scholarly journals Thought Experiments and Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality

2016 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-547
Author(s):  
Benoit Gaultier

According to Timothy Williamson, philosophy is not a mere conceptual investigation and does not involve a specific cognitive ability, different in nature from those involved in acquiring scientific or ordinary knowledge of the world. The author holds that Williamson does not succeed in explaining how it is possible for us to acquire, through thought experiments, the type of knowledge that, according to him, philosophy predominantly aims to acquire—namely, knowledge of metaphysical modality. More specifically, the author considers in detail Russell’s stopped clock and Locke’s prince and the cobbler thought experiments, and argues that Williamson has not shown how the kind of thought experiment of which they are instances, and which is typically encountered in philosophy, can be the instrument of knowledge of metaphysical modality that he takes this kind of thought experiment to be. More positively, the author advances that the modal conclusions of such thought experiments are drawn through conceptual investigation.

Author(s):  
James Robert Brown ◽  
Michael T. Stuart

Thought experiments are performed in the imagination. We set up some situation, we observe what happens, then we try to draw appropriate conclusions. In this way, thought experiments resemble real experiments, except that they are experiments in the mind. The terms “thought experiment,” “imaginary experiment,” and “Gedankenexperiment” are used interchangeably. There is no consensus on a definition, but there is widespread agreement on which are standard examples. It is also widely agreed that they play a central role in a number of fields, especially physics and philosophy. There are several important questions about thought experiments that naturally arise, including what kinds of thought experiments there are, what roles they play, and how, if at all, they work. This last question has been the focus of much of the literature: How can we learn something new about the world just by thinking? Answers range from “We don’t really learn anything new” to “We have some sort of a priori insight into how nature works.” In between there are a great variety of rival alternative accounts. There is still no consensus; debate is wide open on almost every question pertaining to thought experiments.


1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Norton

Whatever the original intent, the introduction of the term ‘thought experiment’ has proved to be one of the great public relations coups of science writing. For generations of readers of scientific literature, the term has planted the seed of hope that the fragment of text they have just read is more than mundane. Because it was a thought experiment, does it not tap into that infallible font of all wisdom in empiricist science, the experiment? And because it was conducted in thought, does it not miraculously escape the need for the elaborate laboratories and bloated budgets of experimental science?These questions in effect pose the epistemological problem of thought experiments in the sciences:Thought experiments are supposed to give us information about our physical world. From where can this information come?One enticing response to the problem is to imagine that thought experiments draw from some special source of knowledge of the world that transcends our ordinary epistemic resources.


Open Theology ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Taliaferro ◽  
Elliot Knuths

AbstractWe present a criterion for the use of thought experiments as a guide to possibilia that bear on important arguments in philosophy of religion. We propose that the more successful thought experiments are closer to the world in terms of phenomenological realism and the values they are intended to track. This proposal is filled out by comparing thought experiments of life after death by Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman with an idealist thought experiment. In terms of realism and values we contrast an exemplary thought experiment by Iris Murdoch with one we find problematic by William Irwin.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-270
Author(s):  
Chris King ◽  
Peter Kennett ◽  
Elizabeth Devon

The Earthlearningidea website (www.earthlearningidea.com) launched in 2008 as part of the International Year of Planet Earth, publishes geoscience teaching ideas online as free-to-download pdfs. The website publishes a new idea every two weeks, so that more than 280 ideas have now appeared in English. Translators around the world kindly offered to translate the ideas into their own languages and more than 900 translations can now be accessed through the website. So far, nearly 3.5 million pdfs of the ideas have been downloaded across the world at a mean rate of more than 40,000 per month. The activi-ties have been used in teacher training in a number of countries, as recorded in the Earthlearningidea blog at http://earthlearningidea.blogspot.co.uk/. An analysis was published in 2016 of the different approaches used in the ideas pub-lished to that date. The analysis (n=250) showed that some ideas covered several of categories, and that overall coverage was: basic skills, 4%; observation, 16%; illustration 39%; investigation, 10%; diagrammatic models, 5%; physical models, 44%; thought experiments, 13% and unattributed, 12%. The thought experiments were deliberately focused on promoting deep un-derstanding through deep questioning in the lab and field. They include examples such as: ‘Earthquake through the window - what would you see, what would you feel?: asking pupils to picture for themselves what an earthquake through the window might look like’; ‘Sand on a sill: What will happen to a sand grain left on a window sill? – a rock cycle discussion’; ‘From clay balls to the structure of the Earth: a discussion of how physics can be used to probe Earth’s structure’; ‘Is there life in this soil sample? - questions to consolidate pupil understanding of soil-formation’; ‘The ‘What could hurt you here?’ ap-proach to field safety - teaching how to keep safe during fieldwork and other outdoor activities’; ‘What was it like to be there – in the rocky world? – bringing the formation of solid rock to life by imagining yourself there when it formed’; ‘Fieldwork: the ‘All powerful’ strategy – discussing geological histories in imaginative ways’ and ‘Fieldwork – interactive re-creation: ac-tivities using simple transportable apparatus to simulate features in the field’. Two of these Earthlearningidea activities are given in full, as examples of the Earthlearningidea approach in general, and the use of the ‘thought experiment’ ideas to gen-erate deep questioning and discussion in the lab and field, in particular.


