Inferential Communication: Bridging the Gap Between Intentional and Ostensive Communication in Non-human Primates

Communication, when defined as an act intended to affect the psychological state of another individual, demands the use of inference. Either the signaler, the recipient, or both must make leaps of understanding which surpass the semantic information available and draw from pragmatic clues to fully imbue and interpret meaning. While research into human communication and the evolution of language has long been comfortable with mentalistic interpretations of communicative exchanges, including rich attributions of mental state, research into animal communication has balked at theoretical models which describe mentalized cognitive mechanisms. We submit a new theoretical perspective on animal communication: the model of inferential communication. For use when existing proximate models of animal communication are not sufficient to fully explain the complex, flexible, and intentional communication documented in certain species, specifically non-human primates, we present our model as a bridge between shallower, less cognitive descriptions of communicative behavior and the perhaps otherwise inaccessible mentalistic interpretations of communication found in theoretical considerations of human language. Inferential communication is a framework that builds on existing evidence of referentiality, intentionality, and social inference in primates. It allows that they might be capable of applying social inferences to a communicative setting, which could explain some of the cognitive processes that enable the complexity and flexibility of primate communication systems. While historical models of animal communication focus on the means-ends process of behavior and apparent cognitive outcomes, inferential communication invites consideration of the mentalistic processes that must underlie those outcomes. We propose a mentalized approach to questions, investigations, and interpretations of non-human primate communication. We include an overview of both ultimate and proximate models of animal communication, which contextualize the role and utility of our inferential communication model, and provide a detailed breakdown of the possible levels of cognitive complexity which could be investigated using this framework. Finally, we present some possible applications of inferential communication in the field of non-human primate communication and highlight the role it could play in advancing progress toward an increasingly precise understanding of the cognitive capabilities of our closest living relatives.

Limb Preference in Animals: New Insights into the Evolution of Manual Laterality in Hominids

Until the 1990s, the notion of brain lateralization—the division of labor between the two hemispheres—and its more visible behavioral manifestation, handedness, remained fiercely defined as a human specific trait. Since then, many studies have evidenced lateralized functions in a wide range of species, including both vertebrates and invertebrates. In this review, we highlight the great contribution of comparative research to the understanding of human handedness’ evolutionary and developmental pathways, by distinguishing animal forelimb asymmetries for functionally different actions—i.e., potentially depending on different hemispheric specializations. Firstly, lateralization for the manipulation of inanimate objects has been associated with genetic and ontogenetic factors, with specific brain regions’ activity, and with morphological limb specializations. These could have emerged under selective pressures notably related to the animal locomotion and social styles. Secondly, lateralization for actions directed to living targets (to self or conspecifics) seems to be in relationship with the brain lateralization for emotion processing. Thirdly, findings on primates’ hand preferences for communicative gestures accounts for a link between gestural laterality and a left-hemispheric specialization for intentional communication and language. Throughout this review, we highlight the value of functional neuroimaging and developmental approaches to shed light on the mechanisms underlying human handedness.

Proactive or reactive? Neural oscillatory insight into the leader-follower dynamics of early infant-caregiver interaction

We know that infants’ ability to coordinate attention with others towards the end of the first year is fundamental to language acquisition and social cognition (Carpenter et al., 1998). Yet, we understand little about the neural and cognitive mechanisms driving infant attention in shared interaction: do infants play a proactive role in creating episodes of joint attention? Recording EEG from 12-month-old infants whilst they engaged in table-top play with their caregiver, we examined the ostensive signals and neural activity preceding and following infant- vs. adult-led joint attention. Contrary to traditional theories of socio-communicative development (Tomasello et al., 2007), infant-led joint attention episodes appeared largely reactive: they were not associated with increased theta power, a neural marker of endogenously driven attention, or ostensive signals before the initiation. Infants were, however, sensitive to whether their initiations were responded to. When caregivers joined their attentional focus, infants showed increased alpha suppression, a pattern of neural activity associated with predictive processing. Our results suggest that at 10-12 months, infants are not yet proactive in creating joint attention. They do, however, anticipate behavioural contingency, a potentially foundational mechanism for the emergence of intentional communication (Smith & Breazeal, 2007).

