The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P)

Author(s):  
Rosemary Foot

This chapter traces the origins and elaboration of the R2P norm. It places the accent on the process of norm development during which a variety of states, including China, were able to shape the norm’s characteristics. It begins with a discussion of the norm’s origins in 1990s debates, initial reception in 2001, formalization in documentary form in 2005, and then its implementation structure as elaborated in 2009. Next, it turns to the Libyan intervention in 2011 under the R2P banner and the impact of that usage on R2P’s status. The tracing of the R2P’s pathway shows that for a state, such as China, that is concerned about international image and does not wish to appear obstructive or irresponsible, it can find welcome and bedrock support for its conservative attitude towards R2P among several other states concerned about the norm’s implications. The discussion also shows how the complex layering of the norm has presented China with the ability to shape the norm discursively and to insert its own normative preferences into the process of R2P elaboration.

2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 787-805
Author(s):  
Zheng Chen ◽  
Hang Yin

Abstract While China and Russia's general policies towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are similar, the two reveal nuanced differences in addressing specific emergencies. Both express support for the first two pillars of R2P while resisting coercive intervention under its aegis, as they share anxieties of domestic political security and concerns about their international image. Nonetheless, addressing cases like the Syrian crisis, Russian statements are more assertive and even aggressive while Chinese ones are usually vague and reactive. This article highlights the two states’ different tones through computer-assisted text analyses. It argues that diplomatic styles reflect Russian and Chinese perceptions of their own place in the evolving international order. Experiences in past decades create divergent reference points and status prospects for them, which leads to their different strategies in signalling Great Power status. As Beijing is optimistic about its status-rising prospects, it exercises more self-restraint in order to avoid external containments and is reluctant to act as an independent ‘spoiler’. Meanwhile, Moscow interprets its Great Power status more from a frame of ‘loss’ and therefore is inclined to adopt a sterner approach to signal its status. Although their policies complement each other on many occasions, there is nothing akin to a Sino–Russian ‘bloc’.


Significance Several recent strains in the relationship guaranteed a tense official dialogue and tepid reception of Xi across Washington -- the impact of China's economic slowdown on the US stock market, accusations of Chinese cyber theft of US government workers' personal data, and continued maritime tensions. Impacts China's climate change commitments will improve its international image, but will not reduce tensions on other issues. Washington will impose sanctions if it believes China is breaking the new cybercrime agreement. US politics ahead of next year's presidential election will put more strain on China-US relations. Dialogue on the South China Sea is unlikely to bear fruit while Washington's policy is undecided.


2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mónica Serrano

AbstractWhile critics have claimed that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a North-South polarising issue and is therefore controversial, this is a deliberate misrepresentation in a rhetorical war led by a small minority of UN member states. The first section of this article briefly reviews the evolution of this emerging norm from its inception in the 2001 report by the International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention (ICISS), to its endorsement in 2005 by more than 150 heads of states in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, to its more recent configuration in a three-pillar structure. The next part seeks to identify the main criticisms that have been levelled at R2P. It touches on some of the myths and allegations that have long accompanied R2P, as well as on the chief legitimate concerns underlying the shift towards implementation. The third and concluding section briefly touches upon the impact of the interventions in Libya and Côte D'Ivoire upon the evolving R2P consensus, and critically assesses the implications of a normative strategy that has put a premium on unanimity and unqualified consensus.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 30-38
Author(s):  
Rinor REXHEPI ◽  
Vigan SAHITI

Public diplomacy which is part of soft power is a branch of diplomacy which has recently taken place and importance in the agendas of large and small states. This segment of diplomacy includes a series of methods and maneuvers which bring positive results to the country it uses and promotes for its own interests. Sports diplomacy is an important dimension of a country's public diplomacy, which has an important and influential role. Different countries aim to use sports diplomacy in the most effective way in favor and profit of their country, and one of these countries is the state of Kosovo. During our work we have tried to present the impact of Kosovo sports diplomacy and its role in improving the international image. Through descriptive, comparative, analytical methods as well as through interviews we have tried to shed light on how much sports diplomacy has influenced the improvement of Kosovo's international image. With the method of interviews, we have interviewed 3 experts in sports diplomacy, and we have analyzed these interviews by implementing the comparison with materials and scientific facts which are related to public diplomacy, with an emphasis on sports diplomacy. In conclusion, we can say that sports diplomacy in Kosovo should be given great importance in order to achieve greater results. Kosovo and its competent institutions need to develop specific strategies and investments for its sports diplomacy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
Pedro Emanuel Mendes ◽  

