American Grand Strategies

2021 ◽  
pp. 440-456
Author(s):  
Robert Jervis
Keyword(s):  
International Economic ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
Psychological Processes ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
Grand Strategies ◽  
Domestic Values ◽  
American Grand Strategy

How do we explain the vigorous debate about what American grand strategy should be? Most of the proponents are Realists, and this is particularly true for the alternatives of Restraint and Deep Engagement discussed here. These camps disagree not about whether the US is in decline, but in how secure it is, how tightly the world is interconnected, how much commitments can be kept within bounds, whether alliances and military ties are necessary to underpin a productive international economic system, and the links between foreign policy and domestic values. Few analysts in either camp are willing to acknowledge tradeoffs among the significant values they hold, which indicates that psychological processes as well as analytical differences are at work.

Rethinking American Grand Strategy

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Military History ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
Economic Issues ◽  
Contemporary World ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The World ◽  
Grand Strategies ◽  
Strategic Thought ◽  
American Grand Strategy

What is grand strategy? What does it aim to achieve? And what differentiates it from normal strategic thought—what, in other words, makes it “grand”? In answering these questions, most scholars have focused on diplomacy and warfare, so much so that “grand strategy” has become almost an equivalent of “military history.” The traditional attention paid to military affairs is understandable, but in today's world it leaves out much else that could be considered political, and therefore strategic. It is in fact possible to consider, and even reach, a more capacious understanding of grand strategy, one that still includes the battlefield and the negotiating table but can also expand beyond them. Just as contemporary world politics is driven by a wide range of non-military issues, the most thorough considerations of grand strategy must consider the bases of peace and security as broadly as possible. A theory that bears little resemblance to the reality around us every day—in which gender, race, the environment, and a wide range of cultural, social, political, and economic issues are salient—can be only so useful. This book examines America's place in the world. The chapters reexamine familiar figures, such as John Quincy Adams and Henry Kissinger, while also revealing the forgotten episodes and hidden voices of American grand strategy. They expand the scope of diplomatic and military history by placing the grand strategies of public health, race, gender, humanitarianism, and the law alongside military and diplomatic affairs to reveal hidden strategists as well as strategies.

US grand strategy after the Cold War: Can realism explain it? Should realism guide it?

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M Walt
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
Structural Constraints ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Policy Elites

This article uses realism to explain past US grand strategy and prescribe what it should be today. Throughout its history, the United States has generally acted as realism depicts. The end of the Cold War reduced the structural constraints that states normally face in anarchy, and a bipartisan coalition of foreign policy elites attempted to use this favorable position to expand the US-led ‘liberal world order’. Their efforts mostly failed, however, and the United States should now return to a more realistic strategy – offshore balancing – that served it well in the past. Washington should rely on local allies to uphold the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East and focus on leading a balancing coalition in Asia. Unfortunately, President Donald Trump lacks the knowledge, competence, and character to pursue this sensible course, and his cavalier approach to foreign policy is likely to damage America’s international position significantly.

Euro-Atlantic Relations in the XXI Century: Problems and Scenarios

2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (11) ◽  
pp. 31-37
Author(s):  
N. Arbatova
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
The United States ◽  
Defense Spending ◽  
Main Question ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
World Economic ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Economic And Financial Crisis

