Combating the financing of proliferation: challenges and new tools

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 1107-1121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian John Stewart ◽  
Andrea Viski ◽  
Jonathan Brewer
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Task Force ◽  
National Level ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Original Research ◽  
Financial Crime ◽  
Task Force Report ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing

Purpose This paper aims to examine why most governments appear to attach less importance to countering proliferation finance than they do to countering money laundering or terrorist financing. Design/methodology/approach The paper examines this question from a number of perspectives including a definitional perspective, a national regulatory perspective and a private sector implementation perspective. Findings It is shown that there are presently significant gaps in counter proliferation finance implementation at the national level, with follow-on implications for private sector compliance. Research limitations/implications A key finding is that most governments do not address the issue of proliferation finance as distinct from other forms of financial crime such as terrorist financing or money laundering. Practical implications Practical opportunities for improved financial sector implementation of counter proliferation finance controls are identified, but it is argued that it is states that must do more to meet their obligations for improvements to be realised. Social implications The risk of not doing so is that the financial system will continue to be misused to finance the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Originality/value The study seeks to fill a gap in existing academic literature on the question of why proliferation finance receives less attention than other forms of financial crime. The study builds on original research undertaken by the authors including the typologies of proliferation finance, which were later incorporated into an updated Financial Action Task Force report on this topic, as well as events organised by the authors to explore the topic of proliferation finance implementation with governments and the private sector.

Measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in Palestine

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Murrar Firas
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Evaluation Process ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Assessment Process ◽  
National Committee ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Mutual Evaluation ◽  
Combat Money Laundering

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the evolution of anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) procedures in Palestine since 2004 in accordance with the standards issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Design/methodology/approach This study is qualitative in nature and involves studying the most important improvements made by Palestinian authorities in the state’s legislative and institutional frameworks to enhance the AML/CFT regime. Findings Palestine has established the necessary legal basis to combat money laundering and terrorist financing crimes. At the institutional level, the Financial Follow-up Unit was granted all the required powers of Financial Intelligence Units. The National Committee for Combating Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism has also played a vital role in issuing policies and plans to respond to the outcomes of the National Risk Assessment process. In contrast, a number of challenges still exist mainly with respect to the political factors and their expected consequences on the process of preparing for and conducting the mutual evaluation process for Palestine. Originality/value This study focusses on the AML/CFT efforts in Palestine owing to the nature and specificity of the Palestinian situation, as Palestine’s AML/CFT procedures have not been subject to any previous mutual evaluation process by the MENAFATF. Such efforts have rarely addressed the Palestinian case, making this study important to researchers and those interested in this field.

Identifying and reducing the money laundering risks posed by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as money rules

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehi Eric Esoimeme
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Medium Risk ◽  
Bank Accounts ◽  
The Uk

Purpose This paper aims to help build awareness with financial institutions about the money laundering risks posed by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as Money Mules and theme assures that financial institution scan adopt to detect illicit funds which are being received into the bank accounts of low risk or medium risk customers who are unknowingly recruited as “Money Mules”. Design/methodology/approach The research took the form of a desk study, which analysed various documents and reports such as a 2019 report on Money Mules by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL); a 2019 and 2020 report on Money Mules by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Better Business Bureau (BBB); the Financial Action Task Force Guidance on the Risk Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High Level Principles and Procedures) 2007; the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 2012; the United Kingdom’s Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017; the United States Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual 2014; Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2018; The UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as amended); the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group JMLSG, Prevention of money laundering/combating terrorist financing: Guidance for the UK financial sector Part I June 2017 (Amended December 2017); the United States Codified Bank Secrecy Act Regulations (31 CFR); the Nigerian Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2011 (as amended); and the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group JMLSG, Prevention of money laundering/combating terrorist financing: Guidance for the UK financial sector Part II: Sectoral Guidance June 2017 (Amended December 2017). Findings This paper determined that financial institutions may be able to prevent proceeds of crime from being laundered by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as Money Mules if they focus monitoring resources on the emotionally vulnerable customers like newcomers to the country, unemployed people who may have lost their jobs because of a pandemic like COVID-19, students and those in economic hardship; pay very close attention to the country of origin where the funds emanate from; pay very close attention to the country where the funds are being transferred to; and pay close attention to frequent large cash deposits followed by wire transfers. Originality/value While most articles focus on the money laundering risk(s) associated with Money Mules and the measures that individuals can use to ensure that their bank accounts are not used by criminals to launder illicit funds, this paper focuses on the different mechanisms that banks can use to detect illicit funds which are being received into the bank accounts of low risk or medium risk customers who are unknowingly recruited as “Money Mules”. This paper recommends a proportional approach that balances anti-money laundering measures, financial inclusion and human rights. The mechanisms/measures which have been extensively discussed in this paper will help banks to identify, assess and understand their money laundering and terrorist financing risks as it relates to Money Mules and take commensurate measures to mitigate them.