This article develops an analysis of the impact of the historical ecumenical pattern of portuguese foreign policy on the European Union’s external relations. Its main objective is to identify Portugal’s influence on developing the European Union’s (eu) external relations, namely the holding of international summits in the framework of the portuguese eu presidencies. The article is structured in two main parts. First, the article theorises Portugal’s role as a Pivot State in the eu’s external relations, underlining Portugal’s current foreign policy’s identity and normative characteristics. Secondly, the article presents an analysis of Portugal’s role in the organisation of international summits. Its central argument concerns the explanation of Portugal’s contribution to the eu in terms of European foreign policy, namely in the sophistication of the eu’s external relations and its international image.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 19-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Shusterman ◽  
Michelle Godwin

When the United Nations (un) agreed on a definition of the Responsibility to Protect (r2p) at the 2005 World Summit, the two paragraphs it endorsed articulated what r2p stands for, giving the concept a focused but narrow remit around protecting populations specifically from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in armed conflict. In its next paragraph, the un Membership reiterated concerns on the impact of armed conflict on children echoing the landmark 1612 Resolution by the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict (caac) adopted a few weeks before. Though side-by-side in the text, caac and r2p were not linked. To this day, for international practitioners in emergency responses, the interaction between both remains unclear. While this simultaneous peak moment for r2p and caac may have occurred by chance, this article describes how both concepts (as advocacy tools and instruments for practitioners to ‘respond’) emerged out of similar concern for protecting civilians – including children – in conflict. However, the link between both concepts should not be overstated. While r2p and caac fit together for the intentions they share, this happened more coincidentally than purposefully. This article argues, taking an international practitioner’s perspective, that both concepts should not be understood as always operating at the same level. caac has grown from an advocacy platform to an umbrella of different programmes, responses, tools and frameworks, including the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (mrm) on Children and Armed Conflict. Even if applied with variable success, these tools and approaches under the caac agenda chart some ways practitioners can hope to do more towards protecting children in conflict. But for those same practitioners, delivering on a Responsibility to Protect is a different question – one where their ‘responsibility’ is at best secondary and implicit, because r2p sits squarely as a primary and explicit responsibility of states – who are also the ultimate duty bearers for children’s rights. While the echoes of a child rights agenda can be heard in the conversation around r2p, and while r2p can help frame and drive efforts by child protection practitioners to respond to some of the worst situations children face, r2p is, for the protection agency field officer, an aspirational goal, necessarily out of reach.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jutta Brunnée ◽  
Stephen Toope

AbstractThe rapid rise of the responsibility to protect provides us with a unique opportunity to consider the impact of a decade or so of determined norm entrepreneurship. The responsibility to protect has not yet become a binding norm of international law, and in this article we examine what factors are holding back or promoting this development. We draw on an 'interactional' account of international law, which focuses on three inter-locking elements. First, legal norms are social norms and as such they are connected to social practice – they must be grounded in shared understandings. Second, what distinguishes law from other types of social ordering is not so much form or pedigree, as adherence to specific criteria of legality. When norm creation meets these criteria and, third, is matched with norm application that also satisfies the legality requirements, international law will have legitimacy and generate a sense of commitment among those to whom it is addressed. After highlighting key steps in the norm building process so far, from the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to the General Assembly debate in 2009, we offer a brief sketch of our theoretical framework, and employ it to examine the trajectory of the responsibility to protect norm, concluding with an assessment of its current and potential status as binding law. Although the responsibility to protect, including its potential for the collectively authorized use of force, is increasingly supported by globally shared understandings, the norm falls short on several of the legality criteria. Furthermore, given the inconsistent practice on protective use of force, no practice of legality can be said to have evolved. Proponents of the norm face a lot of hard work ahead.


2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

What does the world's engagement with the unfolding crisis in Darfur tell us about the impact of the Iraq war on the norm of humanitarian intervention? Is a global consensus about a “responsibility to protect” more or less likely? There are at least three potential answers to these questions. Some argue that the merging of strategic interests and humanitarian goods amplified by the intervention in Afghanistan makes it more likely that the world's most powerful states will act to prevent or halt humanitarian crises. Others insist that the widespread perception that the United States and its allies “abused” humanitarian justifications to legitimate its invasion of Iraq has set back efforts to build a global consensus about humanitarian action. A third group argues that the “responsibility to protect” inhibits the potential for abuse and, as a result, consensus is likely to strengthen post-Iraq for precisely this reason. Through a detailed study of the international engagement with Darfur, I suggest that the latter two arguments have merit but need to be adjusted. I argue that the humanitarian intervention norm has changed in two subtle ways. First, while the strength of the norm itself has not changed, the credibility of the United States and U.K. as “norm carriers” has been significantly undermined. Second, while the “responsibility to protect” has been invoked to support international activism, it has also re-legitimated anti-interventionist arguments.


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