Do we represent peripersonal space?

2021 ◽  
pp. 139-154
Author(s):  
Colin Klein

Work in both animals and humans has demonstrated that the brain specifically tracks the space near the body—the so-called ‘peripersonal space’ (PPS). These representations appear to be multimodal and expressed in body-centred coordinates. They also play an important role in defence of the body from threat, manual action within PPS, and the use of tools—the latter, notably, ‘extending’ PPS to encompass the tool itself. Yet different authors disagree about important aspects of these representations, including how many there are. I suggest that the questions about the nature and number of PPS representations cannot be separated from the question of the mathematical basis of the corresponding representational spaces. I distinguish cartographic from functional bases for representation, suggesting that the latter provides both a plausible account and support a single-representation view. I conclude with reflections on functional bases and what they show about representation in cognitive science.

2021 ◽  
pp. 315-330
Author(s):  
Michael S.A. Graziano

The brain evolved to give special representation to the space immediately around the body. One of the most obvious adaptive uses of that peripersonal space is self-protection. It is a safety buffer zone, and intrusions can trigger a suite of protective behaviours. Perhaps less obvious is the possible relationship between that complex protective mechanism and social signalling. Standing tall, cringing, power poses and handshakes, even coquettish tilts of the head that expose the neck, may all relate in some manner to that safety buffer, signalling to others that one’s protective mechanisms are heightened (when anxious) or reduced (when confident). Here I propose that some of our most fundamental human emotional expressions such as smiling, laughing, and crying may also have a specific evolutionary relationship to the buffer zone around the body, deriving ultimately from the reflexive actions that protect us.


Author(s):  
Evan Thompson

Cognitive neuroscience tends to conceptualize mindfulness meditation as inner observation of a private mental realm of thoughts, feelings, and body sensations, and tries to model mindfulness as instantiated in neural networks visible through brain imaging tools such as EEG and fMRI. This approach confuses the biological conditions for mindfulness with mindfulness itself, which, as classically described, consists in the integrated exercise of a whole host of cognitive and bodily skills in situated and ethically directed action. From an enactive perspective, mindfulness depends on internalized social cognition and is a mode of skillful, embodied cognition that depends directly not only on the brain, but also on the rest of the body and the physical, social, and cultural environment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (S1) ◽  
pp. 121-126
Author(s):  
Anna Berti

AbstractYears ago, it was demonstrated (e.g., Rizzolatti et al. in Handbook of neuropsychology, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, 2000) that the brain does not encode the space around us in a homogeneous way, but through neural circuits that map the space relative to the distance that objects of interest have from the body. In monkeys, relatively discrete neural systems, characterized by neurons with specific neurophysiological responses, seem to be dedicated either to represent the space that can be reached by the hand (near/peripersonal space) or to the distant space (far/extrapersonal space). It was also shown that the encoding of spaces has dynamic aspects because they can be remapped by the use of tools that trigger different actions (e.g., Iriki et al. 1998). In this latter case, the effect of the tool depends on the modulation of personal space, that is the space of our body. In this paper, I will review and discuss selected research, which demonstrated that also in humans: 1 spaces are encoded in a dynamic way; 2 encoding can be modulated by the use of tool that the system comes to consider as parts of the own body; 3 body representations are not fixed, but they are fragile and subject to change to the point that we can incorporate not only the tools necessary for action, but even limbs belonging to other people. What embodiment of tools and of alien limb tell us about body representations is then briefly discussed.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Thompson

Cognitive neuroscience tends to conceptualize mindfulness meditation as inner observation of a private mental realm of thoughts, feelings, and body sensations, and tries to model mindfulness as instantiated in neural networks visible through brain imaging tools such as EEG and fMRI. This approach confuses the biological conditions for mindfulness with mindfulness itself, which, as classically described, consists in the integrated exercise of a whole host of cognitive and bodily skills in situated and ethically directed action. From an enactive perspective, mindfulness depends on internalized social cognition and is a mode of skillful, embodied cognition that depends directly not only on the brain, but also on the rest of the body and the physical, social, and cultural environment.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flavia Cardini ◽  
Natalie Fatemi-Ghomi ◽  
Katarzyna Gajewska-Knapik ◽  
Victoria Gooch ◽  
Jane Elizabeth Aspell

