scholarly journals Understanding self and others: from origins to disorders

2016 ◽  
Vol 371 (1686) ◽  
pp. 20150066
Author(s):  
Caroline Catmur ◽  
Emily S. Cross ◽  
Harriet Over

In order to interpret and engage with the social world, individuals must understand how they relate to others. Self–other understanding forms the backbone of social cognition and is a central concept explored by research into basic processes such as action perception and empathy, as well as research on more sophisticated social behaviours such as cooperation and intergroup interaction. This theme issue integrates the latest research into self–other understanding from evolutionary biology, anthropology, psychology, neuroscience and psychiatry. By gathering perspectives from a diverse range of disciplines, the contributions showcase ways in which research in these areas both informs and is informed by approaches spanning the biological and social sciences, thus deepening our understanding of how we relate to others in a social world.

1999 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
José Manuel Martín Morillas

In this paper it is argued that, despite the welcome psycho-social emphasis in educational linguistic theories witnessed in recent decades, and with it, a rapprochement of the social sciences to the psychological sciences, the relationship between these fields has not gone far enough. The actual challenge is a move towards the unification of the social, psychological and language sciences (anthropology and sociology; cognitive science; and linguistics). A step in this interdisciplinary direction is offered by the discipline called 'cognitive anthropolinguistics', and its central concept of 'cultural cognition'. The paper discusses the implication of this concept for the field of educational linguistics, followed by a brief illustration of a cognitive-cultural application of that concept, namely the concept of 'ethnic stereotype', as part of a socio-cultural guide for a cross-cultural pedagogical grammar.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Rebat Kumar Dhakal

Highlights Social inquiry is much more than the study of society. It further excavates historical facts, critically reflects on everyday happenings, and envisions the future we wish to create. The intent of initiating this dialogue on social inquiry is two-fold: a) to offer a sociological perspective (i.e. ‘thinking sociologically’), and b) to expand our understanding of sociological thinking. Sociological thinking can be developed by examining the periphery of the core. Context matters in understanding any phenomenon under the sociological microscope. Sociological thinking allows many different viewpoints to coexist within a larger structure and that it respects pluralism. Sociological thinking is about developing or providing a perspective to examine social nuances. Sociological thinking should act as a means for social transformation.  Social inquiry serves as a methodology for the social sciences and humanities. It deals with the philosophy of social science and the workings of the social world – giving a way for understanding both the biosphere and the sociosphere.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-242
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Monk-Turner

PurposeThis work examines assumptions of positivism and the traditional scientific method.Design/methodology/approachInsights from quantum mechanics are explored especially as they relate to method, measurement and what is knowable. An argument is made that how social scientists, particularly sociologists, understand the nature of “reality out there” and describe the social world may be challenged by quantum ideas. The benefits of utilized mixed methods, considering quantum insights, cannot be overstated.FindingsIt is the proposition of this work that insights from modern physics alter the understanding of the world “out there.” Wheeler suggested that the most profound implication from modern physics is that “there is no out there” (1982; see also Baggott, 1992). Grappling with how modern physics may alter understanding in the social sciences will be difficult; however, that does not mean the task should not be undertaken (see Goswami, 1993). A starting point for the social sciences may be relinquishing an old mechanistic science that depends on the establishment of an objective, empirically based, verifiable reality. Mechanistic science demands “one true reality – a clear-cut reality on which everyone can agree…. Mechanistic science is by definition reductionistic…it has had to try to reduce complexity to oversimplification and process to statis. This creates an illusionary world…that has little or nothing to do with the complexity of the process of the reality of creation as we know, experience, and participate in it” (Goswami, 1993, pp. 64, 66).Research limitations/implicationsMany physicists have popularized quantum ideas for others interested in contemplating the implications of modern physics. Because of the difficulty in conceiving of quantum ideas, the meaning of the quantum in popular culture is far removed from the parent discipline. Thus, the culture has been shaped by the rhetoric and ideas surrounding the basic quantum mathematical formulas. And, over time, as quantum ideas have come to be part of the popular culture, even the link to the popularized literature in physics is lost. Rather, quantum ideas may be viewed as cultural formations that take on a life of their own.Practical implicationsThe work allows a critique of positivist method and provides insight on how to frame qualitative methodology in a new way.Social implicationsThe work utilizes popularized ideas in quantum theory: the preeminent theory that describes all matter. Little work in sociology utilizes this perspective in understanding research methods.Originality/valueQuantum insights have rarely been explored in highlighting limitations in positivism. The current work aims to build on quantum insights and how these may help us better understand the social world around us.


