scholarly journals A Dynamic Affective Core to Bind the Contents, Context, and Value of Conscious Experience

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth T. Kishida ◽  
L. Paul Sands
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Dopaminergic System ◽  
Behavioral Control ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Dynamic Nature ◽  
Dynamic Changes ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Foundational Work ◽  
The Hard Problem

The private and dynamic nature of conscious subjective experience poses an empirical challenge that has led neuroscience-based theories about consciousness to note the importance of 'the hard problem' of explaining how subjective phenomenal experience can arise from neural activity but set it aside and focus on the 'easier' problems associated with information representation and behavior. This approach leaves a major gap in our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying conscious subjective experience and its dynamic nature. However, computational methods integrated with a variety of tools for measuring human brain activity are beginning to link dynamic changes in subjective affect with reproducible neurobehavioral signals in humans. In particular, research applying computational reinforcement learning theory has shown tremendous utility in investigating human choice behavior and the role the dopaminergic system plays in dynamic behavioral control. This research is beginning to reveal an explicit connection between the dynamics of dopaminergic signals and dynamic changes in subjective affect. However, it should be obvious that the dopaminergic system alone is not sufficient to explain all of the complexities of affective dynamics. We review foundational work, highlight current problems and open questions, and propose a Dynamic Affective Core Hypothesis that integrates advances in our understanding of the representation of the content and context of conscious experiences with our nascent understanding about how these representations acquire and retain affective subjective value.

Neurosurgery and consciousness: historical sketch and future possibilities

2012 ◽  
Vol 117 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harutomo Hasegawa ◽  
Graham A. Jamieson ◽  
Keyoumars Ashkan
Keyword(s):  
21St Century ◽  
Systematic Study ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Intracranial Recording ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Historical Sketch

Neurosurgery has played an important role in the development of neuroscience and the science of consciousness. In this paper, the authors reflect on some of the historical contributions of neurosurgeons to the science of consciousness and discuss the ways in which clinical neurosurgery can contribute to the science of consciousness in the 21st century. An approach to the “hard problem” is proposed based on the principles of psychophysics, and the opportunities offered by intracranial recording and stimulation in patients capable of reporting changes in subjective experience are discussed. Such an approach will allow the systematic study and description of the bridging relationships between neurobiology and conscious experience.

scholarly journals The function of consciousness is to generate experience

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Cleeremans ◽  
Catherine Tallon-Baudry
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
The Core ◽  
Core Function ◽  
Functional Advantage ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
In Virtue Of

Why would we do anything at all if the doing was not doing something to us? In other words: What is consciousness good for? Here, reversing classical views, according to many of which subjective experience is a mere epiphenomenon that affords no functional advantage, we propose that the core function of consciousness is precisely to enable subject-level experience. “What it feels like” is endowed with intrinsic value, and it is precisely the value agents associate with their experiences that explains why we do certain things and avoid others. Thus, we argue that it is only in virtue of the fact that conscious agents experience things and care about those experiences that they are motivated to act in certain ways and that they prefer some states of affairs vs. others. In this sense, conscious experience functions as a mental currency of sorts, which not only endows mental states with intrinsic value, but also makes it possible for conscious agents to compare vastly different experiences in a common subject-centered space — a feature that readily explains the fact that consciousness is unified. If, as we argue, the function of consciousness is to endow agents with subjective experience, then the hard problem of consciousness seems to dissolve.

scholarly journals .The superdeterministic destiny, and its mathematical models within the neural network

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
World Line ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Elementary Particles ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Center Stage ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Universe

The physical interactions among any number of elementary particles are governed by Schrodinger equation. The universe is a superdeterministic state machine which is formed by elementary particles. Mind’s “center stage”, which is a component of the mind, is imagined to exist as a real-time representation of all the elementary particles within the universe; the “center stage” only includes the physical objects perceived in the mind. A naïve cognitive researcher might incorrectly treat her mind’s “center stage” as the real world. It’s possible that the “center stage” doesn’t exist like “the ghost in the machine”. Otherwise, this “center stage” shouldn’t be able to impact the world line of any elementary particle. So, the human body is merely a fuzzy set of elementary particles, no matter the “center stage” really exist or not. The precondition of the “hard problem” of consciousness makes a mistake. Proving the precondition of the “hard problem”, is a “harder problem” of consciousness. The “harder problem” can’t be proved empirically. The conscious experience is actually the use of a mathematical model by a neural network within its low-level calculation. For example, when a neural network uses its 3D model of the reality, it feels like the subjective experience of being immersed within a topological structure.

