Nicaraguan crime falls but political unrest will rise

Subject Despite Nicaragua's low crime rates and generally popular government, political tensions simmer Significance Nicaragua has long avoided the high levels of violent crime suffered by its northern neighbours and is becoming safer, with recent data indicating that the country's murder rate is falling. However, as opposition to the government becomes more vocal, a rise in political violence is undermining such improvements. Impacts Political protests will likely spread from Managua to other cities in the run-up to the 2016 polls. Increased political violence may lead to excessive force being used by security forces. Radicals opposed to the government may attempt to provoke such excessive force to stir anti-government feeling. Further social unrest will take place as Nicaragua's interoceanic canal project gets underway.

Subject Military pressures. Significance The military has become more visible in Ecuador in recent months, with soldiers and tanks deployed on the streets in October, to tackle protests over the elimination of fuel subsidies. Defence Minister Oswaldo Jarrin has become a focus of popular discontent with the security forces, which were accused of using excessive force to contain the unrest. The protests, together with increased drug trafficking and organised crime, have compounded pressures already faced by the security forces due to budget cuts, more of which are planned for 2020. Impacts Investigations into protester deaths will generate tensions between the government and security forces. Close attention will be paid to the tactics and force used by the security forces during future protests. Washington may use stronger Ecuador ties to bolster its presence in the Andean region.


Significance Among those policies are measures targeted at youth unemployment and social care for older people, aimed at attracting left-wing support. Most importantly, Macron has committed to relaunching his controversial pension reforms, which triggered widespread social unrest in late 2019 and early 2020. Impacts Mandatory vaccination could trigger protests and legal action against the government. The centre-right Republicans could take support from Macron if they unite around a strong presidential candidate over the coming months. Macron will likely push for looser EU fiscal rules to facilitate more government spending beyond 2022.


Significance The government claims opposition factions linked to Guaido are behind the upsurge of ‘GEDO’ violence (Grupo Estructurado de Delincuencia Organizada, or Structured Organised Crime Group). Efforts by security forces to ‘stabilise’ GEDO-dominated communities may portend an upsurge in state violence. Impacts The Haitian president’s killing has strengthened the government narrative of externally orchestrated mercenary warfare. Concerns about state decomposition in Venezuela will add urgency to international efforts at successful dialogue. An already weakened Guaido is on the back foot following Guevara’s arrest and lacks the authority to enforce any negotiated outcomes.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan McCargo ◽  
Naruemon Thabchumpon

More than ninety people died in political violence linked to the March–May 2010 “redshirt” protests in Bangkok. The work of the government-appointed Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand (TRCT) illustrates the potential shortcomings of seeing quasi-judicial commissions as a catch-all solution for societies struggling to deal with the truth about their recent pasts. The 2012 TRCT report was widely criticized for blaming too much of the violence on the actions of rogue elements of the demonstrators and failing to focus tightly on the obvious legal transgressions of the security forces. By failing strongly to criticize the role of the military in most of the fatal shootings, the TRCT arguably helped pave the way for the 2014 coup. Truth commissions that are unable to produce convincing explanations of the facts they examine may actually prove counterproductive. Following Quinn and Wilson, we argue in this article that weak truth commissions are prone to politicization and are likely to produce disappointing outcomes, which may even be counterproductive.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-69
Author(s):  
Oonagh Anne McDonald

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which the USA has sought to hold the leading banks to account for the financial crisis and to asses the validity of the methods used. This is the first of two articles which looks at the basis of the Complaints against the banks and the settlements which led to the imposition of large fines on the banks. Design/methodology/approach – The paper first provides an account of the government housing policy from 1995 to 2008 and argues that the cases brought against the banks and then at the legal basis of the charges. The methodology consists of a careful examination of the documentary evidence and an analysis of the changes in the relevant laws used by the Department of Justice when bringing charges against the banks. Findings – The paper concludes that both the basis of the cases against the banks and the purpose of large fines are open to question. Research limitations/implications – Much of the information is available. However, as the major cases against the large banks did not go the court, and the basis of the fines is a settlement between the bank and the Department of Justice, each fine is supported by a relatively brief “Statement of the Facts”. The evidence amassed by subpoenas issued by the Department of Justice is not tested in court. Practical implications – Much greater consideration must be given to more effective ways of holding banks and especially senior executives to account. Social implications – The imposition of large fines does not satisfy the public desire to see that justice is done. Such fines imposed on the ban are not likely to change bank behaviour. Originality/value – Its originality lies in setting out an account of government housing policy and its role in the run-up to the financial crisis. No one has carried out a careful analysis of the cases against the large banks brought by the Department of Justice and, in the second article, by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 354-365
Author(s):  
Peggy Crawford ◽  
Joetta Forsyth