Cryptocurrencies and financial crime: solutions from Liechtenstein

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann ◽  
Marie-Christin Falker
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Financial Crime ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Content Type ◽  
International Standard ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
International Regulations ◽  
Current Compliance

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how cryptocurrencies are being used as a vehicle for financial crime (such as money laundering, terrorist financing and corruption) and propose a more effective international standard for regulation that uses the Liechtenstein blockchain act as a benchmark. Design/methodology/approach This paper investigates how cryptocurrencies facilitate financial crime through a qualitative study consisting of interviews with 10 presumed providers of illegal financial services and 18 international compliance experts. Findings This study shows that cryptocurrencies are a highly suitable vehicle for money laundering, terrorist financing and corruption and that current compliance efforts in the cryptocurrency sector are ineffective. Research limitations/implications The presented findings illustrate that for a more effective combat of financial crime via cryptocurrency, an international standard for blockchain and cryptocurrency regulation must be created. This paper suggests that Liechtenstein’s innovative and comprehensive blockchain act could be used as a basis for said standard. Practitioners should also consider cooperating transnationally when prosecuting financial crime via cryptocurrency. Originality/value The fact that cryptocurrencies facilitate financial crime is widely known. However, this study combines the perspectives of both compliance experts and presumed criminals to gain a comprehensive understanding of the techniques that money launderers, terrorist financiers and corrupt public officials use. This paper examines the potential for the innovative Liechtenstein blockchain act, which has, thus, far not received empirical attention, to set the benchmark for international regulations.

Legitimacy of the Summer 2017 GCC crisis and Qatar’s AML framework

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 405-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Financial Sector ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
The World ◽  
Regulatory Bodies ◽  
Financial Action Task ◽  
Mutual Evaluation

Purpose In June 2017, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ended diplomatic ties with Qatar. There is a legitimate concern about the accusation levied on Qatar. This paper aims to analyse the progress Qatar’s financial system has made with respect to its anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) regulations, which further serves as the country’s effort to combating the financing of terrorism (CTF). The paper further wishes to advance the discussion by considering the legitimate goals of the aforementioned bodies and their discourse on creating national and international obligations towards reducing terrorist financing through robust AML frameworks. Design/methodology/approach The paper analyses Qatar’s legislative and regulatory overhaul following the Financial Action Task Force’s Mutual Evaluation Report. Qatar had distinctively strengthened its approach against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The paper takes an ex ante approach by understanding Qatar’s “strategic deficiencies” before the FATF’s mutual evaluation. Subsequently, the paper studies independent international evaluations of Qatar’s AML/CTF legislation and regulation. Findings The paper finds Qatar in significant compliance to the recommendations of the various international bodies, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Basel AML Index, IMF’s financial sector reviews, United Nations and independent reports on AML progress from regulatory bodies around the world. None of these organizations present obligatory rules but have set and determined and international standard for AML/CTF laws. Originality/value The primary aim is to draw parallels between Qatar’s regulatory AML and CTF efforts through the country’s compliance with international initiatives, such as the FATF guidelines, Basel AML Index, IMF’s financial sector reviews, United Nations and independent reports on AML progress from regulatory bodies around the world.

scholarly journals The concept of money laundering: a quest for legal definition

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Saleem Korejo ◽  
Ramalinggam Rajamanickam ◽  
Muhamad Helmi Md. Said
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Legal Definition ◽  
Balanced Approach ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Terrorist Acts

Purpose This paper aims to focus on the concept of money laundering and explores the evolution and expansion of criminalization of predicate offences to the money laundering within the international anti-money laundering (AML) regime over the time. It proposes how to limit the size and scope of predicate offences in designing a balanced legal definition. Design/methodology/approach This paper opted a content analysis focussed on the criminalization aspect of offences to money laundering in the international AML regime under the United Nations Conventions (Vienna, Palermo and Corruption Convention) and Financial Action Task Force Standards. Findings This paper provides how the criminalization of money laundering has evolved and its definition expanded over the time. The international definition is widely drafted with wide range of predicate offences from proceeds of drug money to corruption, including terrorist financing and terrorist acts; however, the two phenomena – money laundering and terrorist financing are quiet distinct apart. This continual expansion of predicate offences quite leads legality issues such as over-criminalization and conflict with principles of criminal law. This paper suggests an approach to limit the size and scope of predicate offences to money laundering. Practical implications This paper includes implications for the development of a balanced approach in defining predicate offences through a qualitative limitation approach consistent with the minimalist theory of penalization of criminal law. Originality/value This paper attains an identified issue how the legal definition of the money laundering offence can be improved while considering rule of law and principles of criminal law concerns.

