scholarly journals Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (8) ◽  
pp. 200891 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiromu Ito ◽  
Jun Tanimoto
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Evolutionary Mechanism ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Chicken Game ◽  
The Difference

Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.

The Analysis of Willingness to Cooperate for Farmers to Participate in Water Management Based on Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 1002-1010
Author(s):  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Water Management ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Collective Rationality ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Willingness To Cooperate

To analyze the willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management, we base on game theory and first carry on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management, and find that farmers are into a Prisoners Dilemma in a single game, individual rationality comes into conflict with collective rationality, at this time farmers have a tendency to "free riders", so it is difficult to achieve cooperation between the farmers. Then trying to break the prisoners' dilemma, we carry on the farmers repeated dynamic game, the analysis is carried on in the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, we carry on game evolution analysis for willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management. In order to guarantee the rationality of the study, we conduct a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in province of Zhejiang and finally confirm that the study is reasonable. And through the analysis of the full text, we conclude six important conclusions.

scholarly journals Two conceptions of evolutionary games: reductive vs effective

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artem Kaznatcheev
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Specific Interpretation ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Games Theory ◽  
Future Work

Evolutionary game theory (EGT) was born from economic game theory through a series of analogies. Given this heuristic genealogy, a number of central objects of the theory (like strategies, players, and games) have not been carefully defined or interpreted. A specific interpretation of these terms becomes important as EGT sees more applications to understanding experiments in microscopic systems typical of oncology and microbiology. In this essay, I provide two interpretations of the central objects of games theory: one that leads to reductive games and the other to effective games. These interpretation are based on the difference between views of fitness as a property of individuals versus fitness as a summary statistic of (sub)populations. Reductive games are typical of theoretical work like agent-based models. But effective games usually correspond more closely to experimental work. However, confusing reductive games for effective games or vice-versa can lead to divergent results, especially in spatially structured populations. As such, I propose that we treat this distinction carefully in future work at the interface of EGT and experiment.

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games for Sanitation Boards

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rocío Botta ◽  
Gerardo Blanco ◽  
Christian E. Schaerer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cost Models ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Community Projects ◽  
The Cost

In a group of individuals that come together to produce a good or provide a service, the cooperators (who pay to produce the good) are often exploited by those who receive the benefit without paying the cost. Models were developed over time using incentives (reward or punishment) and the option of abandoning the initiative to promote and stabilize the cooperation. In this paper we analyze several models based on the evolutionary game theory and public good games. We compare and organize them in a taxonomic table following their main characteristics to select the most suitable for a specific problem. The analyzed models are compared by using a public good problem in community projects for water supply. We have reasonable assurance that phenomena that appear on mod- els also occurs in these community projects. Therefore, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be a useful tool for policy-makers in order to improve cooperation and discourage defection in sanitation boards.

scholarly journals Scaling the phase-planes of social dilemma strengths shows game-class changes in the five rules governing the evolution of cooperation

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (10) ◽  
pp. 181085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiromu Ito ◽  
Jun Tanimoto
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Phase Plane ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Universal Scaling ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Scaling Parameters ◽  
Animal Societies

Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD–GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules have four different dilemma resolution (relaxation) mechanisms. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.

POSTPARTUM AMENORRHOEA IN RURAL EASTERN UTTAR PRADESH, INDIA

1998 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-243
Author(s):  
K. N. S. YADAVA ◽  
S. K. JAIN
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Uttar Pradesh ◽  
Current Status Data ◽  
North India ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Survival Status ◽  
The Mean ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Using Data

This paper calculates the mean duration of the postpartum amenorrhoea (PPA) and examines its demographic, and socioeconomic correlates in rural north India, using data collected through 'retrospective' (last but one child) as well as 'current status' (last child) reporting of the duration of PPA.The mean duration of PPA was higher in the current status than in the retrospective data;n the difference being statistically significant. However, for the same mothers who gave PPA information in both the data sets, the difference in mean duration of PPA was not statistically significant. The correlates were identical in both the data sets. The current status data were more complete in terms of the coverage, and perhaps less distorted by reporting errors caused by recall lapse.A positive relationship of the mean duration of PPA was found with longer breast-feeding, higher parity and age of mother at the birth of the child, and the survival status of the child. An inverse relationship was found with higher education of a woman, higher education of her husband and higher socioeconomic status of her household, these variables possibly acting as proxies for women's better nutritional status.