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the underserved area requirements for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the government-sponsored enterprises [GSEs]) and the community needs requirements of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) contributed to the house price run-up in the USA. Design/methodology/approach – This paper predicts the incidence of “Rebounds”, which indicate that a mortgage had been previously denied, to provide evidence on whether certain regulations caused excessively risky mortgage originations. As a different lender rejected the loan given the interest rate that they were willing to charge and information on the borrower, a higher incidence of Rebounds provides evidence that lenders were more frequently disagreeing about loans. This can indicate differences in regulatory pressure or oversight across lenders. Findings – This paper provides evidence that the GSEs were purchasing fewer Rebounds directly from lenders. However, evidence suggests that indirectly, the securitization market served as a conduit for Rebounds to the GSEs that needed to satisfy regulatory underserved area requirements. The necessity of complying with the CRA was found to increase Rebounds. Among regulators, the Federal Reserve was found to have been particularly associated with Rebounds. Originality/value – The paper’s contribution comes from linking Rebounds to legislative and regulatory influences. This contributes to the literature on excess credit and fraud, as well as the effect of underserved area requirements and the CRA. Also, this paper adds a new dimension to the literature on securitization, by showing the influence of regulation on the securitization of risky mortgages.


Significance The slowdown of 2015 continued through the first half of 2016 and may develop into recession by year-end. Depressed prices for Kazakhstan's main exports, inflation and falling consumer demand form a nexus of problems with which the government is struggling to cope. Impacts Oil production is set to rise to replenish the treasury, despite the OPEC plan for output caps. The search for new export markets will prompt the government to review existing and forge new ties. Social unrest is most likely in single-industry towns. The government will try to maintain current social spending levels to avoid unrest.


Subject Impact of oil output cuts on Azerbaijan. Significance Azerbaijan has agreed to cut oil production in the first half of 2017 in support of the agreement reached by OPEC and non-OPEC states. It can ill afford a further loss of revenues, but the bigger picture is that oil production is already on a downward curve. Impacts To avoid social unrest, the government will need to allocate spending to mitigate the impact of rising prices. Fiscal pressures may rein in lavish spending on Russian military hardware. The government will maintain strong ties with Turkey as an export route and security ally.


Significance Mawarire is the founder of the 'This Flag' movement, which has been a driving force behind a wave of demonstrations and strikes earlier this month against graft, unemployment and economic mismanagement by President Robert Mugabe's government. Impacts Import bans will adversely affect South African exporters, for whom Zimbabwe is a key regional market. Use of the South African rand in Zimbabwe will remain unpopular, due to concerns about its weakness against the dollar. The government will prioritise cash for paying the salaries of the security forces, since these underpin the regime's survival. Loans from the African Export-Import Bank will help Harare to begin paying the World Bank some of its arrears.


Significance The decision was the latest move by the government to spurn international involvement in its political crisis. Relations between Burundi and the ICC have been deteriorating since the ICC chief prosecutor announced in April an investigation into political violence that has engulfed the country since President Pierre Nkurunziza's controversial decision to seek a third term in office. Impacts Aid suspensions or sanctions could raise the price of isolation, but implementation will require coordination, an uncertain proposition. The president and his supporters will move toward consolidating power, including through constitutional change. Burundi may withdraw its contingent of troops from the AU Mission in Somalia. Renewed insecurity would drive further forced migration above the hundreds of thousands already displaced.


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