Anti-realist Semantics: the Role of Criteria

1982 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 225-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Crispin Wright
Keyword(s):  
Good Evidence ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Theoretical Physics ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Michael Dummett ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
In Virtue Of

§I. Anti-realism of the sort which Michael Dummett has expounded takes issue with the traditional idea that an understanding of any statement (here, declarative sentence) is philosophically correctly analysed as involving grasp of conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. Many kinds of statement to which, as we ordinarily think, we attach a clear sense would have to be represented, according to this tradition, as possessing verification-transcendent truth-conditions; if true that is to say, they would be so in virtue of circumstances of a type transcending our range of possible awareness. Exactly where to draw the boundaries of our possible awareness might be controversial; but there is clearly no being aware, in the relevant sense, of the kind of state of affairs which would make true a generalization of theoretical physics, an assertion about James II weight on his twenty-eighth birthday, a claim about what would have happened if Edward Heath had not sought a fresh mandate during the miners' strike, or—from your point of view—the statement that my left ear aches. In each of these kinds of case the traditional view, while granting that we (or you) cannot experience the truth-conferring states of affairs as such, would nevertheless credit us with a clear conception of the type of thing they would be. To be sure, there is then no possibility of a straightforward construal of this conception as a recognitional capacity. But the traditional view tends to conceal from itself the problematic status which the alleged grasp of truth-conditions therefore assumes by working with the picture that the ‘conception’ is indirectly recognitional, that it issues in a cluster of unproblematic recognitional capacities; in particular, the ability to recognize what is or is not good evidence for the relevant statement and the ability to recognize its logical relations to other statements.

Anti-realist Semantics: the Role of Criteria

1982 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 225-248
Author(s):  
Crispin Wright
Keyword(s):  
Good Evidence ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
Theoretical Physics ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Michael Dummett ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
In Virtue Of

§I. Anti-realism of the sort which Michael Dummett has expounded takes issue with the traditional idea that an understanding of any statement (here, declarative sentence) is philosophically correctly analysed as involving grasp of conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. Many kinds of statement to which, as we ordinarily think, we attach a clear sense would have to be represented, according to this tradition, as possessing verification-transcendent truth-conditions; if true that is to say, they would be so in virtue of circumstances of a type transcending our range of possible awareness. Exactly where to draw the boundaries of our possible awareness might be controversial; but there is clearly no being aware, in the relevant sense, of the kind of state of affairs which would make true a generalization of theoretical physics, an assertion about James II weight on his twenty-eighth birthday, a claim about what would have happened if Edward Heath had not sought a fresh mandate during the miners' strike, or—from your point of view—the statement that my left ear aches. In each of these kinds of case the traditional view, while granting that we (or you) cannot experience the truth-conferring states of affairs as such, would nevertheless credit us with a clear conception of the type of thing they would be. To be sure, there is then no possibility of a straightforward construal of this conception as a recognitional capacity. But the traditional view tends to conceal from itself the problematic status which the alleged grasp of truth-conditions therefore assumes by working with the picture that the ‘conception’ is indirectly recognitional, that it issues in a cluster of unproblematic recognitional capacities; in particular, the ability to recognize what is or is not good evidence for the relevant statement and the ability to recognize its logical relations to other statements.

scholarly journals Reasonable standards for smart cities

2019 ◽  
pp. 96-102
Author(s):  
V. N. Zverev ◽  
S. V. Talenfeld ◽  
V. A. Shubarev
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Smart Cities ◽  
Technical Committee ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Internet ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Smart Communities ◽  
The Internet Of Things

The paper considers the issues of creating smart cities from the point of view of sustainable development of subjects, the role of the internet of things for a modern understanding of the development of smart communities, when the Internet has become the main means of communication not only for people, but also for subjects. The world experience of creation of normative base by technical Committee ISO/TC268 Sustainable development of communities is analyzed. The role of the internet of things (STK 1/ WG 10) is noted as an important part of the identified problem and for a understanding of the development of smart communities, when the internet has become the main means of communication not only for people but also for subjects. Particular attention is paid to the state of affairs in the standardization of requirements for «subjects of sustainable development» in theRussian Federation. Proposals have been developed for work in the establishment of common rules, regulations for such an urgent and multifunctional object of standardization, as the subject of sustainable development or a smart city.

