Islamic ethical values of corporate top leadership and real earnings management

2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 869-884 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rahayu Abdul Rahman ◽  
Normah Hj Omar ◽  
Asheq Rahman ◽  
Ruhaini Muda

Purpose This paper aims to study the roles of Muslim CEO, Muslim Chairman and Muslim board of directors in mitigating earnings management via real activities manipulation. Design/methodology/approach In total, 656 firm year-observations from 2007 to 2014 of Malaysian Top 100 firms listed on Bursa Malaysia is used to examine the relationship between real earnings management (REM) and the religious ethical values of Muslim top leadership of the firms. Findings The study provides evidence that there was no significant relationship between ethical values and REM measures among Muslim top corporate leaders. However, through additional analysis on sub-sample firms, this study finds that Muslim CEO and Muslim Chairman have a significant and negative association with proxies of REM: RCFO and RPC. Research limitations/implications The results show that Muslim CEO and Muslim Chairman are the actors that contribute more control in limiting REM especially in family-owned firms in Malaysia. Originality/value This is the first published paper that focuses on Islamic ethical values of corporate top leadership and REM in Malaysia, as previous studies have focused more on accruals earnings management.

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kais Baatour ◽  
Hakim Ben Othman ◽  
Khaled Hussainey

Purpose The study aims to examine the effect of multiple directorships on accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. It analyses whether earnings management practices in the Saudi context increase or decrease with the average number of multiple directorships. Design/methodology/approach The study uses the approach by Roychowdhury (2006) to capture the level of real earnings management and uses the cross-sectional model by Jones (1991) to measure accrual-based earnings management. Findings The paper provides partial evidence supporting the “busyness” hypothesis where earnings management practices increase with the number of multiple directorships. The evidence shows that multiple directorships have a positive and significant effect on real earnings management in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, we find no significant impact of multiple directorships on accrual-based earnings management. Originality/value This is the first study that empirically investigates the relationship between multiple directorships and earnings management in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The paper contributes to the limited literature on multiple directorships in developing countries by examining their impact on opportunistic real earnings management.


2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 432-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Moradi ◽  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mohammad Zamanirad

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of managers’ incentive bonuses on both accrual and real earnings management. Design/methodology/approach – First, the authors investigate the relationship between managers’ bonuses and both accrual earnings management (measured by a modified Jones model) and real earnings management (measured by Roychowdhury proxies). Next, the authors examine whether management has any preferences for earnings management methods to enhance its bonuses. Finally, the authors investigate the possible effects of earnings management on future operating performance. The sample consists of compositional data in the period from 2006 to 2012. Findings – The authors find a negative relationship between real earnings management and managers’ bonuses and detect that managers prefer to use accrual earnings management to earn more bonuses. The results also show that real earnings management will reduce a firm’s performance in future periods, and on the other hand that increasing managers’ bonuses links to improvement of the firm’s future performance. The results suggest that managers are typically aware of the negative effects of real earnings management on the firm’s future performance and thus prefer to improve the firm’s performance in securing their bonuses when their ability to manage accruals is constrained. Originality/value – The implications of this paper provide further evidence on how managers’ bonuses affect their discretion in using accrual and real earnings management. This finding is important to investors and regulators.


Author(s):  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mahmoud Mousavi Shiri ◽  
Seyedeh Zahra Hossini

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to emphasize the relationship between managerial ability, earnings management, internal control quality and audit fees to establish whether or not there is a significant relationship between the variables of managerial ability, earnings management, internal control quality and the audit fees. Design/methodology/approach The study sample includes 190 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2009–2016. Research hypotheses were tested using the statistical methods of multivariable linear regression and data envelopment analysis pattern. Findings The obtained results indicate that there is a significant and direct relationship between managerial ability and internal control quality as well as real earnings management and internal control quality. Based on the results obtained from the second hypothesis, the authors could claim that there is an inverse and significant relationship managerial ability and audit fees. The third hypothesis also revealed that in companies with lower audit fees, there is a stronger relationship between managerial ability and internal control quality. The results of related tests show no significant relationship between accrual-based earnings management and internal control quality. Originality/value This paper is the first study in Iran whose main focus is on the relationship between managerial ability, earnings management, internal control quality and audit fees.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 339-362
Author(s):  
Mouna Ben Rejeb Attia