2021 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-42
Author(s):  
Dragana Ćorić

Living in the world of legal norms seems to be easy: you have rules of conduct guiding you how to behave in a lot of life situations including the fact what will happen to you if you do not obey these rules. In a way, legal norms are predicting the future giving us the guidelines for living. Although the legal system together with its rules tend to cover all areas of social life, there are situations that couldn't be foreseen at the time of making a particular regulation. These gaps could be spanned by adopting subsequent rules of conduct. In order to predict an event that may occur, and to predict human behavior in these situations as well as a human response to punishment when someone violates a rule, it is good to conduct a thought experiment. The basis of a thought experiment can be a completely fictitious and even currently impossible event, or a variation of some of the known and possible events. The key question when formulating a thought experiment is "what if ". The answers to this question may start with "then it is possible", "then it will be", "it could be" or something similar. The answers will differ in terms of content only on the basis of the values, beliefs and attitudes of the one who answers the "what if" question. In our paper, we will briefly present the concept of a thought experiment, its internal structure, types and, by giving some examples, encourage readers to be more informed about this topic.


2015 ◽  
pp. 123-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Koshovets ◽  
T. Varkhotov

The paper considers the analogy of theoretical modeling and thought experiment in economics. The authors provide historical and epistemological analysis of thought experiments and their relations to the material experiments in natural science. They conclude that thought experiments as instruments are used both in physics and in economics, but in radically different ways. In the natural science, a thought experiment is tightly connected to the material experimentation, while in economics it is used in isolation. Material experiments serve as a means to demonstrate the reality, while thought experiments cannot be a full-fledged instrument of studying the reality. Rather, they constitute the instrument of structuring the field of inquiry.


Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Carsten Bergenholtz ◽  
Jacob Busch ◽  
Sara Kier Praëm

Abstract Studies in experimental philosophy claim to document intuition variation. Some studies focus on demographic group-variation; Colaço et al., for example, claim that age generates intuition variation regarding knowledge attribution in a fake-barn scenario. Other studies claim to show intuition variation when comparing the intuition of philosophers to that of non-philosophers. The main focus has been on documenting intuition variation rather than uncovering what underlying factor(s) may prompt such a phenomenon. We explore a number of suggested explanatory hypotheses put forth by Colaço et al., as well as an attempt to test Sosa's claim that intuition variance is a result of people ‘filling in the details’ of a thought experiment differently from one another. We show (i) that people respond consistently across conditions aimed at ‘filling in the details’ of thought experiments, (ii) that risk attitude does not seem relevant to knowledge ascription, (iii) that people's knowledge ascriptions do not vary due to views about defeasibility of knowledge. Yet, (iv) we find no grounds to reject that a large proportion of people appear to adhere to so-called subjectivism about knowledge, which may explain why they generally have intuitions about the fake-barn scenario that vary from those of philosophers.


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
James Robert Brown

Religious notions have long played a role in epistemology. Theological thought experiments, in particular, have been effective in a wide range of situations in the sciences. Some of these are merely picturesque, others have been heuristically important, and still others, as I will argue, have played a role that could be called essential. I will illustrate the difference between heuristic and essential with two examples. One of these stems from the Newton–Leibniz debate over the nature of space and time; the other is a thought experiment of my own constructed with the aim of making a case for a more liberal view of evidence in mathematics.


2022 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-43
Author(s):  
V. N. Karpovich

In his theory of natural laws David Lewis rejects the authenticity of impossible worlds on the grounds that the contradiction contained within his modifier "in (the world) w" is tantamount to a contradiction in the whole theory, which seems unacceptable. At the same time, in philosophical discourse very often researchers use counterfactual situations and thought experiments with impossible events and objects. There is a need to apply the theory of worlds to genuine, concrete, but impossible worlds. One way to do this is to reject Lewis's classical negation on the grounds that it leads to problems of completeness and inconsistency inside the worlds. The proposed extension for impossibility is compatible with Lewis's extensional metaphysics, although it leads to some loss for description completeness in semantics.


Conatus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
David Menčik

This paper intends to discuss some aspects of what we conceive as personal identity: what it consists in, as well as its alleged fragility. First I will try to justify the methodology used in this paper, that is, the use of allegories in ontological debates, especialy in the form of thought experiments and science fiction movies. Then I will introduce an original thought experiment I call “Who am I actually?,” one that was coined with the intent to shed light on several aspects of the issue under examination, that is, the fragility of personal identity. Then I will move on to Christopher Nolan’s film The Prestige, as well as to Derek Parfit’s ‘divided minds’ thought experiment, to further discuss the fragility of personal identity; next to identity theft, the prospect of duplication is also intriguing, especially with regard to the psychological impact this might have on both the prototype and the duplicate. I will conclude with the view that spatial and temporal proximity or coexistence, especially when paired with awareness on behalf of the duplicates, would expectedly result in the infringement of the psychological continuity of one’s identity.


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