scholarly journals The Good of Life

2020 ◽  
pp. 203-224
Author(s):  
Vince R. Vitale
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Moral Obligations

This chapter considers the implications of Non-Identity Theodicy for divine morality. This requires assessing the extent to which the moral status of a harm inducing action can be affected by the fact that the persons harmed by the action in question would not have existed had that action not been performed. It is argued (against some influential assumptions in the ethics of procreation literature) that the good of a worthwhile human life (lived by someone who otherwise would not have existed) has unique justificatory power, and further that the good of a God-given human life (lived by someone who otherwise would not have existed) has justificatory power great enough to depict God as not violating moral obligations to human persons by his policy of evil allowance. These arguments are aided by an analogy between divine creation and human procreation. Reflection on the morality of human procreation implies, it is suggested, that it is not always wrong to create people in an environment in which you know they will suffer seriously. Further, it is argued that if you think voluntary human procreation is in general morally permissible, you have even more reason to think that divine creation and sustenance is morally permissible; conversely, if you think it would be immoral for God to create and sustain our universe, then you have even more reason to think voluntary human procreation is in general immoral. It is concluded that Non-Identity Theodicy reasonably can be taken to be successful.

scholarly journals Making Sense of What We Are: A Mythological Approach to Human Nature

Philosophy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hauskeller
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Human Animal

AbstractThe question what makes us human is often treated as a question of fact. However, the term ‘human’ is not primarily used to refer to a particular kind of entity, but as a ‘nomen dignitatis’ – a dignity-conferring name. It implies a particular moral status. That is what spawns endless debates about such issues as when human life begins and ends and whether human-animal chimeras are “partly human”. Definitions of the human are inevitably “persuasive”. They tell us about what is important and how we should live our lives as humans, and thus help us to make sense of what we are.

scholarly journals Etyczne podstawy kontroli genetycznej

Etyka ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 111-131
Author(s):  
Alicja Przyłuska-Fiszer
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Control ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Future Generation ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Traditional Concept ◽  
The Future ◽  
Genetic Endowment

The purpose of this paper is to examine some beliefs about the ethical justification of negative eugenics, i.e. a policy of limiting the frequency of childbearing by women prone to give birth to children with genetic defects. The main thrust of the paper is to define and defend of a particular duty v i s – á – v i s the future generations, viz. the duty to provide the future persons with healthy genetic endowment. In the first part of the paper the concept of the ‘obligation to future generation’ is considered. In the second part the putative right of children to acquire healthy genetic endowment is critically assessed from the moral point of view. The author focuses on important reservations concerning moral rights of not even potentially existing persona and the subsequent difficulty in establishing when such rights are infringed. The last part of the paper deals with the possibility of justifying our moral obligations to the future generations by consulting our direct moral duties, and bypassing the controversial issues of the rights of non-existent persons. The author concludes: one of the most credible methods of justifying the objectives of negative eugenics is the acceptance of the depersonalized version of the utilitarian principle (also called globally conceived principle of utility) which stipulates that the sum of pain in the world be minimized and the sum of happiness be maximized. In the same vein the traditional concept of the ‘sanctity’ of human life should be revised in the light of the principle that human life presupposes consciousness and dignity. When these two assumptions are made, it can be shown that due to the application of genetic control the future generations will live a happier life and suffer from fewer diseases than they would if we decided to ban genetic control.

A Christian Theological Account of Human Worth

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Gushee
Keyword(s):  
Human Dignity ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Moral Claim ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
The Real ◽  
Modern Period ◽  
Real Issue ◽  
Central Elements ◽  
European Civilization ◽  
Human Worth

This chapter argues that biblical revelation served as the most important source, at least in European civilization, for the still critically important moral claim that each human life carries profound worth, and the related moral-legal demand that each human being’s dignity must be respected. In Christian theo-ethical terms, this means that the real issue is ‘the God-declared sacredness of each human life with correlated moral obligations’ rather than merely ‘human dignity’. The chapter enters into the biblical materials to present in their own distinctive ways central elements that gave birth to a sacredness-of-life norm and continue to fund that norm today. I reserve a few comments at the end of the chapter to discuss how and why ‘sacredness of human life’ became ‘human dignity’, and what was lost (and perhaps gained) when that transition occurred in the modern period.

Animals, Ethics and Aesthetics

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-87
Author(s):  
David Lamb
Keyword(s):  
Significant Role ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Community ◽  
Aesthetic Appreciation ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Response ◽  
Community Or ◽  
Ethical Status ◽  
The Status ◽  
Negative Sense

Abstract Mainstream theories which argue for enhanced ethical status of animals with appeals to sentience or intelligence have depicted aesthetics in a negative sense. This paper supports a different outlook. We explore reasons why aesthetic appreciation of animals is portrayed as subjective and sentimental, concerned only with superficial and external features. Aesthetic qualities, as understood here, are not intended as criteria for admission to a moral community or as a guide for veterinary professionals when prioritizing therapy. The case for measuring the extent of an animal’s beauty or attractiveness in order to establish its entitlement to moral status or rights is a non-starter. Nevertheless, aesthetic traditions, we argue, play a significant role in our moral response to animals and objectives to protect them. As a corrective to misunderstandings regarding the status of aesthetics in deliberation about moral obligations to animals a case for the integration of ethics and aesthetics is developed.

