Identifying and reducing the money laundering risks posed by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as money rules

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehi Eric Esoimeme
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Medium Risk ◽  
Bank Accounts ◽  
The Uk

Purpose This paper aims to help build awareness with financial institutions about the money laundering risks posed by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as Money Mules and theme assures that financial institution scan adopt to detect illicit funds which are being received into the bank accounts of low risk or medium risk customers who are unknowingly recruited as “Money Mules”. Design/methodology/approach The research took the form of a desk study, which analysed various documents and reports such as a 2019 report on Money Mules by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL); a 2019 and 2020 report on Money Mules by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Better Business Bureau (BBB); the Financial Action Task Force Guidance on the Risk Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High Level Principles and Procedures) 2007; the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 2012; the United Kingdom’s Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017; the United States Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual 2014; Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2018; The UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as amended); the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group JMLSG, Prevention of money laundering/combating terrorist financing: Guidance for the UK financial sector Part I June 2017 (Amended December 2017); the United States Codified Bank Secrecy Act Regulations (31 CFR); the Nigerian Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2011 (as amended); and the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group JMLSG, Prevention of money laundering/combating terrorist financing: Guidance for the UK financial sector Part II: Sectoral Guidance June 2017 (Amended December 2017). Findings This paper determined that financial institutions may be able to prevent proceeds of crime from being laundered by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as Money Mules if they focus monitoring resources on the emotionally vulnerable customers like newcomers to the country, unemployed people who may have lost their jobs because of a pandemic like COVID-19, students and those in economic hardship; pay very close attention to the country of origin where the funds emanate from; pay very close attention to the country where the funds are being transferred to; and pay close attention to frequent large cash deposits followed by wire transfers. Originality/value While most articles focus on the money laundering risk(s) associated with Money Mules and the measures that individuals can use to ensure that their bank accounts are not used by criminals to launder illicit funds, this paper focuses on the different mechanisms that banks can use to detect illicit funds which are being received into the bank accounts of low risk or medium risk customers who are unknowingly recruited as “Money Mules”. This paper recommends a proportional approach that balances anti-money laundering measures, financial inclusion and human rights. The mechanisms/measures which have been extensively discussed in this paper will help banks to identify, assess and understand their money laundering and terrorist financing risks as it relates to Money Mules and take commensurate measures to mitigate them.

scholarly journals Perception versus reality: Iranian banks and international anti-money laundering expectations

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vahid Molla Imeny ◽  
Simon D. Norton ◽  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mahdi Moradi
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government ◽  
Domestic Banks ◽  
The Uk

Purpose Iran has been ranked by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as one of the foremost countries in the world for money laundering. However, Iranian banks claim that they comply with international standards for reporting suspicious activity, risk management and training. This paper aims to investigate this dichotomy between perception and reality. Design/methodology/approach A Wolfsberg-style questionnaire was sent to partners in Iranian accounting firms, which have audited domestic banks over the past five years to investigate the adequacy of risk management systems. Findings Most Iranian banks have anti-money laundering (AML) systems, which compare favourably with those of international counterparties. Banks take a risk-based approach to potential criminal behaviour. The negative perception of Iranian banks is principally attributable to the government’s unwillingness to accede to “touchstone” international conventions. In spite of having in place AML laws, which are comparable in intent with those of the UK and the United States of America (USA), weak enforcement remains a significant impediment of which the political establishment is aware. Practical implications Measures required to bring Iranian banks into compliance with international standards may be less extensive than perceptions suggest. However, failure of the government to accede to conventions stipulated by the FATF means that banks may remain ostracised by foreign counterparties for the foreseeable future. Originality/value This study provides a unique insight into the extent of AML compliance in Iranian banks as verified by external auditors.

Measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in Palestine

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Murrar Firas
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Evaluation Process ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Assessment Process ◽  
National Committee ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Mutual Evaluation ◽  
Combat Money Laundering

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the evolution of anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) procedures in Palestine since 2004 in accordance with the standards issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Design/methodology/approach This study is qualitative in nature and involves studying the most important improvements made by Palestinian authorities in the state’s legislative and institutional frameworks to enhance the AML/CFT regime. Findings Palestine has established the necessary legal basis to combat money laundering and terrorist financing crimes. At the institutional level, the Financial Follow-up Unit was granted all the required powers of Financial Intelligence Units. The National Committee for Combating Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism has also played a vital role in issuing policies and plans to respond to the outcomes of the National Risk Assessment process. In contrast, a number of challenges still exist mainly with respect to the political factors and their expected consequences on the process of preparing for and conducting the mutual evaluation process for Palestine. Originality/value This study focusses on the AML/CFT efforts in Palestine owing to the nature and specificity of the Palestinian situation, as Palestine’s AML/CFT procedures have not been subject to any previous mutual evaluation process by the MENAFATF. Such efforts have rarely addressed the Palestinian case, making this study important to researchers and those interested in this field.

