Legal analysis of Qatar’santi-money laundering and combating terrorist financing legislation and regulation amidst the summer 2017 GCC crisis

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 793-804
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem

Purpose The recent diplomatic split between members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Qatar with accusations of terrorist financing (TF). This paper aims to study Qatar’s domestic legislations, which specifically targets money laundering and TF activities. The country has stringently worked in compliance with international standards on combating financing of terrorism (CFT) and anti-money laundering (AML) practices by imparting autonomous power to regulatory bodies, such as the Qatar Central Bank and other agencies. Design/methodology/approach This paper studies independent legislations passed under the Emir’s decree over the past decade advancing Qatar’s AML ranking, with significant effort in CFT regulations. The paper also analyses the advancement in AML/CFT regulation and their validity with respect to international standards set by various governmental, intergovernmental and non-profit agencies. Findings The analysis finds Qatar in compliance with strong AML/CFT regulations. Further, it finds the government to have provided transparent oversight to international organizations that attest to the findings of the legislative efforts. This paper disproves claims and accusations that have possibly been presented to the GCC and subsequently led members to abruptly end diplomatic relations with Qatar over allegations of TF activities, amongst others. Originality/value The paper offers insight into Qatar’s legislative and regulatory advancement with respect to the AML/CTF in the past decade. The paper also discusses Qatar’s legislative advancement in relation to the evolutions of the country’s financial system, adopting a more robust mechanism to combat financing of terrorism and ML.

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Gilmour ◽  
Tristram Hicks ◽  
Simon Dilloway

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine – using crime script analysis – the practical effectiveness of internationally endorsed and universally recognised counter-terrorism financing (CTF) standards in preventing the movement of money for the purposes of terrorism. The paper does not seek to examine the originating circumstances of terrorist finances or how laundered value is assigned. Design/methodology/approach Preliminary evaluation focuses on the discrepancies between the practices of money laundering and terrorist financing. Following an introduction to crime scripts, internationally endorsed anti money laundering (AML)/CTF practices are discussed to identify the process used to trace, prevent and limit money laundering and terrorist financing. Several terrorist financing case studies are then aligned to the process of crime script analysis to determine whether existing AML/CTF practices are effective in preventing terrorist financing. Findings The AML model “Placement, layering, integration” is only relevant to CTF in the comparatively rare cases when the origin of the money is crime. This creates a false sense of security through over reliance on AML/CTF for CTF purposes. A crime script approach can be applied to terrorist finance, but it is currently hindered by insufficient reporting of low level financing of terrorists, their addresses and associates. Law enforcement make insufficient use of financial intelligence – as a routine practice – in their crime and terrorist investigations; they have not adopted parallel investigation as a routine approach and consequently remain largely unconnected with the AML/CTF regime. Practical implications Utilising terrorist financing case studies, this paper identifies that existing AML/CTF international standards and practices are not adequate for controlling the movement of funds for financing terrorism because of the lack of focus on a specific script that aligns to known terrorist finance methodologies. While the paper identifies that existing AML/CTF international standards are thorough, the process underpinning the financing of terrorism is too dissimilar to the process of money laundering, namely, placement, layering, and integration, to support practices associated with terrorism prevention and detection. Originality/value This paper provides an examination of the practicalities behind the countering of terrorist financing from a compliance and investigative perspective. The paper is of interest to those involved in policy, compliance and investigations associated with terrorist financing.


Subject Money laundering and terrorist financing clampdown. Significance On March 15, the UK Treasury announced plans to create a new watchdog aiming to improve detection of crimes relating to money laundering and terrorist financing, and published draft updates to money-laundering regulations. After Brexit, the United Kingdom will no longer have to adhere to EU money-laundering rules; improving the regulatory framework around suspicious financial activity is crucial to ensure it does not become even more attractive to international launderers. Impacts The new watchdog should make compliance easier, minimising the regulatory burden on high-value sectors. Increased scrutiny of estate agents and lawyers may reduce demand for high-end UK residential property, slowing growth in house prices. Against the backdrop of Brexit, the government may shy away from pressuring Overseas Territories in case it provokes independence demands.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 405-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem

Purpose In June 2017, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ended diplomatic ties with Qatar. There is a legitimate concern about the accusation levied on Qatar. This paper aims to analyse the progress Qatar’s financial system has made with respect to its anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) regulations, which further serves as the country’s effort to combating the financing of terrorism (CTF). The paper further wishes to advance the discussion by considering the legitimate goals of the aforementioned bodies and their discourse on creating national and international obligations towards reducing terrorist financing through robust AML frameworks. Design/methodology/approach The paper analyses Qatar’s legislative and regulatory overhaul following the Financial Action Task Force’s Mutual Evaluation Report. Qatar had distinctively strengthened its approach against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The paper takes an ex ante approach by understanding Qatar’s “strategic deficiencies” before the FATF’s mutual evaluation. Subsequently, the paper studies independent international evaluations of Qatar’s AML/CTF legislation and regulation. Findings The paper finds Qatar in significant compliance to the recommendations of the various international bodies, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Basel AML Index, IMF’s financial sector reviews, United Nations and independent reports on AML progress from regulatory bodies around the world. None of these organizations present obligatory rules but have set and determined and international standard for AML/CTF laws. Originality/value The primary aim is to draw parallels between Qatar’s regulatory AML and CTF efforts through the country’s compliance with international initiatives, such as the FATF guidelines, Basel AML Index, IMF’s financial sector reviews, United Nations and independent reports on AML progress from regulatory bodies around the world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-456
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem

Purpose The State of Kuwait operates a US$110bn economy and serves as an integral part of the global energy trade, holding over 9% of the world’s oil reserves. In addition, Kuwait is making attempts to open its economy, working towards domestic diversification. This paper aims to understand Kuwait’s internal financial protection mechanisms and their compliance to international standards. It is imperative to understand Kuwait’s legal and regulatory system that combats money laundering and terrorist financing concerns, which further extends to the region’s security discourse. This paper focuses on the State of Kuwait’s internal efforts to propel anti-money laundering/combating terrorist financing (AML/CTF) measures, and further evaluate these measures with respect to international evaluations. Design/methodology/approach Anti-money laundering and combatting terrorist financing mechanisms require a layered analysis to understand the legislative and bureaucratic organization of enforcement. Further, these measures, taken within the domestic framework, must be compared to international standards, and thus taken into account by observers. This paper studies Kuwait AML/CTF mechanisms by studying the country’s legislation, regulation and implementation. The country’s legislation will offer insight into the basic foundation of the country’s stance against money laundering and terrorist financing. Kuwait’s regulation against money laundering/terrorist financing (ML/TF) will represent the enforcement mechanisms and risk-assessment tools mandated by the independent regulatory authorities. Finally, the country’s enforcement levels will provide a deeper understanding of the country’s systemic approach to successfully combatting ML and TF activities. In addition, this paper also studies international evaluations that present an independent and factual view regarding Kuwait’s AML/CTF structure and its implementation. Findings Following a thorough examination of primary and secondary literature, this paper finds the State of Kuwait to have taken significant steps in implementing recommended legislative and regulatory mechanisms. The paper found significant strategic deficiencies within internal mechanisms pre-2014, which have been largely resolved in the state’s ex post approach to the Financial Action Task Force’s recommendations. There is also evidence of an improving enforcement mechanism in the state’s recent efforts in reducing exposure to ML and TF risks. However, the paper finds certain “strategic deficiencies” within the country’s internal reporting and external publishing administration. Practical implications The State of Kuwait is an important member in the route to regional stability and security in the Middle-East and Arabian Gulf region. Kuwait’s northern border abuts with Iraq, and connects the country with the rest of the Middle-East. The upward regional instability could create internal security risks for Kuwait. In addition, the State of Kuwait has taken the onus, in addition to the Sultanate of Oman, to mediate the diplomatic lapse between members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The aforementioned positions ascertain a need to examine, and further recommend measures that promote a strong regional financial system. Originality/value This paper finds the government of Kuwait to have taken major steps to create a framework that is parallel to international standards. However, there have been significant delays in activating and implementing several regulatory procedures. The delay of certain procedures has since been rectified by the state. This paper presents a comprehensive qualitative analysis of the country’s legislative, regulatory and enforcement structures and further evaluates the internal performance.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem

Purpose This paper aims to study the three levels of anti-money laundering (AML) and combating of terrorist financing (CTF) regulations that apply to banks and financial institutions listed within the country. The paper aims to determine risks arising from globalised financial centres within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and potential improvements deficiencies that may otherwise serve as conduits for criminal and terrorist organisations. There is a significant body of literature that covers the advance of AML/CTF legislation in the Dubai-based free trade zone, the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). Though free trade zones are scattered across the UAE, the DIFC has the highest foreign investment in the country with an expanded international network. Design/methodology/approach The UAE has made progress as part of its fight against money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF). This paper studies the legislative stance by analysing the country’s AML/CTF laws. Also, the advances of global financial centres in the UAE have created layers of regulation, each regulator with their own set of rules. This paper attempts to study the regulations and the level of their enforcement to combat ML and TF. Findings This paper finds significant regulatory oversight in certain frameworks set within the UAE’s financial system. However, the paper finds secondary literature and evaluations conducted by international bodies that suggest some deficiencies within the mechanisms, that are being resolved by the country’s regulatory agencies. The UAE’s advancing network of financial institutions has created a global chain of monetary transfers, which offers some possibility of ML also extending to TF. Though the country has made progress, there remain a few flaws that can be exploited by criminal and terrorist organisations. Practical implications ML has the possibility to damage markets if allowed in excess. This is not the case with the UAE, and large unverified transactions are investigated by the regular authorities. ML is now a matter of concern when funds acquired through illegal means may be used to directly finance terrorism. Originality/value This paper tests the UAE’s mechanisms to combat ML and TF in the context of the country’s advancing of a global central financial market. There is a need to understand these regulations as investors within the UAE and abroad may sometimes face risk if ML/TF deficiencies are exploited by criminal and terrorist organisations. This paper provides an insight into the country’s infrastructure to combat ML and TF and also weighs its performance as per international standards and guidelines.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vahid Molla Imeny ◽  
Simon D. Norton ◽  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mahdi Moradi

Purpose Iran has been ranked by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as one of the foremost countries in the world for money laundering. However, Iranian banks claim that they comply with international standards for reporting suspicious activity, risk management and training. This paper aims to investigate this dichotomy between perception and reality. Design/methodology/approach A Wolfsberg-style questionnaire was sent to partners in Iranian accounting firms, which have audited domestic banks over the past five years to investigate the adequacy of risk management systems. Findings Most Iranian banks have anti-money laundering (AML) systems, which compare favourably with those of international counterparties. Banks take a risk-based approach to potential criminal behaviour. The negative perception of Iranian banks is principally attributable to the government’s unwillingness to accede to “touchstone” international conventions. In spite of having in place AML laws, which are comparable in intent with those of the UK and the United States of America (USA), weak enforcement remains a significant impediment of which the political establishment is aware. Practical implications Measures required to bring Iranian banks into compliance with international standards may be less extensive than perceptions suggest. However, failure of the government to accede to conventions stipulated by the FATF means that banks may remain ostracised by foreign counterparties for the foreseeable future. Originality/value This study provides a unique insight into the extent of AML compliance in Iranian banks as verified by external auditors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem

Purpose This paper aims to study Saudi Arabia’s approach to combat money laundering and terrorist financing through legislation, regulation and implementation. Saudi Arabia is an integral part of the global economy and energy market. Saudi Arabia is also an important nexus for incoming foreign investment in the region. The country has, for many years, confronted negative exposure on challenging money laundering and terrorist financing. This paper analyses Saudi Arabia’s efforts to maintain international standards of AML/CTF and distinguishes regulatory practice from the existing comments and conjecture on the country’s performance. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses a qualitative study of Saudi Arabia’s approach to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The approach is spread across three stages of AML/CTF policy – namely, legislative, regulatory and implementation. Further, the paper also uses independent evaluation to understand Saudi Arabia’s performance in comparison to the international standards of good AML/CTF practice. Findings The paper finds Saudi Arabia in compliance with international standards of AML/CTF practice. The paper also traces strengthening of AML/CTF-related legislation and regulation in Saudi Arabia over the past two decades. The paper also finds significant evidence that suggests a biased representation of Saudi Arabia’s AML/CTF practices. The factual analysis of Saudi Arabia and its AML/CTF practice is in contradiction of the established discourse on the country’s money laundering and terrorist financing risk profile. Practical implications The paper presents a legislative and regulatory analysis of Saudi Arabia’s AML/CTF practice. It is important to understand the implications of injudicious conjecture on Saudi Arabia’s financial strategy to diversify the country’s economy (Mouawad, 2005). Commentators and observers must consider the evidence presented in this paper and reassess the discourse regarding Saudi Arabia’s adherence to international standards of AML/CTF. Originality/value Understanding Saudi Arabia’s approach to combat money laundering and terrorist financing is essential to the factors that maintain stability in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has participated in the region with government forces to maintain stability. The paper examines the overall risk as per international standards, which can be attributed to Saudi Arabia’s AML/CTF profile.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem

Purpose This paper aims to examine the level of anti-money laundering (AML) and combatting terrorist financing (CTF) practices incorporated within the legal framework of the Kingdom of Bahrain. The paper also studies the application of AML/CTF legislation in regulatory practice and implementation. Bahrain is an important state within the Middle-East region and is an integral part to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The paper analyzes Bahrain’s compliance to international AML/CTF standards and presents recommendations on remaining deficiencies. Design/methodology/approach The paper studies the level of AML/CTF legislation enacted by the Kingdom of Bahrain by first examining the regulatory application, and then, the level of implementation. To understand the level of AML/CTF implementation, the paper uses literature on increased prosecution, penalties and reports for AML/CTF crimes in the Kingdom of Bahrain. In addition, the paper analyzes Bahrain’s compliance level to international standards of AML/CTF legislation and regulation. Findings The paper finds evidence of significant progress in the application of best practices of AML/CTF within the Kingdom of Bahrain. The paper also finds an increase in levels of implementation – i.e. suspicious transaction reports, investigations and prosecutions – with respect to AML/CTF violations. Additionally, the paper finds a limited number of deficiencies in Bahrain’s effort to establish strong reporting and enforcement mechanisms. Practical implications Bahrain is an important member of the international trade network and one of the fastest growing non-oil economies in the region. The country sought to diversify the economy, with more industry- and service-intensive sectors. The level of AML/CTF implementation represents an important risk-averse approach to financial services in the country. Evidence of the country’s strengthening approach is an important factor in determining foreign investment confidence and the country’s policy on combatting terrorism financing. Originality/value Commentators have previously recognized key deficiencies in Bahrain’s enactment and application of AML/CTF legislation. However, the analysis does not incorporate externalities arising from regulatory delay in domestic AML/CTF policy. The following paper studies the progress made by Bahrain since 2000-2001 and subsequent attempts at improving enforcement to maintain international compliance.


Policy Papers ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (14) ◽  
Author(s):  

The Fund’s Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) program represents an important contribution to the international community’s response to money laundering and terrorist financing over the past decade. The program originally focused primarily on (a) AML/CFT assessments – as part of the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) program and of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) – and (b) capacity development activities. Following guidance provided by the Board in 2011, money laundering, terrorist financing and related predicate crimes issues (hereinafter also referred to as financial integrity issues) are being raised in the context of surveillance when they are judged to affect domestic and balance of payments stability. Moreover, some recent Fund-supported programs have also incorporated financial integrity issues.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 264-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Truby

Purpose Under scrutiny in light of the growing threat of international terrorism, Qatar faces pressure and accusations that it is not doing enough to counter terror financing and clamp down money laundering. The issue is not that Qatar is avoiding positive action, but that by the time measures are implemented, they become outdated because the international community has by then tightened its regulatory requirements. Qatar’s slow pace has led to a case of cat-and-mouse chase with respect to updating its standards, with a revised set of rules being required by the time Qatar implements the last set of international standards. This study aims to draw on lessons from the past to help Qatar avoid findings of it falling below international standards in the upcoming 2017 mutual evaluation. Design/methodology/approach The primary purpose of this article is to catalogue Qatar’s efforts to comply with international anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-terror finance standards. It demonstrates the real legislative progress post-2008 recorded by Qatar to minimize money laundering and terrorist financing. The paper also contests the view that Qatari law is insufficient. Findings The paper explains Qatar’s efforts to comply with the recommendations made by each evaluation by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). It also highlights the potential for Qatar to be caught out again by the evolution of international expectations in an upcoming review, which, it is understood, is likely to take place in 2017. Originality/value No article exists specifically on this research field. As Qatar prepares for its 2017 FATF evaluation, it should be reminded of the need to comply with all new standards.


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