The Euro-Atlantic relations after the end of the Cold war have been strongly influenced by the impact of three interrelated crises: the existential crisis of NATO, the world economic and financial crisis, and the crisis in the Russia-West relations. The end of bipolarity has changed the threat environment and revealed how different alliance members formulate their threat perception and foreign policy interests. Europe stopped to be the US foreign policy priority. The US pivot to Asia has raised European concerns about American commitments to collective defense. The removal of the threat of a global conflict resulted in the EU initiatives aimed at promoting integration in the field of common security and defense policy (CSDP). Even though the US has officially welcomed a stronger European pillar in NATO, it has become concerned about new approaches that could divide transatlantic partnership and take resources away from military cooperation. At the same time the unilateralist preferences of the Bush administration generated deep political divisions between the United States and the European Union. The world economic and financial crisis contributed to a dangerous gulf between American and European defense spending. The US has complained about the tendency of the alliance’s European members to skimp on defense spending and take advantage of America’s security shield to free ride. In the absence of a clear external threat NATO tried to draft new missions, which were found in NATO’s expansion to the post-Communist space and Alliance’s out of area operations. But these new missions could not answer the main question about NATO’s post-bipolar identity. Moreover, the Kosovo operation of NATO in 1999 fueled Russia’s concerns about NATO’s intentions in the post-Soviet space. The creeping crisis in the Russia-West relations resulted in the Caucasus and Ukrainian conflicts that provided kind of glue to transatlantic relations but did not return them to the old pattern. There can be several representing possible futures lying ahead. But under any scenario EU will be faced with a necessity to shoulder more of the burden of their own security.

American Grand Strategy and Political Economy Theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Narizny
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Defense Spending ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
International Economy ◽  
Rust Belt ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
American Grand Strategy

Nearly everything a state does has distributional consequences, including grand strategy. Societal groups with different stakes in the international economy and defense spending often have conflicting strategic priorities, and these groups pursue their parochial interests by supporting the nomination and election of like-minded politicians. Thus, grand strategy is a product of political economy. An overview of American foreign policy over the last several decades illustrates this logic. In the 1980s, the Democratic and Republican coalitions had conflicting interests over the international economy, so the two parties diverged on grand strategy. The recovery of the Rust Belt in the 1990s and 2000s, however, brought increasing convergence. Political discourse over foreign policy was fiercely partisan, but, with the notable exception of George W. Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, the two parties shared essentially the same view of America’s role in the world. The disastrous outcome in Iraq led the Bush administration back to the middle ground in its second term, and Obama followed the same course. In contrast, the election of Donald Trump augurs change. Trump’s electoral coalition consists of a different balance of interests in the international economy than that of past Republican presidents, so he is likely to pursue different strategic priorities.

scholarly journals Contemporary Problems of a “Grand Strategy” in the US Foreign Policy

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-39
Author(s):  
S. Kislitsyn
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Global Leadership ◽  
Us Foreign Policy ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Expert Community ◽  
Policy Elites

The research examines the main problems of a grand strategy in the US foreign policy. Attention is paid to the conceptual understanding of this term, its historical development, and the current state. The article analyzes the positions of American foreign policy elites and the expert community regarding the problem of the US self-positioning in the outside world. The article consists of three parts. The first analyses the main conceptual provisions of the “grand strategy” as a term. It describes its development from a military term, reflecting the general tactics in interstate confrontation to its comprehensive understanding as a coordination principle of long-term and medium-term goals with short term actions. The second part of the article focuses on the American foreign policy elites, their approaches, as well as public opinion on this issue. It is noted that the ideology of global leadership has become an important component of the establishment's thinking. It largely impedes the development of new foreign policy concepts and, as a result, reformatting the grand strategy. The third part is devoted to the positions of the expert community on the issue of grand strategy. Four main versions are considered: "Offensive", "Selective engagement", "Offshore Balancing", "Zero-sum". The author comes to a conclusion that the US foreign policy mixes several types of strategies at the moment. It is noted that as China strengthens, the United States faces a new competition, which, unlike the Soviet threat, implies not military-political, but economic confrontation. The implementation of the scenario of a "new Cold War" between Washington and Beijing can define the new goals of the grand strategy. At the same time, this also creates an ideological dilemma of recognizing a new challenge, an increasing alternative for American global leadership - the idea of which is still popular among representatives of American foreign policy elites.

