Against the Doctrine of Infallibility
Abstract According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle—made famous in Descartes’ cogito—is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can’t be wrong about but shouldn’t believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one's overall doxastic state worse.
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1992 ◽
Vol 50
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pp. 1622-1623
1993 ◽
Vol 51
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pp. 450-451
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2008 ◽
Vol 29
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pp. 205-216
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2010 ◽
Vol 26
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pp. 162-171
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2020 ◽
Vol 228
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pp. 244-253
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