The Issue Incentive Model of Party System Attention

Author(s):  
Christoffer Green-Pedersen

This chapter presents the ‘issue incentive model of party system attention’. This model uses the issue competition literature and policy agenda-setting theory as a platform for building a theoretical framework with individual issues as analytical points of departure, and at the same time, the model focuses on explaining the entire issue agenda and not just individual issues. The issue incentive model explains the issue content of party politics through the incentives that different issues offer to large, mainstream parties. The concept of the party system agenda is a key element in the framework as it is the dependent variable. The model is not focused on explaining party attention at a particular time such as during an election campaign, for instance; focus here is on attention in the medium term such as a decade. The concept of the party system agenda highlights the interaction among political parties and their shared perceptions of which issues are important. The incentives for large, mainstream parties with regard to a particular issue are argued to be decisive; partly because large, mainstream parties are much more flexible in terms of issue attention than niche parties are, and partly because the largest parties traditionally dominate government formation and thus politics. Furthermore, three types of incentives are argued to be particularly decisive for whether large, mainstream parties want to pay attention to an issue: issue characteristics, issue ownership, and coalition considerations.

2021 ◽  
pp. 92-112
Author(s):  
Emiliano Grossman ◽  
Isabelle Guinaudeau

What determines the issue content of party competition? The extant literature is torn between issue ownership theories predicting contrasted partisan profiles and more strategic views of electoral platforms emphasizing parties’ incentives to converge on the priorities with the greatest payoffs. This chapter argues that parties are like snakes in tunnels: this metaphor conceptualizes parties’ incentives to emphasize contrasted issues to stay true to their identity and past priorities (the ‘snake’ component) as well as constraints exerted on those efforts by political opponents and context (the ‘tunnel’). Parties need to accommodate emerging problems and their competitors’ strategies, resulting in considerable cross-partisan overlap. Utilizing analyses of Comparative Agendas Project data on issue attention in party manifestos, plus qualitative observations on single electoral campaigns and how parties ‘steal’ issues from each other, the chapter discusses the potential implications of our observations for the way elections influence policies, a topic at the core of the next chapter.


Author(s):  
Christoffer Green-Pedersen

This chapter summarizes the main findings of the book and discusses its implications. The theoretical argument of the book presented in the issue incentive model is that the vote and office incentives of large, mainstream parties are the key to explaining how policy issues rise and decline on the party system agenda. Furthermore, the argument is that the vote and office incentives of large, mainstream parties depend on three factors, namely issue characteristics, issue ownership, and coalition considerations. Empirically, the book highlights the more complex party system agenda with the decline, but not disappearance, of macroeconomic issues as well as the rise in ‘new politics’ issues together with education and health care. Moreover, various ‘new politics’ issues have seen very different trajectories. Finally, the chapter lays out the implications of these findings for two larger debates within the study of West European party politics. One debate is about the role of niche parties and the consequences of their growth for the West European party system. The second debate is about the linkage between voters and political parties in contemporary Western societies. Discussing these implications also sheds light on the implication of more recent developments within West European party systems, namely the electoral decline of large, mainstream parties.


Author(s):  
Christoffer Green-Pedersen

Party politics in Western Europe has changed profoundly over the last decades. Long gone are the times when class-based political parties with extensive membership dominated politics. Instead, party politics has become issue-based. Surprisingly few studies have focused on how the issue content of West European party politics has developed over the past decades. This book therefore offers a comprehensive analysis of the issue content of West European party politics. To do so, the book develops a new theoretical model labelled the ‘issue incentive model’ of party system attention. The aim of the model is to explain how much attention issues get throughout the party system, which is labelled ‘the party system agenda’. To explain the development of the party system agenda, one needs to focus on the incentives that individual policy issues offer to large, mainstream parties, i.e. the typical Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, or Conservative/Liberal parties that have dominated West European governments for decades. The core idea of the model is that the incentives that individual policy issues offer to these vote- and office-seeking parties depend on three factors, namely issue characteristics, issue ownership, and coalition considerations. The issue incentive model builds on and develops a top-down perspective according to which the issue content of party politics is determined by the strategic considerations of political parties and their competition with each other.


Author(s):  
Christoffer Green-Pedersen

Long gone are the times when class-based political parties with extensive membership dominated politics. Instead, party politics has become issue-based. Surprisingly few studies have focused on how the issue content of West European party politics has developed over the past decades. Empirically, this books studies party politics in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK from 1980 and onwards. The book highlights the more complex party system agenda with the decline, but not disappearance, of macroeconomic issues as well as the rise in ‘new politics’ issues together with education and health care. Moreover, various ‘new politics’ issues such as immigration, the environment, and European integration have seen very different trajectories. To explain the development of the individual issues, the book develops a new theoretical model labelled the ‘issue incentive model’ of party system attention. The aim of the model is to explain how much attention issues get throughout the party system, which is labelled ‘the party system agenda’. To explain the development of the party system agenda, one needs to focus on the incentives that individual policy issues offer to large, mainstream parties, i.e. the typical Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, or Conservative/Liberal parties that have dominated West European governments for decades. The core idea of the model is that the incentives that individual policy issues offer to these vote- and office-seeking parties depend on three factors, namely issue characteristics, issue ownership, and coalition considerations. The issue incentive model builds on and develops a top-down perspective on which the issue content of party politics is determined by the strategic considerations of political parties and their competition with each other.


