Debt crisis will delay Zimbabwe economic recovery

Subject Outlook for Zimbabwe's sovereign debt. Significance Secretary to the Treasury Willard Manungo earlier this month revealed that the government owes its diplomats 10 million dollars in salary arrears. It is the latest development in Zimbabwe's fiscal crunch, worsened by President Robert Mugabe's government's limited access to debt financing. This is forcing it to pursue complex, simultaneous negotiations with multiple creditors. Impacts Limited financing will hurt government plans to import 700,000 tonnes of maize necessary to address drought-induced shortfalls. South Africa's restrictive visa regime and clampdowns on illegal immigrants could begin to hurt remittance flows to Zimbabwe. Former Vice-President Joice Mujuru is unlikely to announce a new party in the short term, but may do so before polls in 2018.

Significance President Cyril Ramaphosa, who had been under escalating pressure from business and organised labour to reopen the economy fully, justified the relaxation by citing reductions in new case figures. There are indications that all provinces may have reached their peak of infections by end-July. Impacts Despite the scale of the crisis, the government appears still to lack urgency in formulating a substantive economic response. Government's withdrawal of an appeal to a 2018 declaratory order will raise hopes for greater flexibility with miners in the short term. Lockdown-related drops in reported crimes will likely prove short-lived, given renewed alcohol sales, growing joblessness and hardship.


Significance The surprisingly ample victory of opposition candidate Alberto Fernandez over President Mauricio Macri in the August 11 presidential primaries triggered a currency run and a sharp fall in international reserves and led the government to announce a “voluntary reprofiling” of short-term debt. The announcement was interpreted as a default, worsening investor expectations. The debt crisis puts the political transition at stake, with nearly two months before the general election and over three months until a new administration takes office in December. Impacts Following a new debt crisis, capital markets will be closed, forcing a sharper fiscal adjustment. The financial crisis will delay any economic rebound and worsen social indicators. The fragile fiscal situation will inhibit implementation of any ‘populist’ measures by the new government. The structural reform agenda will make some progress, though more slowly than expected.


Subject Mounting political challenges. Significance Amid internal criticism over budget cuts and street protests over reductions in education spending, President Lenin Moreno on November 22 asked his whole cabinet to resign. The decision illustrates the difficulties facing Moreno in managing his government and party and in maintaining support, as he tries to pull his administration towards the political centre. Anti-corruption efforts have further complicated this task, with investigations opening political wounds and implicating members of the government, including Vice-President Maria Alejandra Vicuna. Impacts Dialogue with social and political actors may help ease resistance to budget cuts in the short term, but fiscal pressures will persist. Protests will increase as cuts start to bite and Correa supporters and other sociopolitical actors mobilise their bases. Lower oil prices would constrain the government, threatening its austerity programme and raising the need for external borrowing in 2019.


Significance Ortega has rejected any possibility of dialogue with the opposition and avoided implementing democratising reforms. Elections scheduled for November 7 look sure to cement the government’s position, but will lack legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Impacts The government will maintain total control of the election process. While it is widely assumed that Ortega will run, is it possible that his wife Vice-President Rosario Murillo will do so in his place. A cybercrime law will reduce but not remove the prospect of mass protest organisation via social media. Repression, combined with a slow pandemic recovery, will increase hardship for ordinary Nicaraguans, driving outward emigration.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-179
Author(s):  
Guidong Wang

Purpose With the increase of state capital, corporate total factor productivity (TFP) has a tendency to jump up at first and then slowly decrease. Generally, no significant “productivity paradox” can be observed in China’s manufacturing industry. With the increase of export density, corporate TFP also shows a trend of initial jump growth and subsequent slow decline. This paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach Using the 1996–2013 China Industrial Enterprise Database, this paper studies the monopolistic behavior of Chinese manufacturing enterprises through the measurement of TFP and corporate monopoly power. Findings Results show that China’s manufacturing monopoly enterprises are generally innovation-oriented rather than rent-seeking. However, there are certain differences between diversified types of monopoly enterprises: the ones with state capital are more inclined to innovate than those without, whereas the ones with export delivery value are more inclined to seek rent than those without. Originality/value Therefore, the government should implement differentiated policies for diversified types of monopoly enterprises, and do so in a targeted manner fully reflecting the containment of rent-seeking and the encouragement of innovation.


