Inference and Its Role in Rational Action

2020 ◽  
pp. 194-209
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Reasoned Action ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Rational Action ◽  
Wide Scope ◽  
Rational Actions

Action, like knowledge, is portrayed in this chapter as having grounds, but neither acting nor knowing requires a basis in inference. We can view agency as information-responsive, reasons-responsive, and rational without endorsing such intellectualist views. Acting for a reason need not be reasoned action. Beliefs or perceptible cues can guide intentional action without constituting knowledge. Intentions may have wide scope and complex content, much as beliefs can have complex propositional objects, and this enables a single intention to govern multiple deeds. Rational actions, moreover, are immensely various, extending to things we do rationally, without these actions being reason-based or even intentional. Granted, learning how to do many of the important things we do, say in speaking, playing instruments, and hiking, normally requires gaining propositional knowledge along the developmental route. Nonetheless, some propositional knowledge is like a ladder that, once having climbed up on it, we can do without.

Knowledge, Action, and Defeasibility

2021 ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Carlotta Pavese
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Extreme Form ◽  
Know How ◽  
Center Stage

This essay reviews some motivations for a ‘knowledge-centered psychology’—a psychology where knowledge enters center stage in an explanation of intentional action (Section 8.2). Then it outlines a novel argument for the claim that knowledge is required for intentional action (Section 8.3) and discusses some of its consequences, in particular for the debate on the defeasibility of know-how. Section 8.4 argues that a knowledge-centered psychology motivates the intellectualist view that know-how is a species of know-that. In its more extreme form, the view is committed to an epistemologically substantial claim—i.e., that the epistemic profile of know-how is the same as that of propositional knowledge. Now, it is widely believed that know-that can be defeated by undermining and rebutting defeaters (e.g., Chisholm 1966; Goldman 1986; Pollock and Cruz 1999; Bergmann 2000). If that is correct, one corollary of intellectualism is that the defeasibility of know-how patterns with that of knowledge. A knowledge-centered psychology does predict that, for it predicts that both know-how and knowledge are defeated when one’s ability to intentionally act is defeated. In Section 8.5, by replying to a challenge raised in the recent literature (Carter and Navarro 2018), I argue that this prediction is actually borne out.

scholarly journals Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Ann Springle ◽  
Justin Humphreys
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Alternative Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Causal Theory Of Action ◽  
Theoretical Support ◽  
The Right

AbstractIntellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, and consequently that the knowledge involved in skill is propositional. In support of this view, the intentional action argument holds that since skills manifest in intentional action and since intentional action necessarily depends on propositional knowledge, skills necessarily depend on propositional knowledge. We challenge this argument, and suggest that instructive representations, as opposed to propositional attitudes, can better account for an agent’s reasons for action. While a propositional-causal theory of action, according to which intentional action must be causally produced “in the right way” by an agent’s proposition-involving reasons, has long held sway, we draw on Elizabeth Anscombe’s insights offer a path toward an alternative theory of action. In so doing, we reject the implicitly Cartesian conception of knowledge at the core of the intentional action argument, while hanging on to the idea that mental states are representations of a certain kind. Our argument provides theoretical support for anti-intellectualism by equipping philosophers with an account of non-propositional, practical content.

scholarly journals Rasionalitas Beragama Pekerja Seks Komersial (PSK)

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-137
Author(s):  
Rahmi Putri ◽  
Syafruddin Syafruddin
Keyword(s):  
Analytical Tool ◽  
Rational Action ◽  
Economic Sector ◽  
Depth Interview ◽  
The World ◽  
Qualitative Descriptive ◽  
Rationality Theory ◽  
Descriptive Method ◽  
Rational Actions

This paper aims to explore religious rationality among prostitutes. This study is a case study with a qualitative descriptive method at the Panti Sosial Karya Wanita Andam Dewi Solok. Data was collected using in-depth interview techniques. Using Max Weber's rationality theory as an analytical tool, this study found several important findings. First, the choice to enter the world of prostitution is a rational action taken by prostitutes. The act of prostitution that is carried out is an action that is goal-oriented (instrumentally rational). Actions of prostitution are rationally strived to gain utility, either to show "himself" as a woman or as a person who is responsible in his family. Second, for prostitutes, between prostitution and religion, both are profitable. Prostitution can empower families and improve the economic sector, while religion can reduce and eliminate the sin of prostitution. Religion is not only interpreted as a doctrine that only regulates ritual aspects such as prayer, fasting and all kinds of things, but more than that religion is interpreted as an antidote for any sexual act committed in prostitution.