Is there a commendable regime for combatting money laundering in international business transactions?

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Emerson Clarke
Keyword(s):  
International Business ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
State Level ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Enforcement Mechanisms ◽  
The Uk

Purpose Money laundering and grand business corruption continue to plague the global economy, accounting for 2%-5% of the global gross domestic product. Illicit funds, produced through grand corruption, are laundered using complex layering schemes that cloak them in legitimacy by concealing their origins. Lamentably, weak anti-money laundering (AML) frameworks promote economic instability, unjust commercial advantages and organized crimes. This study aims to highlight the need for comprehensive anti-corruption and AML frameworks by critiquing the exploitable gaps in the global AML regime created by heterogeneous state-level AML regimes to date. Design/methodology/approach This study welcomes the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the financial action task force (FATF) recommendations but underscores the limitations of their effectiveness by investigating state-level enforcement mechanisms to determine these instruments’ true impact or lack thereof. The mutual evaluation reports (MERs) and state-level AML regimes in the UK, the USA and Canada are analyzed to illustrate the distinct implementation of international soft law in domestic legislation. Findings This study finds that UNCAC and the FATF recommendations are pivotal steps towards the establishment of a global AML regime for international business, albeit, one that remains imperfect because of the inconsistency of state-level AML frameworks. Consequently, international cooperation is needed to navigate and improve the discrepancies in varied AML legislation. Originality/value The author provides an in-depth and balanced analysis of current state-level AML developments and relies upon the recent 2016-2018 MERs to indicate the successes and flaws of various AML legislation. Therefore, this critique may guide stakeholders to construct robust AML frameworks and contributes to academic research in AML.

Norway has attained a “low-risk” money laundering rating, how could this be applied globally?

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 166-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary L. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Global Scale ◽  
Low Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Risk Rating ◽  
Risk Ranking ◽  
The Us ◽  
Medium Risk ◽  
The Usa

Purpose – This paper aims to analyze thoroughly all of the sources of research used to develop the money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) low-risk rating, a rating attained by Norway according to the Basel Institute of Governance, and determine the reasons why Norway is one of only two countries in the world according to the 2012 report, with the other being Estonia, to gain an overall low-risk ML and TF rating. Design/methodology/approach – The differences between the USA and Norway which has obtained a low-risk ranking, were compared and contrasted. Findings – Beginning with the Basel Institute Rating index as a legitimate source for use in assessing anti-money-laundering (AML)/TF risk, and the amount of documentation used in the index’s methodology, it has been proven that the low-risk rating Norway has received is well deserved, and that the US rating of medium risk is also deserved for the time the report was published. Achieving a low-risk rating is not as ambiguous as recently thought and neither is its application on a global scale. Originality/value – The paper identifies practical areas of improvement and concerns in addressing the overall issue of ML and terrorist financing.

Follow the money to achieve success: achievable or aspirational

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Alan McTaggart
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Organised Crime ◽  
Economic Crime ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
The Subject

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to highlight the extent to which organised crime and the environment have altered in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing and to explore whether strategies to “follow the money” have been successful. Design/methodology/approach This paper is based on personal analysis and involvement as a practitioner in law enforcement and includes a broad literature review on the subject of terrorist financing and money laundering. Findings Money laundering, terrorist financing and economic crime activity are being disguised in the “noise” of business by specialists that have become very adept at their craft. Financial institutions and lawmakers have invested heavily in countering money laundering and terrorist financing. However, its real effectiveness is somewhat doubtful. Originality/value This paper serves to stimulate further discussion and research on how all actors can increase collaboration and co-operation to increase the effectiveness of disruption strategies associated with these classes of crime.

New developments in Hong Kong’s anti-money laundering laws

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kwok
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Case Law ◽  
New Developments ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Proceeds Of Crime ◽  
Financial Action Task ◽  
Law And Legislation

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss briefly new developments in Hong Kong’s (HK) Anti-Money Laundering (AML) laws, both in terms of case law and legislation. Design/methodology/approach In terms of case law, the author discusses two decisions given by HK’s Court of Final Appeal relating to the dealing of proceeds of crime offence. Also, a guideline case on sentencing is also examined. In terms of legislation, the author briefly outlines the main provisions of the newly enacted AML and Counter-Terrorist Financing (Financial Institutions) Ordinance. Findings As suggested by the Financial Action Task Force, new measures need to be put in place. The AML laws, as they presently stand, need further improvement. Originality/value A good AML regime is necessary as HK continues to thrive as a major financial/banking centre in Asia. This paper seeks to encourage more discussion on the topic.

