Alphabet shareholders take #MeToo issues to C-suite

Headline INTERNATIONAL: Shareholder activism can elevate #MeToo

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Guimaraes ◽  
Ricardo P.C. Leal ◽  
Peter Wanke ◽  
Matthew Morey

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the long-term impact of shareholder activism on Brazilian listed companies. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of 194 companies in 2010, 2012 and 2014 and a two-stage data envelopment analysis to generate an efficiency score based on corporate governance, ownership structure and financial characteristics of companies. In the second stage, the study applies a bootstrap truncated regression to identify whether there is a relationship between the efficiency scores and a company-level activism index. Findings The results show a negative correlation between the efficiency scores and the activism index, suggesting that activist shareholders tend to target less efficient companies. A time analysis over the period 2010-2014 does not offer evidence of impacts of activism on changes of the efficiency scores. Practical implications Activist shareholders target less efficient companies. Shareholder activism increased after regulation that facilitated shareholder voting and required greater company transparency was introduced. Originality/value The two-stage nature of the procedure used in the analysis ascertains that this result is not spurious, assuring data separability between productive resources and contextual variables. This study contributes to the scarce literature on activism in emerging markets.


Significance This followed Samsung's decision to axe its initially much-praised Galaxy Note 7 'phablet' smartphone, launched only in August, after explosions (whose precise cause remains undetermined) affected not only the first handsets but also a supposedly safe replacement model, swiftly introduced after the initial problems. A worldwide return and refund or swap programme began on October 13. Impacts In so highly competitive a sector, Samsung's finances and reputation will take time to recover. Longstanding corporate governance concerns will prompt renewed shareholder activism. The matter is severe enough to count as another 'crisis' for Park's lame duck administration.


Significance A recent report indicates that there has been an increase in shareholder activism in the first third of 2015. For example, activists have become the largest shareholder in Rolls-Royce, nearly prevented a merger of two of Samsung's affiliates and pressed for changes in executive compensation. Impacts Increased investor activism is likely to lead to greater share buybacks or dividend payments. However, many US stocks are likely already overvalued through repeated past buybacks. This risks a politically damaging (for the Democratic presidential nominee) stock market correction in the next twelve months.


Significance The SEC had wanted to reform its proxy system, which is decades old, for years. President Donald Trump's administration has pressed the SEC to restrict the scope for shareholder activism to promote environmental, social and governance (ESG) goals. Impacts Popular pressure on funds in favour of sustainable investing will grow in coming years. Shareholder pressure for companies to perform better on ESG goals, incluidng gender and racial diversity, will increase. The next administration might be wary of increasing oversight on COVID-19-hit US corporates.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mila Ivanova

Purpose This study aims to foster a deeper understanding of socio-ethical shareholder activism by outlining the corporate campaigning strategies of a UK-based non-governmental organisation (NGO) and by assessing their impact on both institutional investors and the practices of two multinational companies. As we move into a world where shareholder ownership is becoming more democratised, shareholder activism is gaining prominence in the USA, Europe and Asia, opening new avenues for participation in corporate governance by stakeholders such as NGOs who have traditionally been uninvolved in corporate decisions. Design/methodology/approach The article adopts a qualitative methodology and case study research design. It relies on semi-structured interviews, analysis of documents and participant observation. Findings First, the study sheds light into the ways in which NGOs are connecting themselves to the financial sector. It argues that they can pursue their political goals by framing their arguments in a way that emphasises the short-term financial risks/benefits for investors. Secondly, it demystifies the term “shareholder activism”, transforming it from an action tool belonging only to big and powerful institutions, to a tool which gives other stakeholders such as NGOs and ordinary people a real stake in companies’ affairs. What is more, the study highlights the divergent nature of institutional shareholder activist intervention in the USA and the UK. Research Limitations/implications Given the generally long-term nature of shareholder campaigns, which can sometimes span over several years, it could be beneficial to adopt a longitudinal research design. Future research can endeavour to focus on a number of different campaigns over a period that exceeds three years. Practical Implications The research has implications for NGOs adopting a shareholder activist campaigning model and for policy makers aiming to encourage investor stewardship. Originality/value The fact that the research field of NGO socio-ethical shareholder activism is relatively new and under-explored by academia, coupled with the growing incidence of the phenomenon in the UK and across the world, as well as its potential benefits for society as a whole, renders further investigation into the topic necessary.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulya Yasmine Prisandani

Purpose This paper aims to elaborate on the extent to which the Indonesian legal framework has provided room for shareholder activism and the extent to which shareholder activism has been implemented in Indonesia. Design/methodology/approach This study combines normative and empirical legal research methods. Indonesian laws and regulations are analyzed aside from the analysis of empirical data and court decisions on shareholder activism implementation. Findings Indonesian laws and regulations have accommodated shareholders’ activism and shareholders have started to rectify mismanagement and abuse of power that causes loss to the company through derivative lawsuits. Despite this, Indonesian shareholders are still passive, shown by the number of questions asked in the general meetings of shareholders despite the high attendance percentage. Shareholders have also formed associations to gather more influence on the company’s decision-making process. Research limitations/implications The empirical observation in this study was limited to LQ45 companies of the February to July 2021 period. This study can be useful to improve corporate governance and corporate communication in a company to encourage higher participation of individual/minority shareholders. This study also serves as an extension to numerous studies on shareholder protection, corporate governance and corporate law in Indonesia. Originality/value Study on shareholder activism in Indonesia is still rare, despite the rising urgency of company supervision and monitoring to prevent mismanagement. To fill in that gap, this research hopes to initiate discussion on shareholder activism in relation to shareholder protection, corporate governance and corporate law implementation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 680-692 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chinyere Uche ◽  
Emmanuel Adegbite ◽  
Michael John Jones