The Triggering Track-Ways Theory

<p>In this thesis I present a new paradigm in human evolutionary theory: the relevance of track-ways reading (TWR) to the evolution of human cognition, culture and communication. Evidence is presented that strongly indicates hominins were exploiting conspecific track-ways 4 million years ago. For a non-olfactory ape that was a specialized forager in open, featureless wetland environments, they were the only viable natural signs to exploit for safety, orienteering, and recognizable social markers. Due to the unique cognitive demands of reading track-ways, as compared to scent-trails all other animals use to find each other and preferred prey species, social TWR triggered the evolution of a unique faculty for narrative elsewhere-and-when cognition in the hominin mind. Two million years later, this narrative faculty was entrenched enough to enable the rather sudden "explosion" of co-operative Oldowan Lithic Culture that began at 2.6mya. This cultural adaptation was a highly successful response to catastrophic environmental change. Thereafter selection for encephalization to increase neural capacity to store and co-operatively exploit socio-ecological knowledge gained from the hominin narrative faculty (via co-evolving, increasingly efficient modes of intentional communication) drove all further biological and cultural developments in the hominin trajectory towards H.sapiens and behavioural modernity.</p>

The Triggering Track-Ways Theory

<p>In this thesis I present a new paradigm in human evolutionary theory: the relevance of track-ways reading (TWR) to the evolution of human cognition, culture and communication. Evidence is presented that strongly indicates hominins were exploiting conspecific track-ways 4 million years ago. For a non-olfactory ape that was a specialized forager in open, featureless wetland environments, they were the only viable natural signs to exploit for safety, orienteering, and recognizable social markers. Due to the unique cognitive demands of reading track-ways, as compared to scent-trails all other animals use to find each other and preferred prey species, social TWR triggered the evolution of a unique faculty for narrative elsewhere-and-when cognition in the hominin mind. Two million years later, this narrative faculty was entrenched enough to enable the rather sudden "explosion" of co-operative Oldowan Lithic Culture that began at 2.6mya. This cultural adaptation was a highly successful response to catastrophic environmental change. Thereafter selection for encephalization to increase neural capacity to store and co-operatively exploit socio-ecological knowledge gained from the hominin narrative faculty (via co-evolving, increasingly efficient modes of intentional communication) drove all further biological and cultural developments in the hominin trajectory towards H.sapiens and behavioural modernity.</p>

Operationalizing Intentionality in Primate Communication: Social and Ecological Considerations

An intentional transfer of information is central to human communication. When comparing nonhuman primate communication systems to language, a critical challenge is to determine whether a signal is used in intentional, goal-oriented ways. As it is not possible to directly observe psychological states in any species, comparative researchers have inferred intentionality via behavioral markers derived from studies on prelinguistic human children. Recent efforts to increase consistency in nonhuman primate communication studies undervalue the effect of possible sources of bias: some behavioral markers are not generalizable across certain signal types (gestures, vocalizations, and facial expressions), contexts, settings, and species. Despite laudable attempts to operationalize first-order intentionality across signal types, a true “multimodal” approach requires integration across their sensory components (visual-silent, contact, audible), as a signal from a certain type can comprise more than one sensory component. Here we discuss how the study of intentional communication in nonlinguistic systems is hampered by issues of reliability, validity, consistency, and generalizability. We then highlight future research avenues that may help to understand the use of goal-oriented communication by opting, whenever possible, for reliable, valid, and consistent behavioral markers, but also taking into account sampling biases and integrating detailed observations of intraspecific communicative interactions.