Limiting the Killing in War: Military Necessity and the St. Petersburg Assumption

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janina Dill ◽  
Henry Shue
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Main Principle ◽  
Normative Framework ◽  
Military Necessity

This article suggests that the best available normative framework for guiding conduct in war rests on categories that do not echo the terms of an individual rights-based morality, but acknowledge the impossibility of rendering warfare fully morally justified. Avoiding the undue moralization of conduct in war is an imperative for a normative framework that strives to actually give behavioral guidance to combatants, most of whom will inevitably be ignorant of the moral status of the individuals they encounter on the battlefield and will often be uncertain or mistaken about the justice of their own cause. We identify the requirement of military necessity, applied on the basis of what we refer to as the “St. Petersburg assumption”, as the main principle according to which a combatant should act, regardless of which side or in which battlefield encounter she finds herself. This pragmatic normative framework enjoys moral traction for three reasons: first, in the circumstances of war it protects human life to a certain extent; second, it makes no false claims about the moral justification of individual conduct in combat operations; and, third, it fulfills morally important functions of law. However, the criterion of military necessity interpreted on the basis of the St. Petersburg assumption does not directly replicate fundamental moral prescriptions about the preservation of individual rights.

scholarly journals Should We Ascribe Capabilities to Sentient Animals? A Critical Analysis of the Extension of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Melin ◽  
David Kronlid
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Life Forms ◽  
Capabilities Approach ◽  
Normal Adult ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Adult Humans ◽  
Moral Relationship

Originally, the Capabilities Approach had a strong anthropocentric orientation because of its focus on the entitlements of individual humans. However, as a part of the interest to employ it within animal and environmental ethics, it has been discussed whether the Capabilities Approach should consider also non-human life forms for their own sake. The most influential and elaborated contribution to this debate is Martha Nussbaum’s extension of the Capabilities Approach to include sentient animals. In this article, we argue that Nussbaum’s ascription of capabilities to animals is problematic, since the concept of a capability normally denotes an opportunity to choose between different functionings. When Nussbaum ascribes capabilities to animals, the concept seems to simply denote specific abilities. Such a use is problematic since it waters down the concept and makes it less meaningful, and it may obscure the fact that normal, adult humans, in contrast to sentient animals, can act as conscious moral agents. The aim of granting moral status to sentient animals can be achieved more convincingly by describing our moral relationship to animals in terms of the functionings we should promote, instead of ascribing capabilities to them. Originally, the Capabilities Approach had a strong anthropocentric orientation because of its focus on the entitlements of individual humans. However, as a part of the interest to employ it within animal and environmental ethics, it has been discussed whether the Capabilities Approach should consider also non-human life forms for their own sake. The most influential and elaborated contribution to this debate is Martha Nussbaum’s extension of the Capabilities Approach to include sentient animals. In this article, we argue that Nussbaum’s ascription of capabilities to animals is problematic, since the concept of a capability normally denotes an opportunity to choose between different functionings. When Nussbaum ascribes capabilities to animals, the concept seems to simply denote specific abilities. Such a use is problematic since it waters down the concept and makes it less meaningful, and it may obscure the fact that normal, adult humans, in contrast to sentient animals, can act as conscious moral agents. The aim of granting moral status to sentient animals can be achieved more convincingly by describing our moral relationship to animals in terms of the functionings we should promote, instead of ascribing capabilities to them.

Moral Recognition and the Limits of Impartialist Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Udo Schuklenk
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Human Brain ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Consideration ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Conceptual Frameworks ◽  
Species Membership ◽  
New Challenges ◽  
Self Learning ◽  
As If

‘Moral status’ is simply a convenient label for ‘is owed moral consideration of a kind’. This chapter argues that we should abandon it and instead focus on the question of what kinds of dispositional capabilities, species memberships, relationships etc., constitute ethically defensible criteria that justifiably trigger particular kinds of moral obligations. Chimeras, human brain organoids, and artificial intelligence do not pose new challenges. Existing conceptual frameworks, and the criteria for moral consideration that they trigger (species membership, sentientism, personhood) are still defensible and applicable. The challenge at hand is arguably an empirical challenge that philosophers and ethicists qua philosophers and ethicists are ill equipped to handle. The challenge that needs addressing is essentially whether a self-learning AI machine, that responds exactly in the same way to a particular event as a person or sentient being would, should be treated as if it was such a person or sentient being, despite doubts about its de facto lack of dispositional capabilities that would normally give rise to such responses.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document