Moral Sensibility

Author(s):  
Owen Ware

This chapter forms the next main thesis of the present study: the synthetic path of the second Critique is broader in scope, since Kant seeks to reveal a necessary connection between our consciousness of the moral law and our capacity to feel pleasure and displeasure. The chapter picks up where Chapter 3 left off by providing a close reading of Kant’s theory of moral sensibility in the Critique of Practical Reason. Two important results follow. First, it is argued that debates over the role of moral feeling in Kant’s moral psychology have failed to acknowledge Kant’s emphasis on the first-personal character of feeling as a feature of our common experience of morality. Second, these debates have failed to connect Kant’s theory of moral sensibility to his project of justification, which the present chapter aims to remedy.

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-40
Author(s):  
Josip Guc

Differentiation of morality and legality is one of the fundamental topoi of Kant?s ethics. However, alongside it is often interpreted in too simple (and also sometimes wrong) manner, this differentiation does not demonstrate the whole complexity of Kant?s understanding of moral correctness of certain types of will determination. Thus the goal of this paper is to point out different kinds of morally relevant actions (which are not limited to morality and legality), and then to explain to which extend each of them can be understood as morally correct. For that purpose we will thoroughly consider the issue of determination of will, and then also some of the problematic interpretations of legality and morality, where as a specific issue arises the one of equating morality with autonomy and legality with heteronomy (especially in domestic philosophical works). The issue of different levels of moral correctness of action will also be examined concerning the phenomenon of moral feeling. Particular attention will be given to the role of the kind of action that refer to having direct inclination toward morally correct action, even though it is not directly determined by the moral law. The analysis of these issues brings us to conclusion that legality is satisfied by an action which is outwardly done in a way it would be done by an autonomously determined will. Considering this, the determination of morality precedes the determination of legality. Other way around can be detected only in the process of education.


Author(s):  
John Deigh

The essays in this collection belong to the tradition of naturalism in ethics. Its program is to explain moral thought and action as wholly natural phenomena, that is, to explain such thought and action without recourse to either a reality separate from that of the natural world or volitional powers that operate independently of natural forces. Naturalism’s greatest exponent in ancient thought was Aristotle. In modern thought Hume and Freud stand out as the most influential contributors to the tradition. All three thinkers made the study of human psychology fundamental to their work in ethics. All three built their theories on studies of human desires and emotions and assigned to reason the role of guiding the actions that spring from our desires and emotions toward ends that promise self-fulfillment and away from ends that are self-destructive. The collection’s essays draw inspiration from their ideas and are arranged to follow the lead of Aristotle’s and Hume’s ethics. The first three survey and examine general theories of emotion and motivation. The next two focus on emotions that are central to human sociability. Turning to distinctively cognitive powers necessary for moral thought and action, the sixth and seventh essays discuss the role of empathy in moral judgment and defend Bernard Williams’s controversial account of practical reason. The final five essays use the studies in moral psychology of the previous essays to treat questions in ethics and social philosophy. The treatment of these questions exemplifies the implementation of a naturalist program in these disciplines.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann

AbstractWhat is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice. Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant's attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve's challenge.


2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 64-89
Author(s):  
Rocco Porcheddu

Heiko Puls’ work Sittliches Bewusstsein und Kategorischer Imperativ in Kants Grundlegung: Ein Kommentar zum dritten Abschnitt, presents an attempt to show that, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant’s argumentation for the objective value of the categorical imperative is almost based upon the same principle as the one presented in the second Critique. More precisely, Puls claims that, like in the Critique of Practical Reason, the Groundwork operates with some kind of fact of reason-theory, which means that our consciousness of the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of our freedom of will. Accordingly, there is no conclusion from a kind of non-moral consciousness of freedom to the freedom of will and from here to the objective value of the categorical imperative, as many interpreters assume. Due to the ambitiousness of his main thesis and his detailed and subtle way of arguing, Puls’ work represents an important and innovative contribution to recent research on Kant’s Groundwork. Nevertheless, his interpretations sometimes seem to favour analysis of loose philological relationships over closer looks on the contexts of passages. Or he focuses excessively on isolated textual evidences for his readings without appropriately recognising the various other evidences against it. In what follows, I give examples for this criticism.


Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer

This book provides an account of the moral psychology behind our attitudes to animals. Its main thesis is that behind both our positive and negative attitudes to animals is an underlying concern that animals pose a threat to our humanness. The book takes an interdisciplinary approach, drawing from research in philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, law, history, sociology, economics, and anthropology. The main thesis of the book is developed by looking at recent research on the phenomenon of dehumanization. Though dehumanization research is often applied only to human groups, it is argued that dehumanization also has implications for how we think about animals. The book provides a critical survey of leading theories about the role of animals in human evolutionary history, the psychology of meat-eating and keeping animals as pets, feelings of fear and disgust toward animals, the use of animal minds to determine their moral status, and the “expanding moral circle” hypothesis. Strategies are also offered for revising our attitudes toward animals and for thinking about the implications of psychological obstacles in meeting our moral obligations to animals. Chapters 2–5 present a new picture of the moral psychology behind our attitudes to animals. Chapters 6–8 lay out an account of how we should think about ethical issues concerning animals, given the psychological details provided in chapters 2–5.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Sticker

Kant was a keen psychological observer and theorist of the forms, mechanisms and sources of self-deception. In this Element, the author discusses the role of rationalizing/Vernünfteln for Kant's moral psychology, normative ethics and philosophical methodology. By drawing on the full breadth of examples of rationalizing Kant discusses, the author shows how rationalizing can extend to general features of morality and corrupt rational agents thoroughly (albeit not completely and not irreversibly). Furthermore, the author explains the often-overlooked roles common human reason, empirical practical reason and even pure practical reason play for rationalizing. Kant is aware that rationality is a double-edged sword; reason is the source of morality and of our dignity, but it also enables us to seemingly justify moral transgressions to ourselves, and it creates an interest in this justification in the first place. Finally, this Element discusses whether Kant's ethical theory itself can be criticised as a product of rationalizing.


2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Kilcoyne

This essay posits a challenge to the continued reading of The Great Hunger (1942) as a realist depiction of the Irish small-farming class in the nineteen forties. The widespread critical acceptance of the poem as a socio-historical ‘documentary’ both relies upon and propagates an outmoded notion of authenticity based upon the implicit fallacy that Kavanagh's body of work designates a quintessence of Irishness in contradistinction to his Revivalist predecessors. In 1959 Kavanagh referred to this delusion as constituting his ‘dispensation’, for indeed it did provide a poetic niche for the young poet. Kavanagh's acknowledgement of this dispensation came with his rejection of all prescriptive literary symbols. While this iconoclasm is widely recognised in his later career, the relevance of The Great Hunger to this question continues to be overlooked. In fact, this poem contains his strongest dialectic upon the use of symbols – such as the peasant farmer – in designating an authentic national literature. The close reading of The Great Hunger offered here explores the poem's central deconstruction of ruralism and authenticity. The final ‘apocalypse of clay’ is the poem's collapse under the stress of its own deconstructed symbolism; the final scream sounds the death knell to Kavanagh's adherence to his authentic dispensation.


2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Patterson

This article addresses the increasingly popular approach to Freud and his work which sees him primarily as a literary writer rather than a psychologist, and takes this as the context for an examination of Joyce Crick's recent translation of The Interpretation of Dreams. It claims that translation lies at the heart of psychoanalysis, and that the many interlocking and overlapping implications of the word need to be granted a greater degree of complexity. Those who argue that Freud is really a creative writer are themselves doing a work of translation, and one which fails to pay sufficiently careful attention to the role of translation in writing itself (including the notion of repression itself as a failure to translate). Lesley Chamberlain's The Secret Artist: A Close Reading of Sigmund Freud is taken as an example of the way Freud gets translated into a novelist or an artist, and her claims for his ‘bizarre poems' are criticized. The rest of the article looks closely at Crick's new translation and its claim to be restoring Freud the stylist, an ordinary language Freud, to the English reader. The experience of reading Crick's translation is compared with that of reading Strachey's, rather to the latter's advantage.


2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Wilfried Warning

Abstract In general, commentators consider Gen 46:8–27 as a secondary addition. Close reading brings to light the structuring role of verses 18 and 25 („these were the sons of Zilpah / Bilhah … and these she bore to Jacob, sixteen souls / seven souls”). In a ten-part outline based on the personal name (PN) „Jacob” v. 18 takes the fourth and v.25 the fourth from last positions. In Genesis 37–50 the noun נפש „soul” occurs thirteen times – now v. 18 takes the sixth and v. 25 the sixth-from-last positions. The thirteen-part table based on the PN „Ruben” stands out for two reasons: Firstly, in Genesis the term „Ruben the first born of Jacob” shows up only twice, namely in the first (34,23) and last (46,8) texts. Secondly, as regards content 37,22 and 42,22 are correlated. In the 13-part outline they take the sixth and sixth-from-last positions respectively. The distinct distribution of these terms indicates that the passage per se is well structured and, what is more, at the same time it has been skillfully integrated in Gen 37–50 and in the Jacob-Joseph cycle.


Author(s):  
John Deigh

This essay is a study of the nature of moral judgment. Its main thesis is that moral judgment is a type of judgment defined by its content and not its psychological profile. The essay arrives at this thesis through a critical examination of Hume’s sentimentalism and the role of empathy in its account of moral judgment. The main objection to Hume’s account is its exclusion of people whom one can describe as making moral judgments though they have no motivation to act on them. Consideration of such people, particularly those with a psychopathic personality, argues for a distinction between different types of moral judgment in keeping with the essay’s main thesis. Additional support for the main thesis is then drawn from Piaget’s theory of moral judgment in children.


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