Linguistic Pragmatism and Weather Reporting

Author(s):  
John Collins

Linguistic pragmatism claims that what we literally say goes characteristically beyond what the linguistic properties themselves mandate. In this book, John Collins provides a novel defence of this doctrine, arguing that linguistic meaning alone fails to fix truth conditions. While this position is supported by a range of theorists, Collins shows that it naturally follows from a syntactic thesis concerning the relative sparseness of what language alone can provide to semantic interpretation. Language–and by extension meaning–provides constraints upon what a speaker can literally say, but does not characteristically encode any definite thing to say. Collins then defends this doctrine against a range of alternatives and objections, focusing in particular on an analysis of weather reports: ‘it is raining/snowing/sunny’. Such reporting is mostly location-sensitive in the sense that the utterance is true or not depending upon whether it is raining/snowing/sunny at the location of the utterance, rather than some other location. Collins offers a full analysis of the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of weather reports, including many novel data. He shows that the constructions lack the linguistic resources to support the common literal locative readings. Other related phenomena are discussed such as the Saxon genitive, colour predication, quantifier domain restriction, and object deletion.

Author(s):  
Zoltán Gendler Szabó

Semantics is the study of linguistic meaning, or more precisely, the study of the relation between linguistic expressions and their meanings. This article gives a sketch of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics; it is the intention of the rest of this article to make it more precise. It starts by considering three alternative characterizations and explain what the article finds problematic about each of them. This leads to the discussion of utterance interpretation, which situates semantics and pragmatics in a larger enterprise. But the characterization of their contrast remains sketchy until the final section, where the article discusses how truth-conditions and the notion of what is said fit into the picture.


2019 ◽  
pp. 87-119
Author(s):  
J. P. Studd

If her view is to diffuse charges of mystical censorship, the relativist needs a well-motivated account of what prevents our quantifying over an absolutely comprehensive domain. But relativists may seek to meet this challenge in different ways. One option is to draw on more familiar cases of quantifier domain restriction in order to motivate the thesis that a quantifier’s domain is always subject to restriction. An alternative is to permit unrestricted quantifiers but maintain that even these fail to attain absolute generality on the grounds that the universe of discourse is always open to expansion. This chapter outlines restrictionist and expansionist variants of relativism and argues that the importance of the distinction comes out in two influential objections that have been levelled against relativism.


Author(s):  
John Collins

This chapter articulates and defends linguistic pragmatism as a linguistic hypothesis that language alone underdetermines truth conditions (or what is said), and doesn’t even provide a variable licence for the truth conditions of an utterance in a context. Linguistic meaning is characterized, therefore, in terms of constraints upon what can be literally said with a linguistic structure, without the presumption that the linguistic properties of an utterance in a context will determine a content. The hypothesis is explained in terms of the resources language makes available to content, differentiated from related positions, and defended against numerous objections, especially those that argue for an essential role for minimal propositions in accounting for aspects of what is said.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Voltolini ◽  

There is definitely a family resemblance between what contemporary contextualism maintains in philosophy of language and some of the claims about meaning put forward by the later Wittgenstein. Yet the main contextualist thesis, namely that linguistic meaning undermines truth-conditions, was not defended by Wittgenstein. If a claim in this regard can be retrieved in Wittgenstein despite his manifest antitheoretical attitude, it is instead that truth-conditions trivially supervene on linguistic meaning. There is, however, another Wittgensteinian claim that truly has a contextualist flavour, namely that linguistic meaning is itself wide-contextual. To be sure, this claim does not lead to the eliminativist/intentionalist conception of linguistic meaning that radical contextualists have recently developed. Rather, it goes together with a robust conception of linguistic meaning as intrinsically normative. Yet it may explain why Wittgenstein is taken to be a forerunner of contemporary contextualism.


2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-87
Author(s):  
Richard Vallée

“Imported” is a member of a large family of adjectives, including “enemy”, “domestic”, “local”, “exported”, “foreign”. Call these terms contextuals. Contextuals are prima facie context-sensitive expressions in that the same contextual sentence can have different truth-values, and hence different truth-conditions, from utterance to utterance. I use Perry’s multipropositionalist framework to get a new angle on contextuals. I explore the idea that the lexical linguistic meaning of contextual adjectives introduces two conditions to the cognitive significance of an utterance. These conditions contain a variable, y, that does not correspond to any lexical component in the sentence. This is the available tool for letting the speakers’ intentions, or what the speakers have in mind, play a semantic role. My view focuses on the complex condition that linguistic meaning (as type) sometimes semantically determines.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 41-60
Author(s):  
Kepa Korta ◽  
Larraitz Zubeldia

Two kinds of meanings are usually associated to the Basque particle bide.1 On the one hand, it has been taken to point to the indirect nature of the speaker’s evidence for the truth of the proposition put forward. According to this view, it would be a sort of inferential particle. On the other hand, bide has been associated to the expression of a certain degree of belief or certainty on the truth of the proposition. This double dimension of bide resembles various aspects of the meaning and use of another Basque particle – omen. The morpho-syntactic behaviour of these two particles is practically identical, and their semantics and pragmatics invite a close comparison. Thus, starting from our conclusions regarding omen, we explore the similarities and differences between both particles. We find two main differences. First, bide encodes a doxastic dimension that is absent from the semantic meaning of omen. And, second, bide can be taken to be an illocutionary force indicator that does not contribute to the proposition expressed, while omen does contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance.


Author(s):  
Vanda Božičević

The article discusses the problem of metaphor from the semantical point of view, at the lexical level. Alter havins explained why do metaphors represent a touch stone of any semantical theory, and after having given a brief survey of possible theoretical solutions of the problem, the author exposes her own view of metaphor based on late Wittgenstein's theory of meaning. On the assumption that there should be no artificial break between semantics and pragmatics the author argues that the same semantical, pragmatical an epistemological principles govern the production and interpretation of literal and metaphorical language. The difference between literal and metaphorical is understood as a token, and not a type difference, depending on what is considered to be the common meaning of a word. Metaphor Is defined as a semantic innovation, nomination, realized by the extension of literal meaning. Arguments for her thesis the author finds in the analysis of the processes of language acquistion.


Author(s):  
Paul M. Pietroski

This chapter characterizes meanings in terms of certain generative procedures. We can begin to locate the natural phenomenon of linguistic meaning by focusing on (Chomsky-style) examples of constrained homophony. Two or more lexical items can connect distinct meanings with the same pronunciation; and phrases like ‘ready to please’ are similarly homophonous. But as ‘eager to please’ and ‘easy to please’ illustrate, phrasal homophony is constrained. Such facts provide important clues about what meanings are, and how they can(not) be combined. The details provide reasons for identifying the languages that children naturally acquire with biologically implemented procedures, and not sets of expressions. There are English procedures; but English is not a thing that speakers share and use to communicate. In this context, some initial reasons are given for doubting that the relevant procedures generate sentences that have truth conditions.


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