Dirty money in the banking sector

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 527-542
Author(s):  
Reeda Al Sabri Halawi
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Special Investigation ◽  
Task Force Report ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Banking Secrecy ◽  
Legal Provisions

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the Lebanese anti-money laundering (AML) paradigm in light of banking secrecy law. The phenomenon of money laundering that was first associated with the crime of drug trafficking developed a lot since the early 1900s to become a major threat to the world’s economy today. The fight against this ever-growing crime, with multiple sources and origins, has been the centre of attention of the biggest countries in the world. Thus, the need for international AML standards was required, by which countries must abide, to ensure an effective fight against this crime. The issue of banking secrecy regulations was important to study along with the AML framework as the principles of the first totally contradict those of the latter. Design/methodology/approach The scope of this study first entails a qualitative technique. It will start with analysing existing legal provisions on money laundering and studying the AML framework internationally and in accordance with the Lebanese banking system. For that, websites such as GoogleScholar and HeinOnline were used to collect many scholars articles. Additionally, Laws, Regulations and Directives have been examined for the purpose of establishing the legal basis for the fight against money laundering. Moreover, an interview was conducted in 2018 with the Lebanese Financial Prosecutor, which served as data related to the operations of the Special Investigation Commission (SIC) in Lebanon, which is the Lebanese Financial Intelligence Unit. Second, quantitative research has been done. Reports of the Association of Banks in Lebanon, Financial Action Task Force Report and Annual Reports of the SIC of Lebanon have been used to gather information related to the AML/combating the financing of terrorism framework, such as customer due to diligence provisions and know-your-customer requirements and to collect statistics of suspicious reports. Findings The question of “How to balance the confidentiality of the Lebanese banking sector with the interest of the international community in the fight against money laundering?” was interesting to study, as it turned out that the existence of such professional secrecy does not affect the effective implementation of the AML guidelines by banks and other financial institutions. This can only happen when there is a special judicial organ to which banking secrecy is not opposable at any time, and which is the sole organ entrusted with lifting off this professional secrecy and allowing the disclosure of information to the competent authorities. Thus, the Lebanese banking system can ensure total compliance with the AML framework while still adopting banking secrecy regulations. Originality/value The choice of Lebanon was compelling because of the special level of protection its banking secrecy law offers.

International regulation of virtual assets under FATF’s new standards

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Georgios Pavlidis
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Task Force ◽  
National Level ◽  
International Regulation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Effective Implementation ◽  
Regulation And Supervision ◽  
Open Source Data ◽  
Source Data ◽  
Financial Action Task

Purpose To critically examine two significant developments for the regulation and supervision of virtual assets and virtual assets services providers: the amendment of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation No 15 in October 2018 and the adoption of an Interpretative Note in June 2019. We argue that new FATF standards constitute an appropriate response to money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with virtual assets, but that they must be followed by firm, consistent and effective implementation at the national level. Design/methodology/approach This paper draws on reports, legislation, legal scholarship and other open source data in order to examine the new FATF standards on virtual assets. Findings The amendment of the FATF Recommendation No 15 in October 2018 and the adoption of an Interpretative Note in June 2019 have been necessary and opportune to forge a global approach to mitigate money laundering risks associated with crypto-assets. The new FATF standards on crypto-asset activities need to be implemented firmly, effectively and consistency to reduce the risk of jurisdiction-shopping by money launderers and terrorism financiers. Originality/value This is one of the first studies examining two important and recent FATF initiatives, the amendment of the FATF Recommendation No 15 in October 2018 and the adoption of an Interpretative Note in June 2019.

scholarly journals The anti-money laundering expectations gap in Iran: auditor and judiciary perspectives

