Ecuador’s military faces cuts as security risks build

Subject Military pressures. Significance The military has become more visible in Ecuador in recent months, with soldiers and tanks deployed on the streets in October, to tackle protests over the elimination of fuel subsidies. Defence Minister Oswaldo Jarrin has become a focus of popular discontent with the security forces, which were accused of using excessive force to contain the unrest. The protests, together with increased drug trafficking and organised crime, have compounded pressures already faced by the security forces due to budget cuts, more of which are planned for 2020. Impacts Investigations into protester deaths will generate tensions between the government and security forces. Close attention will be paid to the tactics and force used by the security forces during future protests. Washington may use stronger Ecuador ties to bolster its presence in the Andean region.

Significance The government claims opposition factions linked to Guaido are behind the upsurge of ‘GEDO’ violence (Grupo Estructurado de Delincuencia Organizada, or Structured Organised Crime Group). Efforts by security forces to ‘stabilise’ GEDO-dominated communities may portend an upsurge in state violence. Impacts The Haitian president’s killing has strengthened the government narrative of externally orchestrated mercenary warfare. Concerns about state decomposition in Venezuela will add urgency to international efforts at successful dialogue. An already weakened Guaido is on the back foot following Guevara’s arrest and lacks the authority to enforce any negotiated outcomes.


Subject The militarisation of security. Significance Lack of police capability and the scale of Guatemala's security challenges mean that the military role in combatting organised crime will continue, despite concerns. President Jimmy Morales recently announced that the military would continue to support police with domestic security. This comes as security challenges remain acute, particularly in urban areas and the northern Peten department. Impacts Peten will remain the focus point of drug trafficking activity, though extortion in urban areas will be a more pressing concern. Public pressure for a tough approach to crime means that periodic excesses by security forces will continue to be tolerated. While Guatemala faces similar security challenges to neighbouring countries, there is little prospect of increased cooperation.


Significance The attack was an attempt to undermine the nine month old national unity government headed by President Ashraf Ghani, who is already losing public confidence since the cabinet is still incomplete and the country still lacks a viable security plan. Meanwhile, Taliban gains in the north have prompted the government to arm local militias to bolster its security forces. According to UN figures, the insurgency has left 974 dead and 1,963 injured in the first four months of 2015 -- a 16% rise on 2014. Impacts Growing public discontent could open spaces for competing leaders and groups opposed to the government, threatening civil unrest. Absent a viable security strategy, NATO may slow the military drawdown, implying extended involvement. Foreign investors, especially China, could renege on their investment commitments if the Taliban continue taking new territory.


Subject Despite Nicaragua's low crime rates and generally popular government, political tensions simmer Significance Nicaragua has long avoided the high levels of violent crime suffered by its northern neighbours and is becoming safer, with recent data indicating that the country's murder rate is falling. However, as opposition to the government becomes more vocal, a rise in political violence is undermining such improvements. Impacts Political protests will likely spread from Managua to other cities in the run-up to the 2016 polls. Increased political violence may lead to excessive force being used by security forces. Radicals opposed to the government may attempt to provoke such excessive force to stir anti-government feeling. Further social unrest will take place as Nicaragua's interoceanic canal project gets underway.


Subject Military perceptions. Significance Residents of Acajete, Puebla, on September 9 reportedly attacked a group of soldiers guarding a warehouse that contained stolen train cargo. As ordered, the armed forces initially refused to retaliate, but the standoff eventually led President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) to authorise a proportional response. The following day the defence ministry (SEDENA) said any further incidents of this nature would be met with force. Similar attacks have nevertheless taken place in several states since. Impacts Negative rhetoric about the security forces could foster tensions between the government and the military if the latter feel unsupported. Failure to develop effective civilian police forces to work with communities and gather local intelligence will hinder crime prevention. Further deterioration of the security situation may hit AMLO’s popularity, as he will increasingly be unable to blame predecessors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 603-615
Author(s):  
Marjan Malesic

