scholarly journals Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperation

2010 ◽  
Vol 365 (1553) ◽  
pp. 2627-2633 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. McNamara ◽  
Olof Leimar
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Environmental Influences ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Trait Variation ◽  
Social Sensitivity ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
Contingent Behaviour

In applying game theory to problems in biology, differences between individuals are often ignored. In particular, when analysing the evolution of cooperation it is often implicitly assumed that ignoring variation will produce predictions that approximate the solution when differences are included. This need not be true. As we demonstrate, differences are not innocuous noise, but can fundamentally change the nature of a game. Even small amounts of variability can stabilize cooperation by, for example, maintaining the need to deal with cheaters. Differences promote the need to learn about others in an interaction, leading to contingent behaviour that can reduce conflict, and to negotiated outcomes that may or may not be more cooperative than unconditional actions. Once there are mechanisms such as mutation and environmental influences that maintain variation within populations, whether cooperation evolves may depend on the variation in the cooperativeness trait. Variation means that it may be worth taking a chance that a partner is cooperative by being cooperative. When there are markets, so that individuals can break off interactions to seek a better partner, variation promotes choosiness and hence penalizes those uncooperative individuals, who are rejected. Variation promotes the need to monitor the previous behaviour of others, and once this social sensitivity exists, the need to maintain a good reputation can promote cooperation.

scholarly journals Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (8) ◽  
pp. 200891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiromu Ito ◽  
Jun Tanimoto
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Evolutionary Mechanism ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Chicken Game ◽  
The Difference

Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.

scholarly journals The influence of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Li ◽  
Yini Geng ◽  
Chen Shen ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Numerical Simulations ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Learning Ability ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Game Dynamics ◽  
Potential Reason ◽  
Heterogeneous Learning ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract In this paper, we design a simple coevolution model to investigate the role of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation. The model weakens the winner’s learning ability in order to keep its current advantage. Conversely, it strengthens the loser’s learning ability for increasing the chance to update its strategy. In particular, we consider this coevolutionary model separately applying to both cooperators and defectors (rule I), only cooperators (rule II), as well as only defectors (rule III) in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Through numerical simulations, we find that cooperation can be promoted in rule II, whereas, cooperation is hampered in rule I and rule III. We reveal its potential reason from the viewpoint of enduring and expanding periods in game dynamics. Our results thus provide a deeper understanding regarding the heterogeneous learning ability on game theory.

The spatial struggle of tit-for-tat and defect

1995 ◽  
Vol 348 (1326) ◽  
pp. 393-404 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Stationary State ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Stable Coexistence ◽  
Spatially Inhomogeneous ◽  
Biological Reality ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Spatially Homogeneous ◽  
Homogeneous Environment

The pioneering work by Trivers (1971), Axelrod (1984) and Axelrod & Hamilton (1981) has stimulated continuing interest in explaining the evolution of cooperation by game theory, in particular, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and the strategy of tit-for-tat. However these models suffer from a lack of biological reality, most seriously because it is assumed that players meet opponents at random from the population and, unless the population is very small, this excludes the repeated encounters necessary for tit-for-tat to prosper. To meet some of the objections, we consider a model with two types of players, defectors (D) and tit-for-tat players (T), in a spatially homogeneous environment with player densities varying continuously in space and time. Players only encounter neighbours but move at random in space. The analysis demonstrates major new conclusions, the three most important being as follows. First, stable coexistence with constant densities of both players is possible. Second, stable coexistence in a pattern (a spatially inhomogeneous stationary state) may be possible when it is impossible for constant distributions (even unstable ones) to exist. Third, invasion by a very small number of T-players is sometimes possible (in contrast with the usual predictions) and so a mutation to tit-for-tat may lead to a population of defectors being displaced by the T-players.

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games for Sanitation Boards

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rocío Botta ◽  
Gerardo Blanco ◽  
Christian E. Schaerer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cost Models ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Community Projects ◽  
The Cost

In a group of individuals that come together to produce a good or provide a service, the cooperators (who pay to produce the good) are often exploited by those who receive the benefit without paying the cost. Models were developed over time using incentives (reward or punishment) and the option of abandoning the initiative to promote and stabilize the cooperation. In this paper we analyze several models based on the evolutionary game theory and public good games. We compare and organize them in a taxonomic table following their main characteristics to select the most suitable for a specific problem. The analyzed models are compared by using a public good problem in community projects for water supply. We have reasonable assurance that phenomena that appear on mod- els also occurs in these community projects. Therefore, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be a useful tool for policy-makers in order to improve cooperation and discourage defection in sanitation boards.

scholarly journals A Heterogeneous Network Modeling Method Based on Public Goods Game Theory to Explore Cooperative Behavior in VANETs

Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1802
Author(s):  
Qiuhua Wang ◽  
Hao Liu ◽  
Xing Jin ◽  
Zhen Wang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Heterogeneous Network ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Modeling Method ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Approaches To Study ◽  
Game Theoretic

Cooperative vehicular networking has been widely studied in recent years. Existing evolution game theoretic approaches to study cooperative behavior in Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) are mainly based on the assumption that VANET is constructed as a homogeneous network. This modeling method only extracts part attributes of vehicles and does not distinguish the differences between strategy and attribute. In this paper, we focus on the heterogeneous network model based on the public goods game theory for VANET. Then we propose a Dynamic Altruism Public Goods Game (DAPGG) model consisting of rational nodes, altruistic nodes, and zealots to more realistically characterize the real VANET. Rational nodes only care about their own benefits, altruistic nodes comprehensively consider the payoffs in the neighborhood, while zealots insist on behaving cooperatively. Finally, we explore the impacts of these attributes on the evolution of cooperation under different network conditions. The simulation results show that only adding altruistic nodes can effectively improve the proportion of cooperators, but it may cause conflicts between individual benefits and neighborhood benefits. Altruistic nodes together with zealots can better improve the proportion of cooperators, even if the network conditions are not suitable for the spread of cooperative behavior.

scholarly journals The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Schmid ◽  
Pouya Shati ◽  
Christian Hilbe ◽  
Krishnendu Chatterjee
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Full Cooperation

AbstractIndirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other’s behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the predominantly studied ‘leading eight’ social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social norms.

On the Original Contract: Evolutionary Game Theory and Human Evolution

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Rosenberg ◽  
Stefan Linquist
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Gene Sequence ◽  
Sequence Data ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Gene Sequencing ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Biological Anthropology ◽  
Original Contract ◽  
Gene Sequence Data

AbstractThis paper considers whether the available evidence from archeology, biological anthropology, primatology, and comparative gene-sequencing, can test evolutionary game theory models of cooperation as historical hypotheses about the actual course of human prehistory. The examination proceeds on the assumption that cooperation is the product of cultural selection and is not a genetically encoded trait. Nevertheless, we conclude that gene sequence data may yet shed significant light on the evolution of cooperation.

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