scholarly journals Convergent minds: ostension, inference and Grice's third clause

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 20160107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Moore
Keyword(s):  
Animal Species ◽  
Animal Communication ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Intentional Communication ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Successful Communication ◽  
Gricean Communication ◽  
Ostensive Communication ◽  
Intentional Structure ◽  
Prevailing View

A prevailing view is that while human communication has an ‘ostensive-inferential’ or ‘Gricean’ intentional structure, animal communication does not. This would make the psychological states that support human and animal forms of communication fundamentally different. Against this view, I argue that there are grounds to expect ostensive communication in non-human clades. This is because it is sufficient for ostensive communication that one intentionally addresses one's utterance to one's intended interlocutor—something that is both a functional pre-requisite of successful communication and cognitively undemanding. Furthermore, while ostension is an important feature of intentional communication, the inferences required in Gricean communication may be minimal: ostension and inference may come apart. The grounds for holding that animal communication could not be Gricean are therefore weak. I finish by defending the idea that a ‘minimally Gricean’ model of communication is a valuable tool for characterizing the communicative interactions of many animal species.

scholarly journals Inferential Communication: Bridging the Gap Between Intentional and Ostensive Communication in Non-human Primates

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Warren ◽  
Josep Call
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Complexity ◽  
Communication Systems ◽  
Animal Communication ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Psychological State ◽  
Communication Model ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Primate Communication ◽  
Intentional Communication ◽  
Human Primate

Communication, when defined as an act intended to affect the psychological state of another individual, demands the use of inference. Either the signaler, the recipient, or both must make leaps of understanding which surpass the semantic information available and draw from pragmatic clues to fully imbue and interpret meaning. While research into human communication and the evolution of language has long been comfortable with mentalistic interpretations of communicative exchanges, including rich attributions of mental state, research into animal communication has balked at theoretical models which describe mentalized cognitive mechanisms. We submit a new theoretical perspective on animal communication: the model of inferential communication. For use when existing proximate models of animal communication are not sufficient to fully explain the complex, flexible, and intentional communication documented in certain species, specifically non-human primates, we present our model as a bridge between shallower, less cognitive descriptions of communicative behavior and the perhaps otherwise inaccessible mentalistic interpretations of communication found in theoretical considerations of human language. Inferential communication is a framework that builds on existing evidence of referentiality, intentionality, and social inference in primates. It allows that they might be capable of applying social inferences to a communicative setting, which could explain some of the cognitive processes that enable the complexity and flexibility of primate communication systems. While historical models of animal communication focus on the means-ends process of behavior and apparent cognitive outcomes, inferential communication invites consideration of the mentalistic processes that must underlie those outcomes. We propose a mentalized approach to questions, investigations, and interpretations of non-human primate communication. We include an overview of both ultimate and proximate models of animal communication, which contextualize the role and utility of our inferential communication model, and provide a detailed breakdown of the possible levels of cognitive complexity which could be investigated using this framework. Finally, we present some possible applications of inferential communication in the field of non-human primate communication and highlight the role it could play in advancing progress toward an increasingly precise understanding of the cognitive capabilities of our closest living relatives.

scholarly journals Operationalizing intentionality in primate communication: Social and ecological considerations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evelina Daniela Rodrigues ◽  
Marlen Fröhlich
Keyword(s):  
Nonhuman Primate ◽  
Communication Systems ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Communication Studies ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Primate Communication ◽  
Intentional Communication ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
First Order ◽  
Transfer Of Information

An intentional transfer of information is central to human communication. When comparing nonhuman primate communication systems to language, a critical challenge is to determine whether a signaller intends for the recipient to derive a particular meaning from the message contained in the signal. As it is not possible to directly observe psychological states in any species, comparative researchers have inferred intentionality via behavioural markers derived from studies on pre-linguistic human children. Recent efforts to increase consistency between nonhuman primate communication studies undervalue the effect of possible sources of bias: some behavioural markers are not generalizable across certain signal types (gestures, vocalizations, and facial expressions), contexts, settings and species. Despite laudable attempts to operationalise first-order intentionality across signal types, a true “multimodal” approach requires integration across their sensory components (visual-silent; contact; audible), as a signal from a certain type can comprise more than one sensory component. Here we discuss how the study of intentional communication in non-linguistic systems is hampered by issues of reliability, validity, consistency, and generalizability. We then highlight future research avenues that may help to understand the use of goal-oriented communication by opting, whenever possible, for reliable, valid, and consistent behavioural markers, but taking into account sampling biases and integrating detailed observations of intra-specific communicative interactions.

