A Copula Approach to the Problem of Selection Bias in Models of Government Survival

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daina Chiba ◽  
Lanny W. Martin ◽  
Randolph T. Stevenson
Keyword(s):  
Selection Bias ◽  
Empirical Models ◽  
Selection Problem ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Copula Approach ◽  
Substantive Importance

Theories of coalition politics in parliamentary democracies have suggested that government formation and survival are jointly determined outcomes. An important empirical implication of these theories is that the sample of observed governments analyzed in studies of government survival may be nonrandomly selected from the population of potential governments. This can lead to serious inferential problems. Unfortunately, current empirical models of government survival are unable to account for the possible biases arising from nonrandom selection. In this study, we use a copula-based framework to assess, and correct for, the dependence between the processes of government formation and survival. Our results suggest that existing studies of government survival, by ignoring the selection problem, overstate the substantive importance of several covariates commonly included in empirical models.

“Why Can’t We Be Friends?” The Coalition Potential of Presidents in Semi-presidential Republics—Insights from Romania

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veronica Anghel
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Presidential Regimes ◽  
Depth Interviews

Coalition governments are a regularly studied feature of parliamentary democracies. Debates still linger in the field as to what extent the outcomes of these studies are also applicable in determining who has the upper hand over coalition formation in semi-presidential regimes. This article explores the dynamics of government formation under semi-presidential regimes using evidence from Romania (1990–2016) and discusses the formal and informal potential of the president to shape coalitions. It covers a lacuna in qualitative studies by using evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with prime ministers, cabinet members, and key party decision makers and shows that under certain circumstances presidents can play an influential role in government formation, but these are rather the exception than the rule. Using a case that presents the incentives for an increase in the presidentialization of politics, I show that the mechanisms of a multiparty regime mostly limit the president’s exclusive bargaining advantage to nominating the prime minister and then, much as in a parliamentary democracy, render him or her dependent on the coalition potential of his or her own party.

Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies

2001 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lanny W. Martin ◽  
Randolph T. Stevenson
Keyword(s):  
Government Formation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies

Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies

1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
KAARE STROM
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Rational Solutions ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Political Crises ◽  
Minority Government ◽  
Competing Hypotheses

Minority cabinets account for about 35% of all governments in 15 parliamentary democracies since 1945. Conventional explanations associate minority government formation with political crises, instability, polarization, factionalization, and failures of interparty bargaining. Such explanations are tested and found lacking in empirical support. Instead, minority governments are explained as rational solutions under specified conditions. Minority cabinets form when even oppositional parties can influence parliamentary legislation, and when government participation is likely to be a liability in future elections. This rationalist explanation receives substantial empirical support in tests against competing hypotheses. The results suggest important modifications to theories of government and coalition formation.

Party Competition and Government Formation in Multilevel Settings: Evidence from Germany

2008 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 505-538 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Debus
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
State Level ◽  
Research Field ◽  
The State ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
German State ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Election Manifestos ◽  
Comparative Political Science

AbstractGoverning in multilevel settings has become a prominent research field in comparative political science. This article asks if German state parties adopt similar ideological positions and coalition strategies to the parties on the federal stage. The results of a content analysis of state and federal election manifestos show that German political parties on the state level indeed adopt different programmatic positions to the federal parties'. Government formation on the state level, however, is not only influenced by the state parties' programmatic viewpoints, but also by the predominant patterns of coalition politics at the federal level.

Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Political Transformation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Central Eastern Europe ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
Central Eastern ◽  
Electoral Performance

Coalitions among political parties govern most of Europe’s parliamentary democracies. Traditionally, the study of coalition politics has been focused on Western Europe. Coalition governance in Central Eastern Europe brings the study of the full coalition life-cycle to a region that has undergone tremendous political transformation, but which has not been studied from this perspective. The volume covers Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. It provides information and analyses of the cycle, from pre-electoral alliances to coalition formation and portfolio distribution, governing in coalitions, the stages that eventually lead to a government termination, and the electoral performance of coalition parties. In Central Eastern Europe, few single-party cabinets form and there have been only a few early elections. The evidence provided shows that coalition partners in the region write formal agreements (coalition agreements) to an extent that is similar to the patterns that we find in Western Europe, but also that they adhere less closely to these contracts. While the research on Western Europe tends to stress that coalition partners emphasize coalition compromise and mutual supervision, there is more evidence of ‘ministerial government’ by individual ministers and ministries. There are also a few coalition governance systems that are heavily dominated by the prime minister. No previous study has covered the full coalition life-cycle in all of the ten countries with as much detail. Systematic information is presented in 10 figures and in more than one hundred tables.

The Executive Branch in Israel

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ofer Kenig
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Israeli Government ◽  
Diverse Society ◽  
Institutional Feature

As in other parliamentary democracies, the Israeli government is dependent on the confidence of parliament. Israel is a country with a diverse society, divided by multidimensional political issues and using a proportional representation electoral system. It is therefore not surprising to find a multiparty system with a highly fragmented parliament. This setting produces the central institutional feature of its executive branch: coalition politics. This chapter outlines the process of cabinet formation and the types of coalitions formed, presents an overview of the position of the prime minister, describes the work and structure of cabinet ministers and ministries, explains why governments seldom complete a full term, and assesses claims about both instability and nongovernability in Israel.

Coalition Bargaining Duration in Multiparty Democracies

2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Ecker ◽  
Thomas M. Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
System Complexity ◽  
Leadership Tenure ◽  
Systemic Factors ◽  
Copula Approach ◽  
Specific Factors ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Coalition Bargaining

Why do some government formation periods end after a few days, while others last for several weeks or even months? Despite the rich literature on government formation, surprisingly little is known about the underlying bargaining processes. This article introduces a new dataset on 303 bargaining attempts in nineteen European democracies to analyse the duration of individual bargaining rounds. The study hypothesizes that (1) preference tangentiality, (2) ideological proximity, (3) incumbency and (4) party leadership tenure decrease the duration of coalition bargaining. Employing a copula approach to account for the non-random selection process of the observations, it shows that these actor-specific factors matter in addition to systemic context factors such as post-election bargaining and party system complexity. These findings highlight the need to consider both actor-specific and systemic factors of the bargaining context to explain government formation.

scholarly journals Improving the Interpretation of Fixed Effects Regression Results

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 829-835 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Mummolo ◽  
Erik Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Selection Bias ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Fixed Effects Models ◽  
Independent Variable ◽  
Fixed Effects Regression ◽  
Time Invariant ◽  
Substantive Importance

Fixed effects estimators are frequently used to limit selection bias. For example, it is well known that with panel data, fixed effects models eliminate time-invariant confounding, estimating an independent variable’s effect using only within-unit variation. When researchers interpret the results of fixed effects models, they should therefore consider hypothetical changes in the independent variable (counterfactuals) that could plausibly occur within units to avoid overstating the substantive importance of the variable’s effect. In this article, we replicate several recent studies which used fixed effects estimators to show how descriptions of the substantive significance of results can be improved by precisely characterizing the variation being studied and presenting plausible counterfactuals. We provide a checklist for the interpretation of fixed effects regression results to help avoid these interpretative pitfalls.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document