribute ineffable nonsensical theses to the Tractatus.