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine borrowing capacity (BC) of government-owned firms and whether real earnings management (REM) activities moderate the sensitivity of firm BC to government ownership. Design/methodology/approach A simultaneous equation analysis is applied to study 210 Tunisian non-financial firms over the 2001–2014 period. Findings The empirical results provide substantial evidence indicating that government-owned firms have higher BC and significant REM than other firms; the relationship between government ownership and firm BC is partially moderated by REM activities. Practical implications The findings imply that the implicit credit guarantee of government is not necessarily the unique determinant of firm BC and highlight the role of lenders in monitoring discretionary real transactions in government-owned and protected firms. These implications should be taken in to account by public sector policy makers. In particular, the findings predict that the current government accounting reform in Tunisia on the basis of IPSAS will, probably, improve information quality, but it is still insufficient to control real activities in public institutions. Originality/value This study extends a growing research stream on the relationship between BC and government ownership by focusing on the moderating effect of REM on this relationship and by considering the endogeneity issue. The findings provide evidence that government-owned firms use REM practices to improve their BC. Examining these practices in developing countries provides an opportunity to evaluate the efficiency of their public sector reforms and their effect on a firm’s performance and financing decisions.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sana Mardessi

Purpose The purpose of this study is to address the impact of audit quality on financial reporting quality proxied by real earnings management. To further clarify the mentioned links, this study empirically assesses the moderating effect of audit quality. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on a sample consisting of 90 non-financial companies that are listed in the Amsterdam stock exchange in AEX all share index over the 2010–2017 period. This study applies a quantitative approach and secondary data as the main source of information for analysis. This paper performs an ordinary least squares regression to examine the moderating effect of audit quality on the relationship between financial reporting quality. Findings Empirical findings demonstrate that corporate governance mechanism, mainly independence members, financial expert and audit committee size has a statistically significant relationship with real earnings management. However, the effect of audit committee meetings on real earnings management is not significant. There is also evidence that audit quality moderates the audit committee – real earnings management links. Originality/value This study extends the existing literature by examining the moderating effect of audit quality on the relationship between financial reporting quality proxied by real earnings management in the Dutch context.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Belal Ali Abdulraheem Ghaleb ◽  
Hasnah Kamardin ◽  
Abdulwahid Ahmed Hashed

PurposeThe main aim of this study is to examine the effect of investment in outside governance monitoring (IOGM), through non-executive directors' remuneration (NEDR) and external audit fees (AFEE), on real earnings management (REM) in an emerging market in the Southeast Asia region, Malaysia.Design/methodology/approachThe data comprises 1,056 observations from manufacturing companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for the four-year period, 2013 to 2016. The study tests IOGM individually and aggregately with REM. Feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression is used to test the hypotheses.FindingsThe results show that NEDR is negatively and significantly associated with REM. Likewise, AFEE is significantly associated with lower REM. Aggregate IOGM significantly mitigates REM. Additional tests conducted show consistent findings.Research limitations/implicationsThis evidence supports agency theory and signaling theory, that a high level of investment in governance monitoring signals a high demand for monitoring and fewer agency problems. It justifies more investment in outside scrutiny and monitoring to limit the existence of managers' opportunistic behavior in concentrated markets. This study relies on an aggregate measure of REM and focuses on manufacturing companies in Malaysia; thus, the results may not be the same using other measurements and samples.Originality/valueThe study, to the best of the researchers' knowledge, is the first to document evidence in an emerging market suggesting that higher NEDR and AFEE are individually and aggregately associated with lower REM. Policymakers, shareholders and researchers may consider investment in these two mechanisms as a proxy of high-quality monitoring that mitigates REM.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Radwan Alkebsee ◽  
Adeeb A. Alhebry ◽  
Gaoliang Tian

