Perceptual Expertise and Perceptual Modularity

2020 ◽  
pp. 43-71
Author(s):  
Elijah Chudnoff

According to the Experience Thesis, perceptual expertise is a capacity that manifests itself in perceptual experiences with expertise-specific representational contents. The first part of the chapter locates the Experience Thesis with respect to current debates about the admissible contents of perceptual experience and gives various reasons for believing that it is true. The balance of the chapter explores its compatibility with two other theses about perception and perceptual expertise. One is the Cognition Thesis that perceptual expertise is a capacity that draws on cognition. The other is the Modularity Thesis that perceptual experiences wholly result from modular processing of sensory input.

Author(s):  
Lauren Swiney

Over the last thirty years the comparator hypothesis has emerged as a prominent account of inner speech pathology. This chapter discusses a number of cognitive accounts broadly derived from this approach, highlighting the existence of two importantly distinct notions of inner speech in the literature; one as a prediction in the absence of sensory input, the other as an act with sensory consequences that are themselves predicted. Under earlier frameworks in which inner speech is described in the context of classic models of motor control, I argue that these two notions may be compatible, providing two routes to inner speech pathology. Under more recent accounts grounded in the architecture of Bayesian predictive processing, I argue that “active inference” approaches to action generation pose serious challenges to the plausibility of the latter notion of inner speech, while providing the former notion with rich explanatory possibilities for inner speech pathology.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (10) ◽  
pp. 153c
Author(s):  
Xiaomei Zhou ◽  
Chun-Man Chen ◽  
Catherine J. Mondloch ◽  
Sarina Hui-Lin Chien ◽  
Margaret Moulson

2020 ◽  
pp. 095679762095485
Author(s):  
Mathieu Landry ◽  
Jason Da Silva Castanheira ◽  
Jérôme Sackur ◽  
Amir Raz

Suggestions can cause some individuals to miss or disregard existing visual stimuli, but can they infuse sensory input with nonexistent information? Although several prominent theories of hypnotic suggestion propose that mental imagery can change our perceptual experience, data to support this stance remain sparse. The present study addressed this lacuna, showing how suggesting the presence of physically absent, yet critical, visual information transforms an otherwise difficult task into an easy one. Here, we show how adult participants who are highly susceptible to hypnotic suggestion successfully hallucinated visual occluders on top of moving objects. Our findings support the idea that, at least in some people, suggestions can add perceptual information to sensory input. This observation adds meaningful weight to theoretical, clinical, and applied aspects of the brain and psychological sciences.


Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madeleine Ransom

AbstractDoes the scope of beliefs that people can form on the basis of perception remain fixed, or can it be amplified with learning? The answer to this question is important for our understanding of why and when we ought to trust experts, and also for assessing the plausibility of epistemic foundationalism. The empirical study of perceptual expertise suggests that experts can indeed enrich their perceptual experiences through learning. Yet this does not settle the epistemic status of their beliefs. One might hold that the background knowledge of experts is the cause of their enriched perceptual experience – what is known as cognitive permeation – and so their subsequent beliefs are only mediately justified because they are epistemically dependent on this background knowledge. I argue against this view. Perceptual expertise is not the result of cognitive permeation but is rather the result of perceptual learning, and perceptual learning does not involve cognition in a way that entails cognitive permeation. Perceptual expertise thus provides a means of widening the scope of the immediately justified beliefs that experts can form.


