scholarly journals Looping Effects and the Cognitive Science of Mindfulness Meditation

Author(s):  
Evan Thompson

Cognitive neuroscience tends to conceptualize mindfulness meditation as inner observation of a private mental realm of thoughts, feelings, and body sensations, and tries to model mindfulness as instantiated in neural networks visible through brain imaging tools such as EEG and fMRI. This approach confuses the biological conditions for mindfulness with mindfulness itself, which, as classically described, consists in the integrated exercise of a whole host of cognitive and bodily skills in situated and ethically directed action. From an enactive perspective, mindfulness depends on internalized social cognition and is a mode of skillful, embodied cognition that depends directly not only on the brain, but also on the rest of the body and the physical, social, and cultural environment.

Author(s):  
Evan Thompson

Cognitive neuroscience tends to conceptualize mindfulness meditation as inner observation of a private mental realm of thoughts, feelings, and body sensations, and tries to model mindfulness as instantiated in neural networks visible through brain imaging tools such as EEG and fMRI. This approach confuses the biological conditions for mindfulness with mindfulness itself, which, as classically described, consists in the integrated exercise of a whole host of cognitive and bodily skills in situated and ethically directed action. From an enactive perspective, mindfulness depends on internalized social cognition and is a mode of skillful, embodied cognition that depends directly not only on the brain, but also on the rest of the body and the physical, social, and cultural environment.


2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (04) ◽  
pp. 943-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
SCOTT HOTTON ◽  
JEFF YOSHIMI

Historically cognition was understood as the result of processes occurring solely in the brain. Recently, however, cognitive scientists and philosophers studying "embodied" or "situated" cognition have begun emphasizing the role of the body and environment in which brains are situated, i.e. they view the brain as an "open system". However, these theorists frequently rely on dynamical systems which are traditionally viewed as closed systems. We address this tension by extending the framework of dynamical systems theory. We show how structures which appear in the state space of an embodied agent differ from those that appear in closed systems, and we show how these structures can be used to model representational processes in embodied agents. We focus on neural networks as models of embodied cognition.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey M. Greeson

Objective: To briefly review the effects of mindfulness on the mind, the brain, the body, and behavior. Methods: Selective review of MEDLINE, PsycINFO, and Google Scholar databases (2003—2008) using the terms ``mindfulness,'' ``meditation,'' ``mental health,'' ``physical health,'' ``quality of life,'' and ``stress reduction.'' A total of 52 exemplars of empirical and theoretical work were selected for review. Results: Both basic and clinical research indicate that cultivating a more mindful way of being is associated with less emotional distress, more positive states of mind, and better quality of life. In addition, mindfulness practice can influence the brain, the autonomic nervous system, stress hormones, the immune system, and health behaviors, including eating, sleeping, and substance use, in salutary ways. Conclusion: The application of cutting-edge technology toward understanding mindfulness— an ``inner technology''—is elucidating new ways in which attention, awareness, acceptance, and compassion may promote optimal health—in mind, body, relationships, and spirit.


2016 ◽  
Vol 371 (1693) ◽  
pp. 20150379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanne De Jaegher ◽  
Ezequiel Di Paolo ◽  
Ralph Adolphs

A recent framework inspired by phenomenological philosophy, dynamical systems theory, embodied cognition and robotics has proposed the interactive brain hypothesis (IBH). Whereas mainstream social neuroscience views social cognition as arising solely from events in the brain, the IBH argues that social cognition requires, in addition, causal relations between the brain and the social environment. We discuss, in turn, the foundational claims for the IBH in its strongest form; classical views of cognition that can be raised against the IBH; a defence of the IBH in the light of these arguments; and a response to this. Our goal is to initiate a dialogue between cognitive neuroscience and enactive views of social cognition. We conclude by suggesting some new directions and emphases that social neuroscience might take.


2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-81
Author(s):  
Ralph-Axel Müller

Although van der Velde's de Kamps's (vdV&dK) attempt to put syntactic processing into a broader context of combinatorial cognition is promising, their coverage of neuroscientific evidence is disappointing. Neither their case against binding by temporal coherence nor their arguments against recurrent neural networks are compelling. As an alternative, vdV&dK propose a blackboard model that is based on the assumption of special processors (e.g., lexical versus grammatical), but evidence from the cognitive neuroscience of language, which is, overall, less than supportive of such special processors, is not considered. As a consequence, vdV&dK's may be a clever model of syntactic processing, but it remains unclear how much we can learn from it with regard to biologically based human language.


Author(s):  
Colin W. Evers ◽  
Gabriele Lakomski

The influence of cognitive science on educational administration has been patchy. It has varied over four main accounts of cognition, which are, in historical order: behaviorism, functionalism, artificial neural networks, and cognitive neuroscience. These developments, at least as they may have concerned educational administration, go from the late 1940s up to the present day. There also has been a corresponding sequence of developments in educational administration, mainly motivated by accounts of the nature of science. The goal of producing a science of educational administration was dominated by the construal of science as a positivist enterprise. For much of the field’s early development, from the 1950s to the early 1970s, varieties of behaviorism were central, with brief excursions into functionalism. When large-scale alternatives to behaviorism finally began to emerge, they were mostly alternatives to science, and thus failed to comport with much of cognitive science. However, the emergence of postpositivist accounts of science has created the possibility for studies in administrator cognition to be informed by developments in neuroscience. These developments initially included the study of artificial neural networks and more recently have involved biologically realistic mathematical models that reflect work in cognitive neuroscience.