Explaining Planned Behavior and Reasoned Action

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (31) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eddie M. Clark
Keyword(s):  
Planned Behavior ◽  
Reasoned Action

Pengaruh Sikap dan Norma Subjektif Terrhadap Niat Gelagat Kepatuhan Cukai Jualan Tempatan

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zainol Bidin ◽  
Zolkafli Hussin ◽  
Shalihen Mohd Salleh
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Reasoned Action ◽  
Reasoned Action

Literatur cukai lalu menyentuh tentang banyak pemboleh ubah yang boleh mempengaruhi gelagat kepatuhan cukai terutama yang berkaitan dengan cukai langsung. Namun begitu, pemboleh ubah niat gelagat tidak banyak digunakan sebagai tumpuan utama sedangkan ia dikenal pasti sebagai pemboleh ubah anteseden bagi gelagat kepatuhan. Justeru, kajian ini dijalankan untuk mengenal pasti pemboleh ubah yang mempengaruhi niat gelagat kepatuhan cukai jualan tempatan, iaitu salah satu komponen cukai tidak langsung. Teori Tindakan Beralasan (Theory of Reasoned Action) yang dibangunkan oleh Fishbein dan Ajzen (1975) digunakan sebagai asas kajian. Sejumlah 338 pelesen cukai jualan tempatan di Semenanjung Malaysia telah terlibat sebagai responden kajian. Kaedah regresi berganda digunakan bagi melihat hubung kait antara sikap dan norma subjektif terhadap niat gelagat kepatuhan. Hasil kajian mendapati bahawa pemboleh ubah sikap dan norma subjektif masing-masing mempengaruhi secara positif dan signifi kan terhadap niat gelagat. Sikap dan norma subjektif dapat menerangkan 64% varian dalam niat gelagat kepatuhan cukai jualan tempatan. Implikasi dan cadangan terhadap pembuat dasar turut dibincangkan.   Kata kunci: Sikap, norma subjektif, niat gelagat, cukai jualan tempatan.

Amâlî (Imla) As Arabic Writing Technique

Metahumaniora ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 128
Author(s):  
Dicky Rachmat Pauji
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Teaching And Learning ◽  
Arabic Language ◽  
Wide Scope ◽  
Writing Style ◽  
Learning Space ◽  
Islamic School ◽  
Related Literature ◽  
Language And Literature ◽  
The Subject

Amâlî (Imla) is a methodology used in studying Arabic language and literature that has a very wide scope. Amâlî (Imla) itself can be translated as: to dictate, to add, to fill in and etc. Amâlî (Imla) may also be interpreted further by the following narration: A teacher (ustadz) comes to a place like a mosque, an Islamic school or any learning space in general. In the process of teaching and learning, all that are spoken by the teacher is written down by the students on pieces of paper they had prepared earlier then be compiled into a book which will be preserved. This paper presents a brief summary of Amâlî (Imla) as a methodology which is discussed in many Amâlî (Imla) related literature works written from the beginning of 7th century until the 14th century. The subject Amâlî (Imla) is written in exceedingly diverse manner, unique to each of numerous known authors. This paper also discusses about various meaning of the word Amâlî (Imla) that has been interpreted differently among authors. In addition, the method of separating chapters and other minor distinct writing style that each of various groups of Amâlî (Imla) authors had developed was presented in this work. And lastly, this paper discusses the fact that Amâlî (Imla) related textbook authors were not only originated from the Middle East, but also from regions such as Iran (Huzistan) and Andalusia

Aristotle's Rational Powers and the Explanation of Action

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-79
Author(s):  
Filip Grgić
Keyword(s):  
Rational Actions

In this paper, I discuss Aristotle's notion of rational powers as presented in his Metaphysics Θ.2 and Θ.5. I argue, first, that his account cannot serve as the model for explaining human rational actions in general. The role of rational powers is restricted to the explanation of arts and their exercises, including the exercises of knowledge through teaching. The exercises of character virtues do not follow the same pattern that is discernible in the exercises of rational powers. Second, I try to show that the similarities between Aristotle's rational powers and powers as they are commonly understood in contemporary accounts of agency, especially regarding their two-sidedness and up-to-usness, are only superficial. Aristotle's rational powers are not genuinely two-sided, and their being up to the agent has nothing to do with the availability of alternative courses of action.

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