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to identify the level of public trust in disaster response actors, i.e. the government, civilian disaster response institutions, the military, NGOs and the media. Design/methodology/approach The data source is the 2015–2016 Slovenian Public Opinion Survey, which used face-to-face interviews (computer-assisted personal interviewing software), and a standardised instrument (questionnaire). A two-stage probability sampling design with stratification at the first stage was applied. The first stage involved a probability proportional to size selection of 150 small areas (statistical areas), where the size measurement was a the number of adult persons in the Central Population Register. The second stage involved the simple random sampling of 12 persons from each of the 150 primary sampling units. A total of 1,024 adult residents participated in the survey. Findings The findings suggest that trust in the government under normal situations is low; however, it becomes slightly higher during disaster conditions. Civilian disaster response institutions (especially firemen and civil protection), the military and NGOs (humanitarian and other volunteer organisations) are highly trusted before and during disasters. Trust in the authorities and media to inform the public in a timely and comprehensive manner about the disaster is also relatively high. Research limitations/implications Perhaps in another period of research, disaster-related experiences of the population might be different, which could certainly change the survey results about trust. Nevertheless, the main finding that low pre-disaster trust can be recovered during a disaster by adequate performance of the institution is not jeopardised. Originality/value The survey results are original.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan McCargo ◽  
Naruemon Thabchumpon

More than ninety people died in political violence linked to the March–May 2010 “redshirt” protests in Bangkok. The work of the government-appointed Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand (TRCT) illustrates the potential shortcomings of seeing quasi-judicial commissions as a catch-all solution for societies struggling to deal with the truth about their recent pasts. The 2012 TRCT report was widely criticized for blaming too much of the violence on the actions of rogue elements of the demonstrators and failing to focus tightly on the obvious legal transgressions of the security forces. By failing strongly to criticize the role of the military in most of the fatal shootings, the TRCT arguably helped pave the way for the 2014 coup. Truth commissions that are unable to produce convincing explanations of the facts they examine may actually prove counterproductive. Following Quinn and Wilson, we argue in this article that weak truth commissions are prone to politicization and are likely to produce disappointing outcomes, which may even be counterproductive.


Subject Pre-election politics in Uganda. Significance The long-expected announcement on June 15 by sacked Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi that he will run for president will bring bitter tensions between him and President Yoweri Museveni out into the open. It is highly unlikely to threaten the latter's 30-year rule but may provoke internal disruption within the ruling party as Museveni makes an example of internal dissent. Impacts Loyalty among the military and police forces will remain central to Museveni's power. Museveni effectively distances himself from graft scandals, while Mbabazi's reputation remains tarnished by several high-profile cases. Oil firms could see some benefits, if Museveni decides to assure them of his solid hold on power. The government was already likely to unleash inflation-inducing spending during the election, but Mbabazi's campaign increases this risk.


Significance Tensions between the Gulf states and Iran have escalated significantly in 2016, in the wake of Iran's signing of a landmark deal in 2015 that brought to an end the decade-long dispute over its nuclear programme. The response of Iran's military to the heightened tensions will be partly influenced by the new chairman of the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), the country's top military body, Major General Mohamad Hossein Bagheri. Impacts A more assertive and non-compromising IRGC will increase pressure on President Hassan Rouhani as he seeks re-election in 2017. Improvements in intelligence collection and dissemination are likely in Syria, aimed at reducing Iranian casualties. The military and government are likely to clash soon over the defence budget and its allocation. The government will try to keep the IRGC in check by tipping the media off about alleged financial wrongdoings. With the next US president expected to adopt a harder-line stance on Iran, the diplomatic rapprochement may be reversed partially.


Subject Political outlook for Angola. Significance President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, in power since 1979, recently announced that he would relinquish the presidency in 2018. While Dos Santos is believed to favour a transition to one of his own children or to Vice-President Manuel Vicente, neither option will find favour in the ranks of the ruling People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) or the wider public. Impacts The military will be immune from major spending cuts given its critical role in ensuring the longevity of the regime. Rising repayment burdens on Chinese loans (estimated to total 25 billion dollars) will further undermine budgetary resources. As social protests rise, the government will respond by clamping down on critics and tightening rules governing civil society groups.


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