Turkey-US relationship will become more transactional

Significance The Turkish government's crackdown on internal dissent, and its opposition to Kurdish groups at home and abroad have placed its NATO ally, the United States, in an awkward diplomatic position. Impacts Diminished military-to-military ties will rob the bilateral relationship of a strengthening influence. The United States will seek to mitigate the chances of a Russia-Turkey clash to avoid further regional complications. Washington will view Ankara's extraction of migration-related concessions from the EU unfavourably.

Significance The presidency will put Romania's isolation in the spotlight. It has no backers in the EU prepared to overlook its escalating retreat from democratic and reform commitments, and there is no sign that the United States is prepared to act as a counterweight. Impacts Romania is ill-prepared for the presidency while political warfare at home will absorb government energies. It is likely that real decision-making will reside in Brussels with Romania having no more than a ceremonial role. Dragnea’s hostility to Brussels makes a tough EU response likely in response to more creeping authoritarianism.


Significance He did not name a new prime minister. Over July 25-26, Saied dismissed Prime Minister Hicham Mechichi, dissolved his government, suspended parliament for 30 days, lifted parliamentary immunity and declared himself chief prosecutor, triggering Tunisia’s worst political crisis in a decade. Impacts The Ennahda party could be persecuted once again, this time on corruption charges, as the reconciliation offered excludes its members. Tunisia may become a new ideological battleground, pitting Turkey and Qatar against the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The EU, the United States and Algeria have some influence on Tunisia and could perhaps play a moderating role.


Significance In 2020 the European Commission appointed a Chief Trade Enforcement Officer for the first time, signalling that Brussels is intent on enhancing its capacity to enforce standards agreed in trade deals. However, the EU's experience with South Korea suggests that holding trade partners to account over breaching standards will be difficult. Impacts Relations with trade partners could deteriorate if the EU is seen to be aggressive in enforcing its standards. Concern over China’s willingness to improve labour and environmental standards could impede ratification the EU-China investment agreement. The EU may be reluctant to sanction some partners, such as the United States, that breach labour or environmental standards.


Significance The United States has already committed, in an unprecedented deal with China in November 2014, to reducing its emissions to 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025 (an improvement on its previous 17% goal). China in return pledged that its emissions would peak around 2030. This agreement is a game-changer for combating global climate change, since the two countries are the world's largest sources of carbon emissions, together accounting for 40% of the total, and were not covered under the now-expired Kyoto Protocol. Impacts Washington is poised to reclaim its place, lost after Kyoto, as a leader in global efforts against climate change. US-China climate cooperation initiatives could serve as templates for other developing countries. There are new opportunities for trilateral cooperation involving the EU. Fears that the bilateral agreement makes the UNFCCC obsolete are unwarranted, but it could preclude more ambitious efforts.


Significance The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) should easily get the most votes, but it faces a likely setback and a dent in its authority. Weakening support from its voters and Turkey's proportional representation system are likely to drive its number of parliamentary seats down from the 327 out of 550 seats it won in 2011, perhaps even to the point where an overall majority is in doubt. Impacts Market confidence and the lira may weaken, but will not deteriorate drastically, unless AKP is forced out of office -- a remote scenario. Fiscal and monetary policy may be loosened to win support until a new government able to last for a full four-year term is in office. A politically weaker AKP risks long-term splits, but these will not emerge unless there have been months of instability. Growing internal discord -- and the government's defiant response to its critics at home and abroad -- may isolate Turkey internationally. The United States and EU will continue to avoid confrontation with the Erdogan government as far as possible.


Subject Chinese FDI into Europe. Significance China's hosting of the G20 summit on September 4-5 came as it is recalibrating its foreign economic strategy, becoming a major investor in the West and particularly the EU. With a few notable exceptions, EU governments have been keen to encourage those investments. Impacts While China will continue to relax restrictions on investments into its domestic economy, it is unlikely to reciprocate fully to the EU. Sectors China considers strategic, including defence equipment and infrastructure, will remain out of bounds to foreign companies. Concerns about the geostrategic risk of Chinese investments appear to resonate more strongly in Australia and the United States than the EU.


Subject Erdogan’s visit to Serbia. Significance The Turkish president’s visit to Serbia on October 9-11 was much publicised. Recep Tayyip Erdogan received a hero’s welcome at a rally in Novi Pazar, where he appeared alongside Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic. Both governments are keen to boost economic ties. Impacts Size and location make Serbia a key economic and diplomatic partner for Turkey in former Yugoslavia. The Turkish state will continue to claim leadership over Balkan Muslims and seek to contain the influence of radical Islam. All Balkan governments will seek good ties with Turkey and to minimise any fallout from Erdogan’s spat with the EU and the United States.


Subject MiFID II implementation and compliance Significance The EU’s flagship investor protection reform -- the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) -- will come into force on January 3, 2018, Valdis Dombrovskis, the EU Commissioner responsible for financial stability, confirmed on October 17, saying that there would not be a further delay. Despite already having been given an extra year's extension, banks are struggling to comply in time because of the directive's complexity. Regulators, too, are behind in expanding their capacity to enforce it. Impacts Firms across the world that do any of their business within the EU will have to comply, not just those registered in the EU. All firms trading in financial instruments must comply but those where this is a small part of their business may be caught unawares. MiFID II will come into effect before the United Kingdom leaves the EU and is likely to be written into UK law post-Brexit. The United States is keen to deregulate, but US firms whose EU activity is not compliant will be punished, possibly harming US-EU relations.


Significance However, the economic and geopolitical environment which facilitated its global regulatory success is changing. Impacts The EU’s unprecedented economic recovery plan should strengthen unity and give it confidence to act stronger on the global stage. Political values will play an increasingly prominent role in shaping the bloc’s relationship with countries such as China. The election of Democratic candidate Joe Biden will not guarantee closer regulatory ties between the United States and the EU.


Subject Russian influence in Bosnia. Significance Russia seems much more adept at playing the Balkan political game than the EU or the United States. Thanks to that and the gradual weakening of Bosnia’s EU perspective, Russia has managed to fill the EU vacuum and establish influence over Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) with a minimum of investment. Impacts BiH could achieve EU candidate status in 2019 if it can satisfy the European Commission that it is meeting required conditions. The EU’s much stronger economic relations with Balkan states will limit Russian influence. Russia’s presence in both Bosnia and Serbia will continue to take the form solely of being able to influence Serbs.


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