Intuitionistic logic and antirealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Pagin
Keyword(s):  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Michael Dummett ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Realist Position ◽  
Logical Connectives ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Excluded Middle ◽  
Mathematical Reality

The law of excluded middle (LEM) says that every sentence of the form A∨¬A (‘A or not A’) is logically true. This law is accepted in classical logic, but not in intuitionistic logic. The reason for this difference over logical validity is a deeper difference about truth and meaning. In classical logic, the meanings of the logical connectives are explained by means of the truth tables, and these explanations justify LEM. However, the truth table explanations involve acceptance of the principle of bivalence, that is, the principle that every sentence is either true or false. The intuitionist does not accept bivalence, at least not in mathematics. The reason is the view that mathematical sentences are made true and false by proofs which mathematicians construct. On this view, bivalence can be assumed only if we have a guarantee that for each mathematical sentence, either there is a proof of the truth of the sentence, or a proof of its falsity. But we have no such guarantee. Therefore bivalence is not intuitionistically acceptable, and then neither is LEM. A realist about mathematics thinks that if a mathematical sentence is true, then it is rendered true by the obtaining of some particular state of affairs, whether or not we can know about it, and if that state of affairs does not obtain, then the sentence is false. The realist further thinks that mathematical reality is fully determinate, in that every mathematical state of affairs determinately either obtains or does not obtain. As a result, the principle of bivalence is taken to hold for mathematical sentences. The intuitionist is usually an antirealist about mathematics, rejecting the idea of a fully determinate, mind-independent mathematical reality. The intuitionist’s view about the truth-conditions of mathematical sentences is not obviously incompatible with realism about mathematical states of affairs. According to Michael Dummett, however, the view about truth-conditions implies antirealism. In Dummett’s view, a conflict over realism is fundamentally a conflict about what makes sentences true, and therefore about semantics, for there is no further question about, for example, the existence of a mathematical reality than as a truth ground for mathematical sentences. In this vein Dummett has proposed to take acceptance of bivalence as actually defining a realist position. If this is right, then both the choice between classical and intuitionistic logic and questions of realism are fundamentally questions of semantics, for whether or not bivalence holds depends on the proper semantics. The question of the proper semantics, in turn, belongs to the theory of meaning. Within the theory of meaning Dummett has laid down general principles, from which he argues that meaning cannot in general consist in bivalent truth-conditions. The principles concern the need for, and the possibility of, manifesting one’s knowledge of meaning to other speakers, and the nature of such manifestations. If Dummett’s argument is sound, then bivalence cannot be justified directly from semantics, and may not be justifiable at all.

Anticlerical Discourse in Modern Russian Science

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4-1) ◽  
pp. 88-111
Author(s):  
Andrey Beskov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Discourse ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Religious Revival ◽  
Russian Science ◽  
Positive Role ◽  
Traditional Religions ◽  
Russian Scientific ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Role Of Religion

One can often read about the religious revival that came about in Russia after the collapse of Soviet power, both in the media and in scientific literature. According to opinion polls, the majority of Russians are believers, mostly orthodox Christians. The Russian state clearly patronizes religion, at least some specific ("traditional") religions. In socio-political discourse, the prevailing view is that religion is a good thing, and if sometimes religion is a source of problems, it is associated with some deviations from the norm, a perversion of the very essence of religion. This point of view can easily be found in Russian scientific periodicals. However, a critical attitude towards the growing role of religion in Russia is also often expressed in Russian science. The article highlights the main reasons for the dissatisfaction of scholars with the current state of affairs. It is also shown that such works have no influence on the religious situation in Russia. Although anti-clerical sentiments are quite clearly expressed in Russian science, they do not fall into the socio-political discourse, since there is simply no such force in Russia that could consistently promote the principle of secularism. In search of an additional electoral resource and a replacement for the Soviet ideology, the authorities did everything to enhance the importance of religion and strengthen the authority of religious leaders. As a result, today, despite the fact that the real level of religiosity of the population is apparently much lower than is commonly believed, politicians (even opposition ones) are not ready to openly doubt the positive role of religion, fearing PR problems.

Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Moral Content ◽  
First Approximation ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Realist View

Moral realism and antirealist-expressivism are of course incompatible positions. They disagree fundamentally about the nature of moral states of mind, the existence of moral states of affairs and properties, and the nature and role of moral discourse. The central realist view is that a person who has or expresses a moral thought is thereby in, or thereby expresses, a cognitive state of mind; she has or expresses a belief that represents a moral state of affairs in a way that might be accurate or inaccurate. The view of antirealist-expressivism is that such a person is in, or expresses, a conative state of mind, one that consists in a certain kind of attitude or motivational stance toward something, such as an action or a person. Realism holds that moral thoughts have truth conditions and that in some cases these truth conditions are satisfied so that our moral thoughts are true. Antirealist-expressivism holds, to a first approximation, that the distinctive moral content of a moral thought does not have truth conditions.