2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Bateson

Charles Darwin has had an extraordinary impact on many aspects of human affairs apart from revolutionizing biology. On the 200th anniversary of his birth, the Cambridge Darwin Festival in July 2009 celebrated these contributions to the humanities, philosophy and religion and the approach to medicine, economics and the social sciences. He is a man to revere. It is no discredit to him that the science of evolutionary biology should continue to evolve. In this article I shall consider some of the ways in which this has happened since his day.


2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 329-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Mesoudi ◽  
Andrew Whiten ◽  
Kevin N. Laland

We suggest that human culture exhibits key Darwinian evolutionary properties, and argue that the structure of a science of cultural evolution should share fundamental features with the structure of the science of biological evolution. This latter claim is tested by outlining the methods and approaches employed by the principal subdisciplines of evolutionary biology and assessing whether there is an existing or potential corresponding approach to the study of cultural evolution. Existing approaches within anthropology and archaeology demonstrate a good match with the macroevolutionary methods of systematics, paleobiology, and biogeography, whereas mathematical models derived from population genetics have been successfully developed to study cultural microevolution. Much potential exists for experimental simulations and field studies of cultural microevolution, where there are opportunities to borrow further methods and hypotheses from biology. Potential also exists for the cultural equivalent of molecular genetics in “social cognitive neuroscience,” although many fundamental issues have yet to be resolved. It is argued that studying culture within a unifying evolutionary framework has the potential to integrate a number of separate disciplines within the social sciences.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 567-585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Beck

ArgumentFriedrich August von Hayek (1899–1992) is mainly known for his defense of free-market economics and liberalism. His views on science – more specifically on the methodological differences between the physical sciences on the one hand, and evolutionary biology and the social sciences on the other – are less well known. Yet in order to understand, and properly evaluate Hayek's political position, we must look at the theory of scientific method that underpins it. Hayek believed that a basic misunderstanding of the discipline of economics and the complex phenomena with which it deals produced misconceptions concerning its method and goals, which led in turn to the adoption of dangerous policies. The objective of this article is to trace the development of Hayek's views on the nature of economics as a scientific discipline and to examine his conclusions concerning the scope of economic prediction. In doing so, I will first show that Hayek's interest in the natural sciences (especially biology), as well as his interest in epistemology, were central to his thought, dating back to his formative years. I will then emphasize the important place of historical analysis in Hayek's reflections on methodology and examine the reasons for his strong criticism of positivism and socialism. Finally, in the third and fourth sections that constitute the bulk of this article, I will show how Hayek's understanding of the data and goal of the social sciences (which he distinguished from those of the physical sciences), culminated in an analogy that sought to establish economics and evolutionary biology as exemplary complex sciences. I will challenge Hayek's interpretation of this analogy through a comparison with Darwin's views inThe Origin of Species, and thus open a door to re-evaluating the theoretical foundations of Hayek's political claims.


2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Lauer

The predictive inadequacy of the social sciences is well documented, and philosophers have sought to diagnose it. This paper examines Brian Epstein’s recent diagnosis. He argues that the social sciences treat the social world as entirely composed of individual people. Instead, social scientists should recognize that material, non-individualistic entities determine the social world, as well. First, I argue that Epstein’s argument both begs the question against his opponents and is not sufficiently charitable. Second, I present doubts that his proposal will improve predictive success for the social sciences, which I support with Edith Penrose’s resource-based theory of the firm.


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