The Iraq Syndrome Revisited

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hastings Dunn
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Us Foreign Policy ◽  
President Obama ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
Vietnam Syndrome ◽  
Post War ◽  
Syndrome Analysis

Commencing from an observation by Freedman that Donald Rumsfeld’s legacy as US Secretary for Defense was comparable with that of Robert McNamara, and that where the latter begat the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ , the former would leave behind the ‘Iraq syndrome’. Analysis of discourse under President Obama reveals that the effects of Iraq are more profound than Freedman indicated. In the Obama era the use of force itself was ever more in doubt. In limiting US commitment to fighting for core interests and formal allies, the Obama administration broke with the main post-war tradition of US foreign policy. This made the use or threat of force more difficult, as the appetite for risk was blunted by its experience in Iraq. Obama’s position was unhelpful in embracing the implications of the limitations of American power. US ‘risk aversion’ risked failing both the US and the world.

Getting Grand Strategy Right

2021 ◽  
pp. 29-48
Author(s):  
Hal Brands
Keyword(s):  
Grand Strategy ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Grand Strategies ◽  
Conceptual Confusion ◽  
American Grand Strategy

This chapter highlights ten common fallacies in the study of grand strategy and clarifies the misconceptions underlying them. Clearing away this conceptual confusion can lead to more productive debates about grand strategy writ large; it can also better inform discussions about the prospects for American grand strategy today. One of the fallacies is thinking of grand strategy as a principle or a doctrine rather than a process. Another is the idea that only certain types of grand strategies are worthy of the label. An additional one is the idea that democracies in particular just cannot get grand strategy right. The chapter then looks at the importance of politics and policy debates to grand strategy.

The Enduring Appeal of Grand Strategy

2021 ◽  
pp. xx-21
Author(s):  
Thierry Balzacq ◽  
Ronald R. Krebs
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Center Of Gravity ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
The World ◽  
History Of

Grand strategy is rife with tensions and paradoxes. It should, according to well-established conventional wisdoms, be the center of gravity of states’ relations with the outside world, yet, in practice, grand strategy often seems an unattainable ideal. As the world has become seemingly more complex and unpredictable, grand strategy might seem less apposite, but it has also had growing resonance in the world of policy and ideas. Grand strategy has long been a staple of thinking about foreign policy, yet the very concept remains contested. This essay introduces readers to the history of the concept of grand strategy and to that literature’s central themes; explores the abiding tensions in the literature on grand strategy—especially as manifest in the contributions to this Handbook; situates the volume’s essays within the logic of the Handbook; and offers some reflections on the reasons for grand strategy’s recent renaissance.

scholarly journals Neoconservatism as discourse: Virtue, power and US foreign policy

2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chengxin Pan ◽  
Oliver Turner
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Discourse Analysis ◽  
Political Context ◽  
Us Foreign Policy ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
The People ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
The 1960S

Neoconservatism in US foreign policy is a hotly contested subject, yet most scholars broadly agree on what it is and where it comes from. From a consensus that it first emerged around the 1960s, these scholars view neoconservatism through what we call the ‘3Ps’ approach, defining it as a particular group of people (‘neocons’), an array of foreign policy preferences and/or an ideological commitment to a set of principles. While descriptively intuitive, this approach reifies neoconservatism in terms of its specific and often static ‘symptoms’ rather than its dynamic constitutions. These reifications may reveal what is emblematic of neoconservatism in its particular historical and political context, but they fail to offer deeper insights into what is constitutive of neoconservatism. Addressing this neglected question, this article dislodges neoconservatism from its perceived home in the ‘3Ps’ and ontologically redefines it as a discourse. Adopting a Foucauldian approach of archaeological and genealogical discourse analysis, we trace its discursive formations primarily to two powerful and historically enduring discourses of the American self — virtue and power — and illustrate how these discourses produce a particular type of discursive fusion that is ‘neoconservatism’. We argue that to better appreciate its continued effect on contemporary and future US foreign policy, we need to pay close attention to those seemingly innocuous yet deeply embedded discourses about the US and its place in the world, as well as to the people, policies and principles conventionally associated with neoconservatism.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document