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vahid Molla Imeny ◽  
Simon D. Norton ◽  
Mahdi Moradi ◽  
Mahdi Salehi
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Expectations Gap ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
Financing Risk ◽  
Significant Divergence ◽  
Financial Action Task ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This study aims to compare judicial and auditor expectations of audit in the detection and reporting of money laundering in Iran. It also aims to assess the implications of expectations gap for the reliability of data provided to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its blacklisting policy. Design/methodology/approach Questionnaires were administered to auditors to determine perceptions of their anti-money laundering (AML) reporting obligations. These were also completed by Iranian judges who hear money laundering prosecutions and who agreed to participate in the research. The group was created through the “snowballing” technique. Findings There is significant divergence between judges and auditors regarding the latter’s AML reporting obligations. Self-perception among auditors regarding investigative duties is insufficiently aligned with expectations of the FATF, particularly where there is use of corporate structures, charities and trusts in which identity of true owners, of payers and payees of funds cannot be accurately verified. This gap presents a significant terrorist financing risk. Practical implications The expectations gap makes training in forensic accounting, as well as compliance with international reporting expectations, a matter of urgency for the Iranian auditing profession. The judiciary needs to be more aware of international expectations. Originality/value Data regarding judicial expectations of auditors’ AML reporting obligations is difficult to obtain and of a highly sensitive nature. This research has obtained such data which has relevance to the FATF blacklisting policy, and to international organisations tasked with disrupting terrorist financing networks.

scholarly journals Reconciliation of anti-money laundering instruments and European data protection requirements in permissionless blockchain spaces

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Iwona Karasek-Wojciechowicz
Keyword(s):  
Data Processing ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
General Data Protection Regulation ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
The Government ◽  
High Level

AbstractThis article is an attempt to reconcile the requirements of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and anti-money laundering and combat terrorist financing (AML/CFT) instruments used in permissionless ecosystems based on distributed ledger technology (DLT). Usually, analysis is focused only on one of these regulations. Covering by this research the interplay between both regulations reveals their incoherencies in relation to permissionless DLT. The GDPR requirements force permissionless blockchain communities to use anonymization or, at the very least, strong pseudonymization technologies to ensure compliance of data processing with the GDPR. At the same time, instruments of global AML/CFT policy that are presently being implemented in many countries following the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, counteract the anonymity-enhanced technologies built into blockchain protocols. Solutions suggested in this article aim to induce the shaping of permissionless DLT-based networks in ways that at the same time would secure the protection of personal data according to the GDPR rules, while also addressing the money laundering and terrorist financing risks created by transactions in anonymous blockchain spaces or those with strong pseudonyms. Searching for new policy instruments is necessary to ensure that governments do not combat the development of all privacy-blockchains so as to enable a high level of privacy protection and GDPR-compliant data processing. This article indicates two AML/CFT tools which may be helpful for shaping privacy-blockchains that can enable the feasibility of such tools. The first tool is exceptional government access to transactional data written on non-transparent ledgers, obfuscated by advanced anonymization cryptography. The tool should be optional for networks as long as another effective AML/CFT measures are accessible for the intermediaries or for the government in relation to a given network. If these other measures are not available and the network does not grant exceptional access, the regulations should allow governments to combat the development of those networks. Effective tools in that scope should target the value of privacy-cryptocurrency, not its users. Such tools could include, as a tool of last resort, state attacks which would undermine the trust of the community in a specific network.

A critical approach to trade-based money laundering

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melvin R.J. Soudijn
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Critical Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Traded Goods ◽  
True Value ◽  
Police Investigations ◽  
Financial Action Task

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to broaden the discussion on trade-based money laundering (TBML). The literature is too narrowly focused on the misrepresentation of the value, quantity or quality of the traded goods. This focus leads to the analysis of price anomalies as a signal of over- or under-invoicing. However, TBML can also occur without manipulation of these factors. Design/methodology/approach – A review of the literature and case study of police investigations. Findings – Financial action task force (FATF) definitions are seriously flawed. The question of whether detecting TBML on the basis of statistical trade data is effective should be much more open to debate. Police investigations show that goods are shipped at their true value within the context of TBML. Research limitations/implications – Using outliers to identify and act on cases of TBML has often been propagated, but scarcely been used to actually show TBML. Real findings are needed. Practical implications – Goods intended for TBML can also be paid for in cash. These cash payments are often out of character with the normal clientele. This should alert companies and compliance sections of banks alike. Originality/value – The critique on the FATF definition opens the field for a more fitting definition. The description of actual TBML cases makes it possible to better understand this method of money laundering.

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