2021 ◽  
Vol - (6) ◽  
pp. 58-77
Author(s):  
Oleg Solovyov

Since Descartes “separation” of the Soul from the Body, we observe a complete confusion in their causal, functional, and semiotic relationships. However, in modern knowledge (about the informational activity of the human brain, the functional and causal properties of its neural networks, the functions of psychic phenomena during the processing of information in it, about the causal “ability” of information) it is time to put an end to this problem. Here, in order to explain what I am talking about, I will use the notion of “information” (which had been unknown by Descartes) regarding the “dispute” between Mind & Body (the Physicality and the Mentality) for “the right” to be a more fundamental ontology of Reality. I will do this by introducing an “arbitrator” — the Objective Reality. This goal is achieved through the study of information activity of the human brain. In the process of this study, it turns out that the information activity of the brain in principle cannot be carried out without mental phenomena. That is, it turns out that the classical physical causality, which operates in the neural networks of the brain, is not able, by itself, without mental phenomena, to implement the information operations that the human brain actually performs. It also turns out that the functional inclusion of mental phenomena (at least, the phenomena of subjective evaluation and mental images) in the neurophysiologic (by and large, physical) activity of the brain explains the possibility and necessity of functional inclusion in this information processing the phenomenon of freedom of choice. After all, the processing information in the brain through mental phenomena allows more than one degree of freedom than it is “allowed” by any physical process.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Balázs Kékesi ◽  
Attila Márton Farkas

A megtestesült kogníció hipotézisre építő kognitív nyelvészet szemszögéből vizsgálva a siket jelnyelv éppoly komplex és természetes nyelv, mint bármely beszélt nyelv. Ebben a megközelítésben a gesztusnyelv és a szónyelv szemantikáját egyaránt meghatározza az agy-test-környezet interakció. A környezetben történő számtalan cselekvési szituáció kognitív szinten rögzülő konzekvenciái, továbbá az interaktív szituációk szimulatív rekonstrukciója kulcsszerepet játszik a nyelvi kommunikáció és megértés folyamataiban. A tanulmány a megtestesült kogníció kutatásra támaszkodva a testhasználat és a nyelvhasználat közti szoros kapcsolatot mutatja be, majd a szituált konceptualizáció tézisének alapján a siket jelnyelv és a szónyelv közötti azonos szerkezeti alapok mellett hoz érveket. A tanulmány célja a siketekkel szembeni negatív előítéletek rombolása a kortárs kognitív tudomány segítségével, rámutatva arra, hogy a jelnyelv korántsem kezdetleges és fejletlen a szónyelvhez képest, sőt, a siket jelnyelvi kifejezések mutatják meg igazán, hogyan is működik a nyelv maga. Továbbá rámutatunk arra, hogy a vizuális természetű gesztusnyelv kognitív nyelvészeti megközelítése közelebb vihet az információs társadalomban egyre nagyobb szerepet kapó képi kommunikáció működésének jobb megértéséhez. --- The significance of deaf sign language within the context of communication culture’s transformation It seems clear when investigating sign language and verbal languages from the perspective of embodied cognition hypotheses based cognitive linguistics that both kinds of languages are natural. In this approach, the semantics of sign and verbal languages are equally assigned by the brain-body-environment interaction. The cognitive consequences of the numerous interactions with the world, and the cognitive ability to simulate those interactions in off-line mode, de-coupled from the environment, are crucial for gaining an understanding of communication and meaning. This paper throws light on the connection between the body and language from the perspective of embodied cognitive science, and argues that situated conceptualization is the most suitable thesis to understand the semantics of both sign and verbal languages. An additional aim of the paper is to help to reduce prejudice against deaf people by demonstrating that deaf sign language is far from being primitive, and moreover, it will show that sign language can facilitate a better understanding of how verbal languages really work. Keywords: embodied cognition, cognitive linguistics, conceptualization, sign language, prejudices


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Jihye Ryu ◽  
Elizabeth Torres

While attempting to bridge motor control and cognitive science, the nascent field of embodied cognition has primarily addressed intended, goal-oriented actions. Less explored, however, have been unintended motions. Such movements tend to occur largely beneath awareness, while contributing to the spontaneous control of redundant degrees of freedom across the body in motion. We posit that the consequences of such unintended actions implicitly contribute to our autonomous sense of action ownership and agency. We question whether biorhythmic activities from these motions are separable from those which intentionally occur. Here we find that fluctuations in the biorhythmic activities of the nervous systems can unambiguously differentiate across levels of intent. More important yet, this differentiation is remarkable when we examine the fluctuations in biorhythmic activity from the autonomic nervous systems. We find that when the action is intended, the heart signal leads the body kinematics signals; but when the action segment spontaneously occurs without instructions, the heart signal lags the bodily kinematics signals. We conclude that the autonomic nervous system can differentiate levels of intent. Our results are discussed while considering their potential translational value.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Mariusz Wojewoda

We use the term “person” when we want to point out that human existence is unrepeatable and unique. The assumption that man is a person constitutes a basis for the belief in the dignity, efficacy, and responsibility of the human individual. Karol Wojtyla built his conception of the person in the context of theological and philosophical discussions. Even though Wojtyła’s conception has been given a great deal of scholarly attention, it is worthwhile to juxtapose it with contemporary anthropological theories that derive from cognitive sciences. Cognitivists usually base their theories on biological and sociological premises. Some conclusions arrived at in the area of the cognitive sciences lead to mind-brain reductionism, a theory in which the human being is regarded as a body endowed with the function of the brain and as an entity whose individual traits are shaped by its social and cultural environment. This position undermines the ideas of free will and the substantial singularity of the human person. However, debates with this position have worked out a non-reductionist alternative, a theory known as emergentism. This theory treats the human mind as a distinct faculty, one which emerges as a phase in the brain’s development. Emergentists base their reasoning on the assumptions that the body is a unity and that the mind is not identical with it. It is my belief that emergentism can be fruitfully applied to the dynamic understanding of the person put forward by Wojtyła in the middle of the 20th century.


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