scholarly journals Operationalizing Intentionality in Primate Communication: Social and Ecological Considerations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evelina D. Rodrigues ◽  
Marlen Fröhlich
Keyword(s):  
Nonhuman Primate ◽  
Communication Systems ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Communication Studies ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Primate Communication ◽  
Intentional Communication ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Transfer Of Information ◽  
Behavioral Markers

AbstractAn intentional transfer of information is central to human communication. When comparing nonhuman primate communication systems to language, a critical challenge is to determine whether a signal is used in intentional, goal-oriented ways. As it is not possible to directly observe psychological states in any species, comparative researchers have inferred intentionality via behavioral markers derived from studies on prelinguistic human children. Recent efforts to increase consistency in nonhuman primate communication studies undervalue the effect of possible sources of bias: some behavioral markers are not generalizable across certain signal types (gestures, vocalizations, and facial expressions), contexts, settings, and species. Despite laudable attempts to operationalize first-order intentionality across signal types, a true “multimodal” approach requires integration across their sensory components (visual-silent, contact, audible), as a signal from a certain type can comprise more than one sensory component. Here we discuss how the study of intentional communication in nonlinguistic systems is hampered by issues of reliability, validity, consistency, and generalizability. We then highlight future research avenues that may help to understand the use of goal-oriented communication by opting, whenever possible, for reliable, valid, and consistent behavioral markers, but also taking into account sampling biases and integrating detailed observations of intraspecific communicative interactions.

scholarly journals Introduction

2009 ◽  
Vol 37 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 353-368
Author(s):  
Dario Martinelli
Keyword(s):  
Animal Species ◽  
Animal Communication ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
In The Beginning

“Zoosemiotics” was introduced in 1963 by Thomas Albert Sebeok, initially as a compromise between ethological and semiotic research. In the beginning, Sebeok was convinced that “zoosemiotics” had to be used mostly as an umbrella term, uniting different scholarly approaches to animal communication). In the light of its most recent developments, a synthetic definition of zoosemiotics can be today that of the study of semiosis within and across animal species.

scholarly journals Comparative perspectives on communication in human and nonhuman primates: Grounding meaning in broadly conserved processes of voice production, perception, affect and cognition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Nielsen ◽  
Drew Rendall
Keyword(s):  
Structure Function ◽  
Communication Systems ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Animal Communication ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Voice Production ◽  
General Constraints ◽  
Affect And Cognition ◽  
Synthetic Approaches

Comparative perspectives on primate and human communication have been marked by two equally untenable extremes: either language is special, without significant evolutionary precedent, or it is not: it is continuous in most aspects with animal communication systems. In this article we outline fertile common ground and point towards synthetic approaches that can unify the study of human and animal communication. First, we suggest that humans have a large suite of perceptual biases that introduce a pressure for languages to be 'functionally deployable'. We suggest that human languages are shaped by this pressure, along with previously established pressures to be both learnable and compressible, and domain-general constraints like memory. Collectively, we suggest that non-arbitrary structure-function relationships are crucial for the deployment of language and communication systems more generally.

scholarly journals Animal cognition and the evolution of human language: why we cannot focus solely on communication

2019 ◽  
Vol 375 (1789) ◽  
pp. 20190046 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Tecumseh Fitch
Keyword(s):  
Communication Systems ◽  
Animal Communication ◽  
Language Evolution ◽  
Animal Cognition ◽  
Small Subset ◽  
Human Language ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Royal Road ◽  
Communicative Signals

Studies of animal communication are often assumed to provide the ‘royal road’ to understanding the evolution of human language. After all, language is the pre-eminent system of human communication: doesn't it make sense to search for its precursors in animal communication systems? From this viewpoint, if some characteristic feature of human language is lacking in systems of animal communication, it represents a crucial gap in evolution, and evidence for an evolutionary discontinuity. Here I argue that we should reverse this logic: because a defining feature of human language is its ability to flexibly represent and recombine concepts, precursors for many important components of language should be sought in animal cognition rather than animal communication. Animal communication systems typically only permit expression of a small subset of the concepts that can be represented and manipulated by that species. Thus, if a particular concept is not expressed in a species' communication system this is not evidence that it lacks that concept. I conclude that if we focus exclusively on communicative signals, we sell the comparative analysis of language evolution short. Therefore, animal cognition provides a crucial (and often neglected) source of evidence regarding the biology and evolution of human language. This article is part of the theme issue ‘What can animal communication teach us about human language?’

scholarly journals Scratching beneath the surface: intentionality in great ape signal production

2019 ◽  
Vol 375 (1789) ◽  
pp. 20180403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty E. Graham ◽  
Claudia Wilke ◽  
Nicole J. Lahiff ◽  
Katie E. Slocombe
Keyword(s):  
Communication Systems ◽  
Animal Communication ◽  
Research Effort ◽  
Great Ape ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Intentional Communication ◽  
Evolutionary Origins ◽  
Signal Production ◽  
Communicative Signals