Author(s):  
Christoffer Green-Pedersen

This chapter provides an analysis of party system attention to health care. Based on the issue incentive model, the importance of issue characteristics for understanding the rising party system attention to health care is clear. Health care is an obtrusive issue of great importance to everyone, so large, mainstream parties have a strong incentive to focus on the issue. However, as it is difficult to satisfy public demands, party attention is often an exercise in blame avoidance. Rapid progress within health-care technology has thus generated more party system attention to the issue because parties are struggling to meet public demands while controlling costs. Comparative differences in how much the attention to health care has increased can be explained to some extent by the comparative differences in health-care systems. The more responsibility for health care is concentrated with the state, the more party attention because parties have to address all kinds of questions about service provision. When responsibility is defused to societal actors, political parties attend less to the issue. Also, the analysis reveals no significant party differences in attention to the issue. There are no niche parties on the issue and no strong tendency for the large, mainstream parties to pay more attention to the issue than other parties do. Thus, health care seems to be an issue to which all political parties have to pay attention.


Author(s):  
Christoffer Green-Pedersen

This chapter provides an analysis of party system attention to education based on the issue incentive model. The analysis shows that large, mainstream parties’ incentives are the key factor in explaining the dynamics of party system attention to education. However, compared to the three issues analysed before, problem characteristics rather than coalition considerations and issue ownership shape the incentives of large, mainstream parties. The fact that education is an obtrusive valence issue relevant to more or less the whole population implies that it is an issue that large, mainstream parties cannot ignore if public debates about policy problems emerge. The increased focus on education and human capital in the knowledge society has thus led to an increased focus on education. This focus has clearly been most pronounced in countries where it has materialized in a debate about the quality of primary schools. In Denmark, and later on also in Sweden, this debate came as a reaction to what was seen as disappointing PISA scores. In the UK, the PISA scores played a limited role in the debate about primary schools.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 1607-1612
Author(s):  
Joseph Okwesili Nkwede ◽  
IBEOGU, ALOYSIUS S. ◽  
Eric Mwambene

This paper titled Political Violence and The Sustainability of Nigerian Democracy seeks to establish the causes of political violence in Nigerian democratic experiment and possibly suggest how to surmount the pathologies with a view to ensuring the survival of the nations fledgling democracy. The study adopted elite theory as a theoretical framework of analysis. The study established that greed, struggle for supremacy between godfathers and godsons have often led to political violence in the countrys party system. The implication of the study is that if the above factors are not assuaged, the polity will continue to elect and nominate mediocre to occupy positions of responsibilities. Similarly, the country polity will keep witnessing wanton destruction of lives and properties. The study therefore recommended that the existing sentiments and parochial cleavages such as ethnicity and religion should not be a pre-requisite when it comes to attracting the suitable qualified candidates for public and political offices.


PCD Journal ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Pal Istvan Gyene

This paper argues that the impact of “Islam” on the Indonesian political system is worth studying on three different levels: 1. society’s political divisions; 2. the party system 3. parliamentary politics. I contend that there is a specifically Indonesian “consensus-oriented” democracy model involved in the process—which is not, however, without Western predecessors—wherein political Islam and Islamist parties act not as destabilising factors but rather as “Muslim democratic” forces that strengthen democratic consensus in a manner similar to some “Western” Christian democratic parties. This research is based partly on a historical and, implicitly, comparative approach. It builds strongly on the theoretical framework and methodology of Sartori’s classic party system typology, Lijphardt’s “majoritarian” and “consensus-based” democracy model, and the so-called neo-institutionalist debate on the possible advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and presidential governments.  


Significance On May 12, Duterte's transition team released an eight-point economic plan, following a bravado-fuelled election campaign that was light on policy content and unnerved investors, partly because key personnel in the administration remained unknown. Impacts Liberal Party defections will strengthen Duterte's congressional influence, and potentially weaken opposition politics. However, new PDP-Laban members could later desert Duterte. Duterte's infrastructure investment and pro-foreign investor reform plans face bottlenecks. A Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos vice presidency would strengthen Duterte further, and reduce the chance of any possible impeachment effort.


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (13-14) ◽  
pp. 1995-2031 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Klüver ◽  
Hanna Bäck

Why do coalition parties settle some policy issues in great detail, whereas other issues are hardly mentioned in coalition agreements? Coalition agreements are important policy platforms that determine policy making during the legislative term. However, we know remarkably little about their content. We shed light on why issue attention in coalition agreements varies so extensively. We argue that intra-cabinet conflict positively affects issue attention as parties have stronger incentives to negotiate a detailed policy agenda that constrains their coalition partners. However, we expect that this effect is conditioned by preference tangentiality and the salience of an issue among coalition partners. Our theoretical expectations are tested drawing on a new data set based on a comprehensive content analysis of 224 agreements negotiated by 181 parties between 1945 and 2015 in 24 West and East European countries. We find support for our hypotheses and conclude that parties draft agreements to limit “ministerial drift.”


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