scholarly journals Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperation

2010 ◽  
Vol 365 (1553) ◽  
pp. 2627-2633 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. McNamara ◽  
Olof Leimar
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Environmental Influences ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Trait Variation ◽  
Social Sensitivity ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
Contingent Behaviour

In applying game theory to problems in biology, differences between individuals are often ignored. In particular, when analysing the evolution of cooperation it is often implicitly assumed that ignoring variation will produce predictions that approximate the solution when differences are included. This need not be true. As we demonstrate, differences are not innocuous noise, but can fundamentally change the nature of a game. Even small amounts of variability can stabilize cooperation by, for example, maintaining the need to deal with cheaters. Differences promote the need to learn about others in an interaction, leading to contingent behaviour that can reduce conflict, and to negotiated outcomes that may or may not be more cooperative than unconditional actions. Once there are mechanisms such as mutation and environmental influences that maintain variation within populations, whether cooperation evolves may depend on the variation in the cooperativeness trait. Variation means that it may be worth taking a chance that a partner is cooperative by being cooperative. When there are markets, so that individuals can break off interactions to seek a better partner, variation promotes choosiness and hence penalizes those uncooperative individuals, who are rejected. Variation promotes the need to monitor the previous behaviour of others, and once this social sensitivity exists, the need to maintain a good reputation can promote cooperation.

scholarly journals Overview on MTD technology based on game theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 309 ◽  
pp. 02012
Author(s):  
Yan Sun ◽  
Weifeng Ji ◽  
Jiang Weng ◽  
Beiying Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Network Security ◽  
Future Development ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Defense Behavior ◽  
Markov Games ◽  
Network Defense ◽  
Decision Method ◽  
Development Direction ◽  
Mobile Target

Mobile target defense (MTD) is a research hotspot in the field of network security. The decision method of network defense based on game theory is an important technique to guide MTD to make the optimal defense behavior in different network environments (GT-MTD). A lot of related work has been put forward in this field. In this paper, we focus on the scope and field of GT-MTD, systematically introduce the application scenarios of MTD in combination with four different game theory models of classical games (static games, signal games), Markov games, differential games or evolutionary games, and put forward the future development direction. There are some new views and explanations on the research of GT-MTD.

scholarly journals HOW TO OBTAIN A GLOBAL REFERENCE THRESHOLD IN AHP/ANP

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Garuti
Keyword(s):  
Real Life ◽  
Absolute Measurement ◽  
Threshold Value ◽  
Rate Of Change ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Medical Diagnoses ◽  
Specific Objective ◽  
Global Threshold ◽  
Disaster Assessment ◽  
The Difference

This paper has two main objectives. The first objective is to provide a mathematically grounded technique to construct local and global thresholds using the well-known rate of change method. The next objective, which is secondary, is to show the relevance and possibilities of applying the AHP/ANP in absolute measurement (AM) compared to the relative measurement (RM) mode, which is currently widely used in the AHP/ANP community. The ability to construct a global threshold would help increase the use of AHP/ANP in the AM mode (rating mode) in the AHP/ANP community. Therefore, if the first specific objective is achieved, it would facilitate reaching the second, more general objective.   For this purpose, a real-life example based on the construction of a multi-criteria index and threshold will be described. The index measures the degree of lag of a neighborhood through the Urban and Social Deterioration Index (USDI) based on an AHP risks model. The global threshold represents the tolerable lag value for the specific neighborhood. The difference or gap between the neighborhood’s current status (actual USDI value) and this threshold represents the level of neighborhood deterioration that must be addressed to close the gap from a social and urban standpoint. The global threshold value is a composition of 45 terminal criteria with their own local threshold that must be evaluated for the specific neighborhood. This example is the most recent in a large list of AHP applications in AM mode in vastly different decision making fields, such as risk disaster assessment, environmental assessment, the problem of medical diagnoses, social responsibility problems, BOCR analysis for the evolution of nuclear energy in Chile in the next 20 years and many others. (See list of projects in Appendix).

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