Combating the financing of proliferation: challenges and new tools

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 1107-1121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian John Stewart ◽  
Andrea Viski ◽  
Jonathan Brewer
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Money Laundering ◽  
Task Force ◽  
National Level ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Original Research ◽  
Financial Crime ◽  
Task Force Report ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing

Purpose This paper aims to examine why most governments appear to attach less importance to countering proliferation finance than they do to countering money laundering or terrorist financing. Design/methodology/approach The paper examines this question from a number of perspectives including a definitional perspective, a national regulatory perspective and a private sector implementation perspective. Findings It is shown that there are presently significant gaps in counter proliferation finance implementation at the national level, with follow-on implications for private sector compliance. Research limitations/implications A key finding is that most governments do not address the issue of proliferation finance as distinct from other forms of financial crime such as terrorist financing or money laundering. Practical implications Practical opportunities for improved financial sector implementation of counter proliferation finance controls are identified, but it is argued that it is states that must do more to meet their obligations for improvements to be realised. Social implications The risk of not doing so is that the financial system will continue to be misused to finance the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Originality/value The study seeks to fill a gap in existing academic literature on the question of why proliferation finance receives less attention than other forms of financial crime. The study builds on original research undertaken by the authors including the typologies of proliferation finance, which were later incorporated into an updated Financial Action Task Force report on this topic, as well as events organised by the authors to explore the topic of proliferation finance implementation with governments and the private sector.

Illicit finance and money laundering trends in Eurasia

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 388-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Cassella
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Common Elements ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Western Countries ◽  
The World ◽  
Beneficial Ownership ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Uk

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to review recent examples of sophisticated money laundering operations involving financial institutions in Eurasia, including Russia and Moldova, and the resulting flow of licit and illicit capital from that part of the world to the UK, the USA, and other Western countries. Design/methodology/approach Relying on materials from publicly available sources, the study uses several case studies to illustrate various money laundering methods with a view toward identifying common elements and aspects of the schemes that might be considered new or innovative. Findings In particular, the study examines the roles that lax anti-money laundering compliance by financial institutions and the use of shell corporations designed to conceal the beneficial ownership of the companies and their assets have played in virtually all of the money laundering schemes. Originality/value The paper discusses the risks that these emerging money laundering methods pose to Western countries and their financial institutions and the approaches that governments might take to minimize those risks and raise the barriers for the laundering of illicit funds within their jurisdictions.

The financial action taskforce and money laundering: critical analysis of the Panama papers and the role of the United Kingdom

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aisha Hassan Al-Emadi
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Rapid Changes ◽  
Financial Action Task ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Desk Review

Purpose This paper aims to study the effectiveness of the implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations in the UK in an attempt to combat the laundering of proceeds of corruption. Design/methodology/approach A desk review of secondary resources was conducted to analyze available literature to examine the research topic. Findings The leakage of 11.5 million documents, known as the Panama papers, has revealed that the UK functioned as a safe haven for illicit and corrupt money. In an attempt to address this, the country called for a public registry of beneficial owners to disclose the identities of the owners of the incorporated corporations and to extend them to individuals abroad holding UK property. The FATF report recognizes the UK’s far-reaching regulation. Despite the measures taken, UK still faces serious risks with regard to the laundering of criminal proceeds, which demonstrates that technical compliance with FATF rules is not enough to effectively curb money laundering. Originality/value This study suggests that FATF rules’ effectiveness in identifying instances of laundering the proceeds of corruption is limited because of the deeply rooted system vulnerabilities and the rapid changes in money laundering trends.

UK fraud and tax evasion measures enhanced

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
House Prices ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Financial Activity ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Government ◽  
Overseas Territories ◽  
The Uk

Subject Money laundering and terrorist financing clampdown. Significance On March 15, the UK Treasury announced plans to create a new watchdog aiming to improve detection of crimes relating to money laundering and terrorist financing, and published draft updates to money-laundering regulations. After Brexit, the United Kingdom will no longer have to adhere to EU money-laundering rules; improving the regulatory framework around suspicious financial activity is crucial to ensure it does not become even more attractive to international launderers. Impacts The new watchdog should make compliance easier, minimising the regulatory burden on high-value sectors. Increased scrutiny of estate agents and lawyers may reduce demand for high-end UK residential property, slowing growth in house prices. Against the backdrop of Brexit, the government may shy away from pressuring Overseas Territories in case it provokes independence demands.

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