Contemporary Echoes of the World Soul

2021 ◽  
pp. 320-342
Author(s):  
Valia Allori
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Quantum Theory ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Quantum Theories ◽  
The World ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Way

Quantum mechanics is a groundbreaking theory: it not only is extraordinarily empirically adequate but also is claimed to having shattered the classical paradigm of understanding the observer-observed distinction as well as the part-whole relation. This, together with other quantum features, has been taken to suggest that quantum theory can help one understand the mind-body relation in a unique way, in particular to solve the hard problem of consciousness along the lines of panpsychism. In this chapter, after having briefly presented panpsychism, Valia Allori discusses the main features of quantum theories and the way in which the main quantum theories of consciousness use them to account for conscious experience.

scholarly journals Towards more authentic simulation-based learning – Nursing students’ experiences

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Mari Helena Salminen-Tuomaala ◽  
Elina Leppäkangs ◽  
Sami Perälä
Keyword(s):  
Nursing Students ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Authentic Learning ◽  
Nursing Role ◽  
Expert Teacher ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Effective Form ◽  
Simulation Based ◽  
Realistic Representation

Background: Nursing students need opportunities for authentic learning in contexts that strongly resemble real-life clinical settings.Objective: This qualitative study describes final year nursing students’ experiences of simulation authenticity and presents development needs proposed by the students. The study aimed at producing knowledge that can be used by educators and technology specialists to develop simulation pedagogy for acute nursing.Methods: Eleven final-year nursing students specializing in acute nursing (intensive care and in- and out-of-hospital emergency care) responded to a questionnaire with four open questions in December 2019. Inductive content analysis was used to analyze the data.Results: The students stressed the importance of their own preparations and living into the nursing role with proper briefing from an expert teacher, supported by a realistic representation of the setting using real equipment, actors, visualization and other multisensory cues.Conclusions: Students’ subjective experience of authenticity depends on many factors; preparation, awareness of objectives, support from the facilitator and the level of environmental fidelity. Simulations, which reach a reasonable degree of authenticity in the students’ experience, can be considered an effective form of authentic learning.

scholarly journals Uncoupling Sensation and Perception in Human Time Processing

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 1369-1380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Binetti ◽  
Alessandro Tomassini ◽  
Karl Friston ◽  
Sven Bestmann
Keyword(s):  
Constant Velocity ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Posterior Cingulate Cortex ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Subjective Duration ◽  
Msec Duration ◽  
Sensory Cortices ◽  
Higher Visual Areas

Timing emerges from a hierarchy of computations ranging from early encoding of physical duration (time sensation) to abstract time representations (time perception) suitable for storage and decisional processes. However, the neural basis of the perceptual experience of time remains elusive. To address this, we dissociate brain activity uniquely related to lower-level sensory and higher-order perceptual timing operations, using event-related fMRI. Participants compared subsecond (500 msec) sinusoidal gratings drifting with constant velocity (standard) against two probe stimuli: (1) control gratings drifting at constant velocity or (2) accelerating gratings, which induced illusory shortening of time. We tested two probe intervals: a 500-msec duration (Short) and a longer duration required for an accelerating probe to be perceived as long as the standard (Long—individually determined). On each trial, participants classified the probe as shorter or longer than the standard. This allowed for comparison of trials with an “Objective” (physical) or “Subjective” (perceived) difference in duration, based on participant classifications. Objective duration revealed responses in bilateral early extrastriate areas, extending to higher visual areas in the fusiform gyrus (at more lenient thresholds). By contrast, Subjective duration was reflected by distributed responses in a cortical/subcortical areas. This comprised the left superior frontal gyrus and the left cerebellum, and a wider set of common timing areas including the BG, parietal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex. These results suggest two functionally independent timing stages: early extraction of duration information in sensory cortices and Subjective experience of duration in a higher-order cortical–subcortical timing areas.

scholarly journals Neurophenomenology of near-death experience memory in hypnotic recall: a within-subject EEG study

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Martial ◽  
Armand Mensen ◽  
Vanessa Charland-Verville ◽  
Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse ◽  
Daniel Rentmeister ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Alpha Activity ◽  
High Density ◽  
Proof Of Concept ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Death Experience ◽  
Eeg Changes ◽  
The One ◽  
Near Death Experiences