Our ability to maintain a coherent bodily self despite continuous changes within and outside our body relies on the highly flexible multisensory representation of the body, and of the space surrounding it: the peripersonal space (PPS). The aim of our study was to investigate whether during pregnancy - when extremely rapid changes in body size and shape occur - a likewise rapid plastic reorganization of the neural representation of the PPS occurs. We used an audio-tactile integration task to measure the PPS boundary at different stages of pregnancy. We found that in the second trimester of pregnancy and postpartum women did not show differences in their PPS size as compared to the control group (non-pregnant women). However, in the third trimester the PPS was larger than the controls' PPS and the shift between representation of near and far space was more gradual. We therefore conclude that during pregnancy the brain adapts to the sudden bodily changes, by expanding the representation of the space around the body. This may represent a mechanism to protect the vulnerable abdomen from injury from surrounding objects.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent C. Müller ◽  
Matej Hoffmann

The contribution of the body to cognition and control in natural and artificial agents is increasingly described as “offloading computation from the brain to the body,” where the body is said to perform “morphological computation.” Our investigation of four characteristic cases of morphological computation in animals and robots shows that the “offloading” perspective is misleading. Actually, the contribution of body morphology to cognition and control is rarely computational, in any useful sense of the word. We thus distinguish (1) morphology that facilitates control, (2) morphology that facilitates perception, and the rare cases of (3) morphological computation proper, such as reservoir computing, where the body is actually used for computation. This result contributes to the understanding of the relation between embodiment and computation: The question for robot design and cognitive science is not whether computation is offloaded to the body, but to what extent the body facilitates cognition and control—how it contributes to the overall orchestration of intelligent behavior.


Author(s):  
Samuel B. Hunley ◽  
Arwen M. Marker ◽  
Stella F. Lourenco

Abstract. The current study investigated individual differences in the flexibility of peripersonal space (i.e., representational space near the body), specifically in relation to trait claustrophobic fear (i.e., fear of suffocating or being physically restricted). Participants completed a line bisection task with either a laser pointer (Laser condition), allowing for a baseline measure of the size of one’s peripersonal space, or a stick (Stick condition), which produces expansion of one’s peripersonal space. Our results revealed that individuals high in claustrophobic fear had larger peripersonal spaces than those lower in claustrophobic fear, replicating previous research. We also found that, whereas individuals low in claustrophobic fear demonstrated the expected expansion of peripersonal space in the Stick condition, individuals high in claustrophobic fear showed less expansion, suggesting decreased flexibility. We discuss these findings in relation to the defensive function of peripersonal space and reduced attentional flexibility associated with trait anxieties.


Author(s):  
M.P. Sutunkova ◽  
B.A. Katsnelson ◽  
L.I. Privalova ◽  
S.N. Solovjeva ◽  
V.B. Gurvich ◽  
...  

We conducted a comparative assessment of the nickel oxide nanoparticles toxicity (NiO) of two sizes (11 and 25 nm) according to a number of indicators of the body state after repeated intraperitoneal injections of these particles suspensions. At equal mass doses, NiO nanoparticles have been found to cause various manifestations of systemic subchronic toxicity with a particularly pronounced effect on liver, kidney function, the body’s antioxidant system, lipid metabolism, white and red blood, redox metabolism, spleen damage, and some disorders of nervous activity allegedly related to the possibility of nickel penetration into the brain from the blood. The relationship between the diameter and toxicity of particles is ambiguous, which may be due to differences in toxicokinetics, which is controlled by both physiological mechanisms and direct penetration of nanoparticles through biological barriers and, finally, unequal solubility.


Parasitology ◽  
1941 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 373-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gwendolen Rees

1. The structure of the proboscides of the larva of Dibothriorhynchus grossum (Rud.) is described. Each proboscis is provided with four sets of extrinsic muscles, and there is an anterior dorso-ventral muscle mass connected to all four proboscides.2. The musculature of the body and scolex is described.3. The nervous system consists of a brain, two lateral nerve cords, two outer and inner anterior nerves on each side, twenty-five pairs of bothridial nerves to each bothridium, four longitudinal bothridial nerves connecting these latter before their entry into the bothridia, four proboscis nerves arising from the brain, and a series of lateral nerves supplying the lateral regions of the body.4. The so-called ganglia contain no nerve cells, these are present only in the posterior median commissure which is therefore the nerve centre.


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