scholarly journals Tracing the Roots of Dementia Praecox: The Emergence of Verrücktheit as a Primary Delusional-Hallucinatory Psychosis in German Psychiatry From 1860 to 1880

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 765-773 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth S Kendler

Abstract While the roots of mania and melancholia can be traced to the 18th century and earlier, we have no such long historical narrative for dementia praecox (DP). I, here, provide part of that history, beginning with Kraepelin’s chapter on Verrücktheit for his 1883 first edition textbook, which, over the ensuing 5 editions, evolved into Kraepelin’s mature concepts of paranoia and paranoid DP. That chapter had 5 references published from 1865 to 1879 when delusional-hallucinatory syndromes in Germany were largely understood as secondary syndromes arising from prior episodes of melancholia and mania in the course of a unitary psychosis. Each paper challenged that view supporting a primary Verrücktheit as a disorder that should exist alongside mania and melancholia. The later authors utilized faculty psychology, noting that primary Verrücktheit resulted from a fundamental disorder of thought or cognition. In particular, they argued that, while delusions in mania and melancholia were secondary, arising from primary mood changes, in Verrücktheit, delusions were primary with observed changes in mood resulting from, and not causing, the delusions. In addition to faculty psychology, these nosologic changes were based on the common-sense concept of understandability that permitted clinicians to distinguish individuals in which delusions emerged from mood changes and mood changes from delusions. The rise of primary Verrücktheit in German psychiatry in the 1860–1870s created a nosologic space for primary psychotic illness. From 1883 to 1899, Kraepelin moved into this space filling it with his mature diagnoses of paranoia and paranoid DP, our modern-day paranoid schizophrenia.

1990 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-85
Author(s):  
Bodil Schmidt

Science and everyday language. Grundtvig’s View of his Native Tongue in Theory and in Practice. As Illustrated by his Article - Om Ordsprog (On Proverbs) 1817By Bodil SchmidtPreserved in the Grundtvig archives are several collections in Grundtvig’s own handwriting of proverbs and popular sayings. In his magazine - Dannevirke - he argued for the preservation of this treasure of Danish proverbs, and urged his readers to assist in their collection.In his demand for a strengthening of the native tongue, Grundtvig was at one with his contemporary romantic poets and philosophers. His article argues for the originality of the Danish language and at the same time protests against the theories that it descends from Icelandic or German. Since his aim is practical, Grundtvig’s article is written in a less philosophical and polemical language than most of the other articles in the magazine. After a lengthy introduction criticising the position of poetry in the 18th century, Grundtvig defines the concept of “proverb” and lists the areas in which proverbs are of importance: language, morals, poetry, history. He follows this with a detailed guide as to how they could be collected. He makes the point, amongst others, that proverbs are useful in the translation of the ancient chronicles of Saxo and Snorre, which he was currently working on. He declares that the aim of his scientific efforts was to protect and enrich the Danish language so that it was qualified to re-awaken the Danish national spirit.A comparison of certain quotations with the common themes of Grundtvig and his colleague in the field, Christian Molbech, shows a marked difference in linguistic style. Where Grundtvig’s language is living, popular and concrete, Molbech’s is academic, stiff and abstract. The quotations included also reveal a decisive difference in the two writers’ view of the people and in their understanding of what the spirit of the people (folkelighed) actually is. Molbech regards “the rough peasant” as a natural creature with no real consciousness and therefore one whom there is no point in trying to enlighten, whereas Grundtvig believes that though the people may be idle and apathetic, they can and must be re-awakened.According to the author of the article there is a parallel between Grundtvig’s attack on the contemporary language of philosophy and our current debate on language being defined politically or ideologically. For Grundtvig, it was obvious that whoever wishes to be understood should use clear and unambiguous language, as close to everyday language as possible. The author asks why, in spite of the advances of science, democratic Denmark should accept that contemporary philosophers, theologians, sociologists and humanists employ a language that we only half understand. Do the Danes still doubt their basic common sense to distinguish between what is true and false? She quotes the proverb: All that glitters is not gold.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-37
Author(s):  
Mark Boespflug
Keyword(s):  