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria. It addresses the paucity of empirical research on institutional shareholder activism in sub-Saharan Africa. Design/methodology/approach This study uses agency theory to understand the institutional shareholder approach to shareholder activism in Nigeria. The data are collected through qualitative interviews with expert representatives from financial institutions. Findings The findings indicate evidence of low-level shareholder activism in Nigeria. The study provides empirical insight into the reasons why institutional shareholders might adopt an active or passive approach to shareholder activism. The findings suggest the pension structure involving two types of pension institutions affects the ability to engage in shareholder activism. Research limitations/implications The research study advances our understanding of the status quo of institutional shareholder activism in an African context such as Nigeria. Practical implications The paper makes a practical contribution by highlighting that regulators need to consider how the financial market conditions and characteristics affect effective promotion of better governance practices and performance through shareholder activism. Originality/value This study draws attention to the implication for shareholder activism of complexities associated with an institutional arrangement where two types of financial institutions are expected to operate and manage the private pension funds in a country.


2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (5) ◽  
pp. 395-415
Author(s):  
Souha Siala Bouaziz ◽  
Ines Ben Amar Fakhfakh ◽  
Anis Jarboui

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance of French companies. Design/methodology/approach This study used 385 firm-year observations drawn from a sample of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index from 2008 to 2012. Data was collected from annual reports of sample companies. To measure earnings management, this study used the model of Raman and Shahrur (2008). The relationship between shareholder activism, earnings management and market performance using the panel data regression model was empirically examined. Findings The results prove that shareholder activism, as indicated by shareholder proposals, has no impact on market performance. However, the existence of shareholder activism affects the market performance positively. In fact, a minimum of proposals proves that shareholder activism plays an appropriate and effective role in creating value. Thus, several activists would resort to “a private activism” which could be the best and the least expensive form. This form of activism is called “behind the scenes.” Findings also show that earnings management has a negative impact on market performance. As a matter of fact, these findings allow to conclude that the firm performance decreases whenever managers undertake to earnings management. Also, earnings management behavior is mainly opportunistic. Finally, the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management has no impact on market performance. This result reveals that shareholder activism proves to be an ineffective mechanism that does not alter the accounting choices, particularly in relation to earnings management. This result shows the inability of active shareholders to define and implement strategies across their proposals, namely, “the lack of monitoring competence.” Research limitations/implications It is important in future research to evaluate the impact of behind the scenes interventions on corporate governance. Also, this paper gives a larger dimension to the effect of shareholder activism on the market performance in the specific context of earnings management, thus justifying the need to expand this study using other methodologies to deepen and better understand this relationship in this context. Practical implications The paper's evidence contributes to an understanding of corporate governance. The finding of this study will help in monitoring and controlling fraudulent earnings management practices that effect on market performance. Further, this study is important to investors, academics and policymakers, as it demonstrates that governance reforms that encourage firms to adopt better governance practices that reduce the likelihood of earnings management. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper pioneers in focusing on the impact of the shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance because previous studies put more emphasis on pair-wise relations (Shareholder activism-earnings management, earnings management-market performance and shareholder activism-market performance). This study provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on market performance.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzette Viviers ◽  
Nadia Mans-Kemp

Purpose Institutional investors in emerging markets are increasingly under pressure to integrate environmental, social and corporate governance considerations into their investment analyses and ownership practices. Old Mutual Investment Group (OMIG) is a South African-based institutional investor that has long been regarded as a pioneer in responsible investing. The purpose of this study was to examine the nature and effectiveness of OMIG's private shareholder activism endeavours over the period 1 January 2014 to 30 June 2018. Design/methodology/approach A unique database was constructed using proprietary, point-in-time data for 69 listed companies covering 283 private engagements. Binary logistic regressions were conducted to test the hypothesised relationships. Findings The majority of the private engagements centred on executive remuneration. This finding was not unexpected given the large and growing wage gap in South Africa. Close to two-thirds of OMIG’s private deliberations were successful. Engagement success was positively associated with a targeted company’s capacity to change and desire to protect its reputation. Research limitations/implications This study only investigated the private shareholder engagement actions of a single, well-resourced institutional investor. Practical implications The findings serve as an encouragement to other investors who are contemplating a more active approach to change unethical and unsustainable corporate policies and practices. Originality/value This unique analysis sheds light on the determinants and success of private shareholder activism in an emerging market.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-153
Author(s):  
Richard Foster

Purpose The purpose of this study is to provide a high-level review of the evolution of shareholder activism and institutional investor engagement in the corporate governance ecosystem in South Africa. Furthermore, it specifically seeks to explain the incorporation of such aspects into the various key codes and reports on corporate governance in South Africa since 1994. Design/methodology/approach Historical narrative and analysis. Findings This study highlights how shareholder activism and institutional investor engagement in the corporate governance ecosystem have been considered and addressed in South Africa since the publication of the First King Report in 1994. The progress that has been made specifically with regard to the introduction of a code for institutional investors is highlighted. The study ultimately acknowledges that this evolution is a continuing journey on the road to stakeholder inclusivity and engagement, and then concludes that the specific role and impact of institutional investors, particularly given some of the recent corporate governance failures, will require further consideration going forward. This should ensure the continued alignment of all stakeholders and assist in making the necessary improvements to the overarching governance framework and attendant culture. Originality/value This study is a part of a special issue that looks at the contribution of the King reports to governance globally.


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