Abstract The neurobiological basis of near-death experiences (NDEs) is unknown, but a few studies attempted to investigate it by reproducing in laboratory settings phenomenological experiences that seem to closely resemble NDEs. So far, no study has induced NDE-like features via hypnotic modulation while simultaneously measuring changes in brain activity using high-density EEG. Five volunteers who previously had experienced a pleasant NDE were invited to re-experience the NDE memory and another pleasant autobiographical memory (dating to the same time period), in normal consciousness and with hypnosis. We compared the hypnosis-induced subjective experience with the one of the genuine experience memory. Continuous high-density EEG was recorded throughout. At a phenomenological level, we succeeded in recreating NDE-like features without any adverse effects. Absorption and dissociation levels were reported as higher during all hypnosis conditions as compared to normal consciousness conditions, suggesting that our hypnosis-based protocol increased the felt subjective experience in the recall of both memories. The recall of a NDE phenomenology was related to an increase of alpha activity in frontal and posterior regions. This study provides a proof-of-concept methodology for studying the phenomenon, enabling to prospectively explore the NDE-like features and associated EEG changes in controlled settings.

scholarly journals “The end of the Dreyfus affair”

2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Mustafa Ali
Keyword(s):  
Human Computer Interaction ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Dreyfus Affair ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Hubert Dreyfus ◽  
Computer Interaction

In this paper, the possibility of developing a Heideggerian solution to the Schizophrenia Problem associated with cognitive technologies is investigated. This problem arises as a result of the computer bracketing emotion from cognition during human-computer interaction and results in human psychic self-amputation. It is argued that, in order to solve the Schizophrenia Problem, it is necessary to first solve the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness since emotion is at least partially experiential. Heidegger’s thought, particularly as interpreted by Hubert Dreyfus, appears relevant in this regard since it ostensibly provides the basis for solving the ‘hard problem’ via the construction of artificial systems capable of the emergent generation of conscious experience. However, it will be shown that Heidegger’s commitment to a non-experiential conception of nature renders this whole approach problematic, thereby necessitating consideration of alternative, post-Heideggerian approaches to solving the Schizophrenia Problem.

scholarly journals Integrated Information Theory and Isomorphic Feed-Forward Philosophical Zombies

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (11) ◽  
pp. 1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jake R. Hanson ◽  
Sara I. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Original System ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Mathematical Framework ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Labeling Scheme ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

Any theory amenable to scientific inquiry must have testable consequences. This minimal criterion is uniquely challenging for the study of consciousness, as we do not know if it is possible to confirm via observation from the outside whether or not a physical system knows what it feels like to have an inside—a challenge referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness. To arrive at a theory of consciousness, the hard problem has motivated development of phenomenological approaches that adopt assumptions of what properties consciousness has based on first-hand experience and, from these, derive the physical processes that give rise to these properties. A leading theory adopting this approach is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which assumes our subjective experience is a “unified whole”, subsequently yielding a requirement for physical feedback as a necessary condition for consciousness. Here, we develop a mathematical framework to assess the validity of this assumption by testing it in the context of isomorphic physical systems with and without feedback. The isomorphism allows us to isolate changes in Φ without affecting the size or functionality of the original system. Indeed, the only mathematical difference between a “conscious” system with Φ > 0 and an isomorphic “philosophical zombie” with Φ = 0 is a permutation of the binary labels used to internally represent functional states. This implies Φ is sensitive to functionally arbitrary aspects of a particular labeling scheme, with no clear justification in terms of phenomenological differences. In light of this, we argue any quantitative theory of consciousness, including IIT, should be invariant under isomorphisms if it is to avoid the existence of isomorphic philosophical zombies and the epistemological problems they pose.

Workload and Performance: Associations, Insensitivities, and Dissociations

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 374-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. A. Hancock ◽  
Gerald Matthews
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Physiological Reactivity ◽  
Human Machine Interaction ◽  
Objective Performance ◽  
Self Reports ◽  
Practical Design ◽  
Future Prediction ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Machine Interaction

Objective: The aim of this study was to distill and define those influences under which change in objective performance level and the linked cognitive workload reflections of subjective experience and physiological variation either associate, dissociate, or are insensitive, one to another. Background: Human factors/ergonomics frequently employs users’ self-reports of their own conscious experience, as well as their physiological reactivity, to augment the understanding of changing performance capacity. Under some circumstances, these latter workload responses are the only available assessment information to hand. How such perceptions and physiological responses match, fail to match, or are insensitive to the change in primary-task performance can prove critical to operational success. The reasons underlying these associations, dissociations, and insensitivities are central to the success of future effective human–machine interaction. Method: Using extant research on the relations between differing methods of workload assessment, factors influencing their association, dissociation, and insensitivity are identified. Results: Dissociations and insensitivities occur more frequently than extant explanatory theories imply. Methodological and conceptual reasons for these patterns of incongruity are identified and evaluated. Application: We often seek convergence of results in order to provide coherent explanations as bases for future prediction and practical design implementation. Identifying and understanding the causes as to why different reflections of workload diverge can help practitioners toward operational success.

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