1991 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann E. Bigelow

Totally blind, visually impaired, and normally sighted children participated in a longitudinal study in which they were asked if an observer could see the toy they were holding from varying distances in three different tasks: (1) in front of the child with no intervening obstacles between the observer and the toy; (2) behind the child with the child's body as an intervening obstacle; (3) in front of the child with walls or furniture as intervening obstacles. Visually impaired and normally sighted children were given the tasks in both blindfold and nonblindfold conditions. The totally blind children mastered the tasks later than the other groups of children. The totally blind and visually impaired children in the blindfold condition made more mistakes in Tasks 1 and 2 when the observer was over 1 metre from them than when she was less than 1 metre from them. The totally blind children had more difficulty on Task 3 than the other children, and were the only children to make mistakes when walls were the intervening obstacles between the observer and the toy. The results suggest that blind children have difficulty understanding the effects of distance and intervening obstacles on vision and that their mistaken ideas may be based on analogies to their own perceptual experience.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-325
Author(s):  
Flor Kusnir ◽  
Slav Pesin ◽  
Gal Moscona ◽  
Ayelet N. Landau

In a dynamically changing environment, the ability to capture regularities in our sensory input helps us generate predictions about future events. In most sensory systems, the basic finding is clear: Knowing when something will happen improves performance on it [Nobre, A. C., & van Ede, F. (2017). Anticipated moments: Temporal structure in attention. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 19, 34–48, 2017]. We here examined the impact of temporal predictions on a less-explored modality: touch. Participants were instructed to detect a brief target embedded in an ongoing vibrotactile stimulus. Unbeknownst to them, the experiment had two timing conditions: In one part, the time of target onset was fixed and thus temporally predictable, whereas in the other, it could appear at a random time within the ongoing stimulation. We found a clear modulation of detection thresholds due to temporal predictability: Contrary to other sensory systems, detecting a predictable tactile target was worse relative to unpredictable targets. We discuss our findings within the framework of tactile suppression.


Perception ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (9) ◽  
pp. 1153-1155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Lewin Altschuler

I have noticed a striking effect that vision can have on movement: when a person makes circular motions with both hands, clockwise with the left hand, counterclockwise with the right hand, while watching the reflection of one hand in a parasagitally placed mirror, if one arm makes a vertical excursion, the other arm tends to make the same vertical excursion, but not typically if the excursing arm is viewed in plain vision. This observation may help in understanding how visual feedback via a mirror may be beneficial for rehabilitation of some patients with movement deficits secondary to certain neurologic conditions, and illustrates that the traditional division of neural processes into sensory input and motor output is somewhat arbitrary.


Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri

Attention performs two constitutive roles in perceptual experience. This chapter argues that this claim is motivated by a need to respect two apparently competing insights about experience, one having to do with its epistemic role in supplying reasons for our beliefs about the world around us, the other to do with the phenomenology of openness to the world. Attention is the glue that binds our sensate, active, and rational natures, that in virtue of which we both find ourselves absorbed by a world of solicitations and also what enables us to access objective features of the entities whose presence solicits us.


2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 572-589
Author(s):  
Elyse Purcell

AbstractThe lived body—or the flesh—in phenomenological thought, has always served to locate the individual unity of personhood, or perceptual experience, or at least one’s objective unity in the lived world. It has been what makes me “who” I am, my individuating facticity. Jean-Luc Marion, in particular, describes the capacity of the flesh to exceed all forms of phenomenological manifestation as a saturated phenomenon. The aim of this essay is to question this status of the flesh by way of an investigation into the work of Julia Kristeva’s account of the foreigner and maternity. It is argued that the status of the flesh as an individuating process is rather a dividing process, which is mediated through my relation to the other. A new Kristevan ethic is sketched.


1994 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 401-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
William von Hippel ◽  
Chris Hawkins ◽  
Sowmya Narayan

We hypothesized that people become expert at perceiving information that is related to concepts they think about a great deal, because of their extensive perceptual experience with this material To test this idea, we manipulated the capitalization of a series of briefly exposed words If expertise emerges because of perceptual experience, then people should show facilitation identifying words that they think about a great deal, but only when capitalization of these words is consistent with prior perceptual experience with these words Support for this hypothesis was found in two experiments—one in which trait words were presented to depressed and nondepressed subjects, and one in which food words were presented to anorexic and nonanorexic subjects Thus, these experiments demonstrated that personality, as well as personality disorder, has the potential to change the nature of the input people receive from the perceptual system


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