PurposeScholars have investigated the association between executives' incentives and earnings management. Most of the extant literature focuses on equity executives' incentives, while most of the earnings management literature focuses on accrual earnings management (AEM), not real earnings management (REM). This paper investigates the association between chief executive officers’ (CEOs) and chief financial officer (CFOs) cash compensation and REM and explores who has more influence on REM, the CEO or the CFO.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use the data of all listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period from 2009 to 2017 and ordinary least squares regression as a baseline model and the Chow test to capture whether the CEO's or the CFO's cash compensation has more influence on REM. To address potential endogeneity issues, the authors use a firm-fixed effect technique and two-stage least squares regression.FindingsThe authors find that CEOs' and CFOs' cash compensation is significantly associated with REM, suggesting that paying non-equity compensation to the CEO and CFO is negatively associated with REM. The authors also find that the CFO's cash compensation has a more significant influence on REM than the CEO's cash compensation, suggesting that the CFO's accounting and financial knowledge strengthens his or her power on the quality of financial reporting.Practical implicationsThe study contributes to the literature of agency and contract theories by using cash-based compensation to provide strong evidence that CEO's and CFO's compensation is associated with REM. It also contributes to the earnings management literature by examining the effect of CEOs' and CFOs' cash compensation on earnings management using proxies for REM-related activities. The study also contributes to the institutional theory by providing empirical evidence on the governance role of executives' cash compensation in deterring REM. Finally, it is the first to examine the relationship between CEO's and CFO's cash compensation and REM, and the first to explore who is more influential regarding REM in emerging markets, the CEO or the CFO.Originality/valueAs a response to the call for investigations of the role of non-equity-based compensation in earnings management and the call to consider non-developed institutional contexts in governance research, this study extends prior studies by providing novel evidence on the relationship between CEOs' and CFOs' non-equity compensation and REM in China's emerging market. The study documents that the CFO has a greater influence on REM than the CEO does.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 508-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noorul Azwin binti Md Nasir ◽  
Muhammad Jahangir Ali ◽  
Rushdi M.R. Razzaque ◽  
Kamran Ahmed

Purpose We examine whether the fraud firms are engaged in real earnings management and accrual earnings management prior to the fraud year in the Malaysian context. Design/methodology/approach Our sample comprises of 65 financial statement fraud and 65 non-fraud firms over a period of eight years from 2001 to 2008. Findings Using the abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) and abnormal production costs as the proxies for real earnings management, we find that financial statement fraud firms engage in manipulating production costs during preceding two years of the fraud event. However, our results show that financial fraud firms engage in manipulating CFO prior to the fraud event. Additionally, we find that financial statement fraud firms prefer to manipulate earnings using accruals relative to real earnings prior to the fraud year. Originality/value Our results demonstrate that real earnings management is more aggressive in financial statement fraud firms compared to the non-fraud firms in the four years prior to fraud.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yvonne Joseph Ason ◽  
Imbarine Bujang ◽  
Agnes Paulus Jidwin ◽  
Jamaliah Said

Purpose Prior studies had documented that CEOs with accounting backgrounds are more conservative as compared to their non-accounting backgrounds counterparts. However, prior studies also suggested that CEOs with accounting backgrounds tend to engage in earnings management activities because they have the knowledge to do so. Motivated by these findings, this study aims to examine empirically the possibility of executive compensation to play a moderating role in influencing the behaviour of CEO with accounting backgrounds towards earnings management. Design/methodology/approach This study uses the data from 2013 to 2017 from Malaysian FTSE Top 30 companies. The data on the education backgrounds of the CEOs were collected manually from the companies’ annual reports. CEOs with accounting qualification was coded 1, and 0, otherwise. The earnings management were the discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model. Meanwhile, the data on executive compensation was also collected manually from the companies’ annual reports. All other governance data were also collected manually from the annual reports, and financial data was collected using the Thompson Reuters DataStream application. Findings This study found that compensation suffered multicollinearity with the CEO accounting background, thus ineligible to act as a moderating variable between the latter and earnings management. The result further documented a negative but insignificant relationship between compensation with earnings management. Originality/value This study discusses the possibility of executive compensation as a moderating variable in the relationship between CEOs with accounting backgrounds and earnings management, whereby, to the authors’ best knowledge, such a discussion is limited in the existing literature.


2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Sun ◽  
George Lan ◽  
Guoping Liu

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of independent audit committees in constraining real earnings management. This study examines the relationships between audit committee characteristics and real activities manipulation. Design/methodology/approach – US firms with stronger incentives to undertake real earnings management are selected as a sample. Regressions are run for the empirical analyses. Findings – It is found that audit committee members' additional directorships are positively associated with real earnings management measured by abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs, suggesting that audit committees with high additional directorships are less effective in constraining real earnings management. The findings are consistent with the notion that audit committee members' busyness impairs their monitoring effectiveness. Originality/value – This study extends the extant research on audit committees' oversight of real earnings management by using refined research design and updated data. This study also provides further evidence on how audit committee members' additional directorships affect their ability to oversee both accrual and real earnings management.


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