Deviant Subcultures in European Context

Since the late 1950s, criminological research has focused on the question of why particular groups are more likely to become involved in criminal and/or deviant behavior. Theories about subcultures start from the premise that smaller sub- or countercultural groupings exist within a larger society and differentiate themselves by developing their own moral precepts, values, and norms. Subcultural theories were originally developed in the United States and have a long theoretical tradition dating back to the 1930s. Structural-functionalist sociologist Albert Cohen in 1955 first used the term, “delinquent subculture.” In his book Criminal Youth, Cohen defined subculture as the sum of dominant knowledge, convictions and beliefs, conventions, preferences, and prejudices within and acquired by participation in the particular group. Deviant behavior arises when these values and norms run counter to those of the dominant culture. Cohen interpreted delinquency as a collective, practical, and quick solution to problems caused by unequal opportunities in the class system. The basic assumption of early subcultural theories was that members of the lower socioeconomic classes established their own value system and norms due to their inability to conform to middle-class values and norms and achieve middle-class goals. Later in the 1970s, subcultural theory was altered and further expanded by the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at Birmingham University. The CCCS posits that criminal subcultures favor delinquency due to intersecting attitudes such as the rejection of authority, hedonism, or sensation-seeking. Moreover, the relationships between members within a subculture are important due to the shared nature of values, norms, and identities. Regionality is no longer a criterion for a delinquent/criminal subculture due to modern Europe’s high level of mobility and digital networks. Instead, modern delinquent/criminal subcultures utilize social media outlets not limited to region to disseminate their values and norms and establish identity. Islamic fundamentalism and the Reich Citizens and Sovereign Citizens movements are examples of subcultures that utilize the Internet to rapidly spread programs and ideologies in a targeted and simple manner. While earlier subcultural studies tended to explain the relationship between subculture and criminality as due to frustration over social and economic inequality, more recent research argues that subcultural theories need to be macro-level focused. Consequently, recent scholarship frames subcultural criminality as an expression of groups’ social and material life, which are defined by stylistic factors such as intentional communication, homology, and specific (piecemeal) solutions to problems.

Decoupling Representations and the Chain of Arguments

In this paper, I propose to understand argumentative decoupling—that is, the structural fact of the argumentative chain self-referring to one (or more) of its constituents (reason, data, conclusion, point of view) in subsequent arguments—as part of the way in which cognitive decoupling representation works. In order to support this claim, I make use of part of the discussion developed in cognitive studies and evolutionary theories that describes this phenomenon when explaining intentional communication. By using Toulmin’s model, I exemplify how decoupling representation may be seen as part of a chain of arguments in which a second argumentative move is usually oriented to action. I conclude by reflecting on the relationship between this human cognitive capacity and the problem of recursion to hold that these two concepts are not synonymous but stand in a subordinated and complementary relation to each other.

Operationalizing intentionality in primate communication: Social and ecological considerations

An intentional transfer of information is central to human communication. When comparing nonhuman primate communication systems to language, a critical challenge is to determine whether a signaller intends for the recipient to derive a particular meaning from the message contained in the signal. As it is not possible to directly observe psychological states in any species, comparative researchers have inferred intentionality via behavioural markers derived from studies on pre-linguistic human children. Recent efforts to increase consistency between nonhuman primate communication studies undervalue the effect of possible sources of bias: some behavioural markers are not generalizable across certain signal types (gestures, vocalizations, and facial expressions), contexts, settings and species. Despite laudable attempts to operationalise first-order intentionality across signal types, a true “multimodal” approach requires integration across their sensory components (visual-silent; contact; audible), as a signal from a certain type can comprise more than one sensory component. Here we discuss how the study of intentional communication in non-linguistic systems is hampered by issues of reliability, validity, consistency, and generalizability. We then highlight future research avenues that may help to understand the use of goal-oriented communication by opting, whenever possible, for reliable, valid, and consistent behavioural markers, but taking into account sampling biases and integrating detailed observations of intra-specific communicative interactions.

Agent, Behaviour, Trace, Repeat: Understanding the Cognitive Processes Involved in Human Stigmergic Coordination

Stigmergy refers to the coordination of agents via artifacts of behaviours (behavioural traces) in the shared environment. Whilst primarily studied in biology and computer science/robotics, stigmergy underlies many human indirect interactions, both offline (e.g., trail building) and online (e.g., development of open-source software). In this review, we provide an introduction to stigmergy and emphasise how and where human stigmergy is distinct from animal or robot stigmergy, such as intentional communication via traces and causal inferences from the traces to the causing behaviour. Cognitive processes discussed on the agent level include attention, motivation, meaning and meta-cognition, as well as emergence/immergence, iterative learning and exploration/exploitation at the interface of individual agent and multi-agent systems. Characteristics of one-agent, two-agent and multi-agent systems are discussed and areas for future research highlighted.