Significance Many areas of the Caribbean have trade, investment and family connections with communities in Florida. As the state now plays a pivotal role in US electoral politics, crises in the region can take on added political importance for parts of Florida’s electorate. Impacts Forecasts of short-term economic recovery for Florida remain highly uncertain given the continuing impact of the pandemic. Clashing interests across the Caribbean may demand greater coordination of US policy than the government can currently offer. Healthcare and disaster relief capabilities within the state are severely overstretched and could be overwhelmed by a new crisis.


Significance The government hopes greater domestic and foreign investment can help turn around the pandemic-hit economy. The governor of Bank Indonesia (BI), the central bank, last week said GDP should grow by 4.6% in 2021, compared with last year’s 2.1% contraction. Impacts Indonesia will count on private vaccination, whereby companies buy state-procured jabs for their staff, to help speed up its roll-out. The Indonesia Investment Authority, a new sovereign wealth fund, will prioritise attracting more investment into the infrastructure sector. Singapore will continue to be Indonesia’s largest source of FDI in the short term.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 478-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianhua Du ◽  
Chao Bian ◽  
Christopher Gan

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the government intervention and bank competition on small and medium enterprise (SME) external debt financing in Chinese capital market. Design/methodology/approach This study uses ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered at the firm level. In addition, the authors use the dynamic system generalized method of moments to address the possible endogeneity issue in the regressions. Findings Using a sample of 908 firms from 2000 to 2010, the authors found that SMEs are more likely to access bank loans only in regions with higher level of government intervention than median government intervention. Further, the result shows that the government is motivated to help SMEs to obtain more external debt in regions where the level of bank competition is lower than the median bank competition index. Last, the authors found evidence that firms with politically connected CEOs are likely to access bank loans. Research limitations/implications This paper highlights that government intervention enables the SMEs to secure more bank loans. Second, the authors’ results imply that the government is motivated to help SMEs to obtain more external debt in regions with low level of bank competition. Originality/value This study contributes to the current literature by revealing that government intervention is the driving force alleviating SMEs’ constraints in accessing external financing. Second, this study finds the evidence to supports the argument that government has a strong motive to help SMEs to secure long-term credits for political purpose (Fan et al., 2012), when the level of bank competition is low (Berger and Udell, 2006).


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 212-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norbert Gaillard

Purpose – This paper aims to shed new light on the inability of credit rating agencies (CRAs) to forecast the recent defaults and so-called quasi-defaults of rich countries. It also describes how Moody’s sovereign rating methodology has been modified – and could be further improved – to solve this problem. Design/methodology/approach – After converting bond yields into yield-implied ratings, accuracy ratios are computed to compare the respective performances of CRAs and market participants. Then Iceland’s and Greece’s ratings at the beginning of the Great Recession are estimated while accounting for the parameters included in the new methodology implemented by Moody’s in 2013. Findings – Market participants outperformed Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s in terms of anticipating the sovereign debt crisis that hit several European countries starting in 2008. However, the new methodology implemented by Moody’s should lead to more conservative and accurate sovereign ratings. Originality/value – The chronic inability of CRAs to anticipate public debt crises in rich countries is dangerous because the countries affected – which are generally rated in the investment-grade category – are substantially downgraded, amplifying the sovereign debt crisis. This study is the first to demonstrate that Moody’s has learned from its recent failures. In addition, it recommends ways to detect serious threats to the creditworthiness of high-income countries.


Significance The presidential election will take place on April 11 and parliamentary elections are scheduled for October. As the country prepares for the polls, security challenges and humanitarian emergencies are unfolding in various parts of the country, especially in remote and border regions. Impacts The designation of a vice-president could shift balances of power within the family network that dominates top political and military posts. Western powers and other African states are likely to accept even a highly flawed election, as they have in the past. Further protests may occur, but Deby appears less vulnerable in the short-term than Malian President Ibrahim Keita proved in 2020.


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