Per aspera ad astra. The relationship of teachers and students in the national gymnasium in the second half of XIX-early XX century

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ольга Грива ◽  
Ol'ga Griva
Keyword(s):  
Russian Empire ◽  
The State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Rote Learning ◽  
Teachers And Students ◽  
The Russian Empire ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

In the presented monograph discusses the state of Affairs in the schools in the second half of XIX — beginning of XX century, concerning questions of organization of relations between teachers and students, by students. Documents of the gymnasiums operating in the territory of the Russian Empire, in particular in the Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa educational districts are analyzed. The author refuted the point of view on the school as a "school of drill and rote learning", and allegedly progressive role of school in shaping the educated, cultured, educated citizens. On numerous unpublished materials of archives (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa and Simferopol), a complex of official pedagogical documents and theoretical works of teachers shows the nature of the organization of intra-relations.

Law as an Artifact

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Functional Analysis ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Complete Analysis ◽  
Legal Interpretation ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Legal Ontology ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

In this volume leading scholars from both the continental and analytic schools examine how their respective theoretical positions relate to the artifactual nature of law. It offers a complete analysis of what the claim that law—and its units: legal systems, legal norms, and particular legal institutions—is an artifact, in fact, ontologically entails and what consequences, if any, this claim has for philosophical accounts of law. Examining the artifactual nature of law draws attention to the role that intention, function, and action play in the ontological structure of law, and how these attributes interact with rules. It puts the role of author and authorship at the center of its analysis of legal ontology, and widens the scope that functional analysis can legitimately have in legal theory, emphasizing how the content of law depends on how it is used. Furthermore, the appeal to artifacts brings to the fore questions about the significance of concepts for the existence of law, and makes available new tools for legal interpretation. The notion of artifactuality offers a starting point from which to approach the basic dilemma of whether it is meaningful to search for essential, necessary, and sufficient features of law, a question that in current legal theory is put when deciding what kind of enterprise legal theory is from a methodological point of view, namely whether it is descriptive or prescriptive. This volume unearths insights and observations of value to all those looking to deepen their understanding of how the law is understood and experienced.

Elucidation of block boundaries as the dissolution channels in hydrated cement

1978 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 484-485
Author(s):  
N.V. Belov ◽  
U.I. Papiashwili ◽  
B.E. Yudovich
Keyword(s):  
Liquid Phase ◽  
Grain Boundaries ◽  
Benzoyl Peroxide ◽  
Phase Contrast ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Hardened Cement ◽  
Hydrated Cement ◽  
Hardened Cement Paste

It has been almost universally adopted that dissolution of solids proceeds with development of uniform, continuous frontiers of reaction.However this point of view is doubtful / 1 /. E.g. we have proved the active role of the block (grain) boundaries in the main phases of cement, these boundaries being the areas of hydrate phases' nucleation / 2 /. It has brought to the supposition that the dissolution frontier of cement particles in water is discrete. It seems also probable that the dissolution proceeds through the channels, which serve both for the liquid phase movement and for the drainage of the incongruant solution products. These channels can be appeared along the block boundaries.In order to demonsrate it, we have offered the method of phase-contrast impregnation of the hardened cement paste with the solution of methyl metacrylahe and benzoyl peroxide. The viscosity of this solution is equal to that of water.

What Is an Institution?

2007 ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Searle
Keyword(s):  
Physical Structure ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Institutional Fact ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Creation ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Typical Point

The author claims that an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure, but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function. The typical point of the creation of institutional facts by assigning status functions is to create deontic powers. So typically when we assign a status function Y to some object or person X we have created a situation in which we accept that a person S who stands in the appropriate relation to X is such that (S has power (S does A)). The whole analysis then gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and deontic powers.

Whatever Happened to the Cambridge Capital Theory Controversies? (With comments by L. Pasinetti, F. Fisher, J. Felipe and J. McCombie, R. Greenfield and reply by the authors)

2009 ◽  
pp. 4-27
Author(s):  
A. Cohen ◽  
G. Harcourt
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Chronological Order ◽  
Capital Theory

The article written by the well-known theorists and historians of economic thought contains a detailed overview of the Cambridge capital controversy, which had raged from the mid-1950-s through the mid-1970-s. The authors track the origins of the controversy and cover arguments of both sides in chronological order. From their point of view, the discussion hasnt been resolved, and its main underlying aspects were ideological beliefs and fundamental methodological controversies on the nature of equilibrium and on the role of time in economic theory. The article is published with comments written by other leading theoreticians.

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