Despite important similarities having been found between human and animal communication systems, surprisingly little research effort has focussed on whether the cognitive mechanisms underpinning these behaviours are also similar. In particular, it is highly debated whether signal production is the result of reflexive processes, or can be characterized as intentional. Here, we critically evaluate the criteria that are used to identify signals produced with different degrees of intentionality, and discuss recent attempts to apply these criteria to the vocal, gestural and multimodal communicative signals of great apes and more distantly related species. Finally, we outline the necessary research tools, such as physiologically validated measures of arousal, and empirical evidence that we believe would propel this debate forward and help unravel the evolutionary origins of human intentional communication. This article is part of the theme issue ‘What can animal communication teach us about human language?’

Communication and intention

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Blackburn
Keyword(s):  
Psychological States ◽  
Successful Communication ◽  
Paul Grice ◽  
Linguistic Means

The classic attempt to understand communication in terms of the intentions of a person making an utterance was put forward by Paul Grice in 1957. Grice was concerned with actions in which a speaker means something by what they do and what is meant might just as much be false as true. He looked for the essence of such cases in actions intended to effect a change in the recipient. Grice saw successful communication as depending on the recognition by the audience of the speaker’s intention. Since then there have been many attempts to refine Grice’s work, and to protect it against various problems. There has also been worry that Grice’s approach depends on a false priority of psychology over semantics, seeing complex psychological states as existing independently of whether the agent has linguistic means of expressing them.

first case of Peter leaning back ostensively to let Mary see William approaching, it is arguable that some of the basic information is made manifest indirectly, through Peter’s intention being made manifest. Someone who engages in any kind of osten-sive behaviour intentionally draws some attention to himself and intentionally makes manifest a few assumptions about himself: for instance, that he is aware of the basic information involved, and that he is trying to be relevant. Peter’s ostension might make it manifest not just that William is approaching, but also that Peter expects Mary to be concerned, and that he is concerned too. Would we want to say, though, that Peter ‘meant something’ by his behav-iour? Like most English speakers, we would be reluctant to do so; but this is irrelevant to our pursuit, which is not to analyse ordinary language usage, but to describe and explain forms of human communication. Our argument at this stage is this: either inferential communication consists in providing evidence for what the communicator means, in the sense of ‘meaning’ which Grice calls ‘non-natural meaning’, and in that case inferential communication is not a well-defined class of phenomena at all; or else showing something should be considered a form of inferential communication, on a par with meaning something by a certain behaviour, and inferential communication and ostension should be equated. There are two questions involved here. One is substantive: which domains of facts are to be described and explained together? Our answer is that ostension is such a domain, and that inferential communication narrowly understood (i.e. under-stood as excluding cases of ostension where talk of ‘meaning’ would be awkward) is not. The second question is terminological (and hence not worth much argu-ment): can the term ‘communication’ be legitimately applied to all cases of osten-sion? Our answer is yes, and from now on we will treat ostensive communication, inferential communication, and ostensive–inferential communication as the same thing. Inferential communication and ostension are one and the same process, but seen from two different points of view: that of the communicator who is involved in ostension and that of the audience who is involved in inference. Ostensive–inferential communication consists in making manifest to an audi-ence one’s intention to make manifest a basic layer of information. It can there-fore be described in terms of an informative and a communicative intention. In the next two sections, we want to reanalyse the notions of informative and com-municative intention in terms of manifestness and mutual manifestness, and to sketch in some of the empirical implications of this reformulation.

2005 ◽  
pp. 159-159
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
English Speakers ◽  
Language Usage ◽  
Basic Information ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
First Case ◽  
Basic Layer ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Ostensive Communication ◽  
Empirical Implications

Implicit Information in Literary Translation

Target ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst-August Gutt
Keyword(s):  
Contextual Factor ◽  
Target Audience ◽  
Literary Translation ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Natural Laws ◽  
Implicit Information ◽  
Successful Communication ◽  
Text Context

Abstract As an instance of human communication, literary translation operates by certain laws and principles assumed to be built into our human make-up. These 'natural laws' of communication give rise to implicit information and are responsible for its special characteristics, such as graded strength of communication and its correlates, including poetic effects. They furthermore determine the interdependence of text, context and successful communication, and limit communicability in incompatible contexts. One important contextual factor consists in what kind of interpretive resemblance the audience expects between translation and original. The ultimate test for a translation is whether or not it achieves with the target audience what the translator intended it to achieve, rather than whether it conforms to some translation-theoretical notion of equivalence.

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