The common sense that heavily informs the epistemology of Thomas Reid has been recently hailed as instructive with regard to some of the most fundamental issues in epistemology by a burgeoning segment of analytic epistemologists. These admirers of Reid may be called dogmatists. I highlight three ways in which Reid's approach has been a model to be imitated in the estimation of dogmatists. First, common sense propositions are taken to be the benchmarks of epistemology inasmuch as they constitute paradigm cases of knowledge. Second, dogmatists follow Reid in taking common sense propositions to provide boundaries for philosophical theorizing. Inasmuch as philosophical theorizing leads one to deny a common sense proposition, such theorizing is stepping outside of the bounds of what it can or should do. Third, dogmatists follow Reid in focusing heavily on the problem of skepticism and by responding to it by refusing to answer the demand for a meta-justification that the skeptic wants.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Barrantes ◽  
Juan M. Durán

We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the (common sense) idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's ( Cobb 2010 ) and Benbaji's ( Benbaji 2003 ) interpretations of Reid's views on causation and explanation. Finally, we present Reid's views from the perspective of the contemporary debate on scientific explanation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Michalak

Motives of espionage against ones own country in the light of idiographic studies The money is perceived as the common denominator among people who have spied against their own country. This assumption is common sense and appears to be self-evident truth. But do we have any hard evidences to prove the validity of such a statement? What method could be applied to determine it? This article is a review of the motives behind one's resorting to spying activity which is a complex and multifarious process. I decided to present only the phenomenon of spying for another country. The studies on the motives behind taking up spying activity are idiographic in character. One of the basic methodological problems to be faced by the researchers of this problem is an inaccessibility of a control group.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-185
Author(s):  
Edyta Sokalska

The reception of common law in the United States was stimulated by a very popular and influential treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England by Sir William Blackstone, published in the late 18th century. The work of Blackstone strengthened the continued reception of the common law from the American colonies into the constituent states. Because of the large measure of sovereignty of the states, common law had not exactly developed in the same way in every state. Despite the fact that a single common law was originally exported from England to America, a great variety of factors had led to the development of different common law rules in different states. Albert W. Alschuler from University of Chicago Law School is one of the contemporary American professors of law. The part of his works can be assumed as academic historical-legal narrations, especially those concerning Blackstone: Rediscovering Blackstone and Sir William Blackstone and the Shaping of American Law. Alschuler argues that Blackstone’s Commentaries inspired the evolution of American and British law. He introduces not only the profile of William Blackstone, but also examines to which extent the concepts of Blackstone have become the basis for the development of the American legal thought.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
William Benzon

Sydney Lamb’s model focuses our attention on the physicality of language, of the signs themselves as objects in the external world and the neural systems the support them. By means of the metaphor of a cognitive dome, he demonstrates that there is no firm line between linguistic and cognitive structure. In this context, I offer physically grounded accounts of Jakobson’s metalingual and emotive functions. Drawing on Vygotsky’s account of language development, I point out that inner speech, corresponding to the common sense notion of thought, originates in a circuit that goes through the external world and is then internalized.


1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-177
Author(s):  
Karen Harding

Ate appearances deceiving? Do objects behave the way they do becauseGod wills it? Ate objects impetmanent and do they only exist becausethey ate continuously created by God? According to a1 Ghazlli, theanswers to all of these questions ate yes. Objects that appear to bepermanent are not. Those relationships commonly tefemed to as causalare a result of God’s habits rather than because one event inevitably leadsto another. God creates everything in the universe continuously; if Heceased to create it, it would no longer exist.These ideas seem oddly naive and unscientific to people living in thetwentieth century. They seem at odds with the common conception of thephysical world. Common sense says that the universe is made of tealobjects that persist in time. Furthermore, the behavior of these objects isreasonable, logical, and predictable. The belief that the univetse is understandablevia logic and reason harkens back to Newton’s mechanical viewof the universe and has provided one of the basic underpinnings ofscience for centuries. Although most people believe that the world is accutatelydescribed by this sort of mechanical model, the appropriatenessof such a model has been called into question by recent scientificadvances, and in particular, by quantum theory. This theory implies thatthe physical world is actually very different from what a mechanicalmodel would predit.Quantum theory seeks to explain the nature of physical entities andthe way that they interact. It atose in the early part of the twentieth centuryin response to new scientific data that could not be incorporated successfullyinto the ptevailing mechanical view of the universe. Due largely ...


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document