Reputation and Gossip in Game Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Charles Roddie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
Future Behavior ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Shed Light

When interacting with others, it is often important for you to know what they have done in similar situations in the past: to know their reputation. One reason is that their past behavior may be a guide to their future behavior. A second reason is that their past behavior may have qualified them for reward and cooperation, or for punishment and revenge. The fact that you respond positively or negatively to the reputation of others then generates incentives for them to maintain good reputations. This article surveys the game theory literature which analyses the mechanisms and incentives involved in reputation. It also discusses how experiments have shed light on strategic behavior involved in maintaining reputations, and the adequacy of unreliable and third party information (gossip) for maintaining incentives for cooperation.

scholarly journals Chinese Dissident Game Two Players between the U.S. and China PRC

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-47
Author(s):  
Susy Tekunan
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Strategic Decision Making ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Positive Results ◽  
Rare Situation ◽  
The U.S

The paper analyzes the decision that the U.S. took upon the request of a Chinese dissent requesting for asylum when the U.S. Secretary of State came to China for a diplomatic visit. The analytical paper extracted the international issue between two contending countries using the game theory to consider the implication and thus to find a solution to the conundrum. Game theory allows for positive results if it is a repeated game but for this rare situation it is not likely that it is a regular game to be repeated over time. While this event is in the past, a similar situation may arise that could use the signaling and strategic decision making process by using this practical yet rarely applied method. 

scholarly journals Gaming of Strategy--Strategic Realignment of Chinese Dairy Industry

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 222
Author(s):  
Liqin Shan ◽  
Jinzhao An
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Marketing Strategy ◽  
Industrial Development ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Dairy Industry ◽  
Development Environment ◽  
Strategy System ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Differentiated Marketing

Over the past ten-odd years, the dizzying prosperity and rapid  development achieved in Chinese Dairy Industrial t actually covered  up a fundamental defect concerning the strategy, which eventually led to the "Melamine Event”. Today, the troubled waters have been poured oil on, but it still needs time to be recovered. China's Dairy Industry, which suffered heavy losses and casualties, is about to seek for a transformation and will have to help himself out of the crisis. This paper will apply the game theory of "Prisoner's Dilemma" case to reflect the strategic defects appeared in the early dairy industrial development, with the combination of the new changes in the dairy industrial development environment after "Melamine Event”, it also points out that the key to revitalize the domestic dairy enterprises is to put the emphasis on the nature of the dairy industry itself, to return to consumers standard, to try to establish the undifferentiated marketing strategy and differentiated marketing strategy system.

scholarly journals The mediating role of constructs representing reasoned-action and automatic processes on the past behavior-future behavior relationship

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Brown ◽  
Martin S Hagger ◽  
Kyra Hamilton
Keyword(s):  
Reasoned Action ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Behavioral Engagement ◽  
Automatic Processes ◽  
Total N ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
Future Behavior

Objective: Past behavior has been consistently shown to predict and explain future behavior. It has been proposed that past behavior effects reflect both reasoned-action and automatic processes. The current study sought to explore the mediation of past behavior-future behavior relationship via constructs representing these processes across three populations and behaviors: binge drinking in university students, flossing in adults, and parental sun safety behavior of children 2 – 5 years of age. Furthermore, this study used a measure of past behavior that combined long-term, recent, and routine patterns of behavioral engagement. Methods. A prospective design with two waves of data collection spaced six weeks apart was adopted. Participants (Total N = 754) completed an initial survey containing measures of past behavior (frequency, recency, and routine), social cognition (attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control), and behavioral automaticity. Six weeks later, participants (N = 454) completed a self-report measure of behavior and behavioral automaticity. Results. Structural equation modelling revealed that automatic, but not reasoned-action processes, mediated the past-to-future relationship, across the three behaviors. Results further revealed that long-term, recent, and routine patterns of behavioral engagement were highly correlated and indicated a second-order past behavior latent variable. Conclusions. While both reasoned-action and automatic factors can predict a range of health behaviors, automatic processes appear to explain the effect of past behavior on future behavior. Further investigations should focus on exploring the role of other non-conscious and automatic processes such as counter-intentional habits and implicit beliefs in explaining engagement in heath behaviors.

Arms Control Verification and Other Games Involving Imperfect Detection

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 923-945 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Wittman
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Imperfect Detection

This article presents an analysis of the strategic behavior of countries when there is imperfect verification of an arms control agreement. It provides a framework for determining whether an arms control agreement is desirable, shows which factors are needed for the agreement to be maintained in the absence of third-party enforcers, and develops propositions relating changes in verification capabilities to changes in the likelihood of cheating and the use of verification technology. These propositions yield several paradoxes of information (for example, the better the verification technology, the less often it will be employed). Since the analysis incorporates both simultaneous and sequential moves by the players, it provides new insights into other applied areas as well as game theory.

Concluding Remarks

2014 ◽  
pp. 455-469
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Many

The main purpose of this chapter is to present a broad brush picture of the many areas of game theory researches and applications that have come into being. Therefore, this chapter can serve only as a minimal guide to the study of game theory and offer pointers towards future research. Although the discussion here has been primarily concerned with the present and future, it is desirable to have at least some understanding of the past. In addition, a rich reference is provided to help readers more fully appreciate the game theory developments of today.

Theory of Games and Theory of International Relations

2011 ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
D. Degterev ◽  
A. Degterev
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
International Relations ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Theory Application ◽  
Multilateral Regimes

The author proposes a historiographical study of the game theory application to the analysis of international negotiations, conditions for modification of multilateral regimes, mechanisms of decision-making in the international organizations. Game theory is a mathematical theory for analysis of strategic behavior (interaction) and it is widely used in the social sciences. It explains the logic of rational behavior of individuals in situations of conflict of interest. Game theory is used by foreign researchers as a method of analysis of international relations. The domestic researchers, however, do not often resorts to it. The “golden age” of game theory was the era of global confrontation between the USSR and the United States.

A Macintosh Interface for the Cameca Camebax-Micro Electron Microprobe

1990 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 438-439
Author(s):  
Carl E. Henderson
Keyword(s):  
Electron Microprobe ◽  
Processing Speed ◽  
Word Processing ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Computer Control ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Disk Storage ◽  
The Past ◽  
User Facility ◽  
Instrument Control

Over the past few years it has become apparent in our multi-user facility that the computer system and software supplied in 1985 with our CAMECA CAMEBAX-MICRO electron microprobe analyzer has the greatest potential for improvement and updating of any component of the instrument. While the standard CAMECA software running on a DEC PDP-11/23+ computer under the RSX-11M operating system can perform almost any task required of the instrument, the commands are not always intuitive and can be difficult to remember for the casual user (of which our laboratory has many). Given the widespread and growing use of other microcomputers (such as PC’s and Macintoshes) by users of the microprobe, the PDP has become the “oddball” and has also fallen behind the state-of-the-art in terms of processing speed and disk storage capabilities. Upgrade paths within products available from DEC are considered to be too expensive for the benefits received. After using a Macintosh for other tasks in the laboratory, such as instrument use and billing records, word processing, and graphics display, its unique and “friendly” user interface suggested an easier-to-use system for computer control of the electron microprobe automation. Specifically a Macintosh IIx was chosen for its capacity for third-party add-on cards used in instrument control.

Future behavior is seen as more intentional than past behavior

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary C. Burns ◽  
Eugene M. Caruso ◽  
Daniel M. Bartels
Keyword(s):  
Past Behavior ◽  
Future Behavior
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