Samsung phablet fire fiasco will hurt South Korea

Significance This followed Samsung's decision to axe its initially much-praised Galaxy Note 7 'phablet' smartphone, launched only in August, after explosions (whose precise cause remains undetermined) affected not only the first handsets but also a supposedly safe replacement model, swiftly introduced after the initial problems. A worldwide return and refund or swap programme began on October 13. Impacts In so highly competitive a sector, Samsung's finances and reputation will take time to recover. Longstanding corporate governance concerns will prompt renewed shareholder activism. The matter is severe enough to count as another 'crisis' for Park's lame duck administration.

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulya Yasmine Prisandani

Purpose This paper aims to elaborate on the extent to which the Indonesian legal framework has provided room for shareholder activism and the extent to which shareholder activism has been implemented in Indonesia. Design/methodology/approach This study combines normative and empirical legal research methods. Indonesian laws and regulations are analyzed aside from the analysis of empirical data and court decisions on shareholder activism implementation. Findings Indonesian laws and regulations have accommodated shareholders’ activism and shareholders have started to rectify mismanagement and abuse of power that causes loss to the company through derivative lawsuits. Despite this, Indonesian shareholders are still passive, shown by the number of questions asked in the general meetings of shareholders despite the high attendance percentage. Shareholders have also formed associations to gather more influence on the company’s decision-making process. Research limitations/implications The empirical observation in this study was limited to LQ45 companies of the February to July 2021 period. This study can be useful to improve corporate governance and corporate communication in a company to encourage higher participation of individual/minority shareholders. This study also serves as an extension to numerous studies on shareholder protection, corporate governance and corporate law in Indonesia. Originality/value Study on shareholder activism in Indonesia is still rare, despite the rising urgency of company supervision and monitoring to prevent mismanagement. To fill in that gap, this research hopes to initiate discussion on shareholder activism in relation to shareholder protection, corporate governance and corporate law implementation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (5) ◽  
pp. 395-415
Author(s):  
Souha Siala Bouaziz ◽  
Ines Ben Amar Fakhfakh ◽  
Anis Jarboui

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance of French companies. Design/methodology/approach This study used 385 firm-year observations drawn from a sample of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index from 2008 to 2012. Data was collected from annual reports of sample companies. To measure earnings management, this study used the model of Raman and Shahrur (2008). The relationship between shareholder activism, earnings management and market performance using the panel data regression model was empirically examined. Findings The results prove that shareholder activism, as indicated by shareholder proposals, has no impact on market performance. However, the existence of shareholder activism affects the market performance positively. In fact, a minimum of proposals proves that shareholder activism plays an appropriate and effective role in creating value. Thus, several activists would resort to “a private activism” which could be the best and the least expensive form. This form of activism is called “behind the scenes.” Findings also show that earnings management has a negative impact on market performance. As a matter of fact, these findings allow to conclude that the firm performance decreases whenever managers undertake to earnings management. Also, earnings management behavior is mainly opportunistic. Finally, the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management has no impact on market performance. This result reveals that shareholder activism proves to be an ineffective mechanism that does not alter the accounting choices, particularly in relation to earnings management. This result shows the inability of active shareholders to define and implement strategies across their proposals, namely, “the lack of monitoring competence.” Research limitations/implications It is important in future research to evaluate the impact of behind the scenes interventions on corporate governance. Also, this paper gives a larger dimension to the effect of shareholder activism on the market performance in the specific context of earnings management, thus justifying the need to expand this study using other methodologies to deepen and better understand this relationship in this context. Practical implications The paper's evidence contributes to an understanding of corporate governance. The finding of this study will help in monitoring and controlling fraudulent earnings management practices that effect on market performance. Further, this study is important to investors, academics and policymakers, as it demonstrates that governance reforms that encourage firms to adopt better governance practices that reduce the likelihood of earnings management. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper pioneers in focusing on the impact of the shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance because previous studies put more emphasis on pair-wise relations (Shareholder activism-earnings management, earnings management-market performance and shareholder activism-market performance). This study provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on market performance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-153
Author(s):  
Richard Foster

Purpose The purpose of this study is to provide a high-level review of the evolution of shareholder activism and institutional investor engagement in the corporate governance ecosystem in South Africa. Furthermore, it specifically seeks to explain the incorporation of such aspects into the various key codes and reports on corporate governance in South Africa since 1994. Design/methodology/approach Historical narrative and analysis. Findings This study highlights how shareholder activism and institutional investor engagement in the corporate governance ecosystem have been considered and addressed in South Africa since the publication of the First King Report in 1994. The progress that has been made specifically with regard to the introduction of a code for institutional investors is highlighted. The study ultimately acknowledges that this evolution is a continuing journey on the road to stakeholder inclusivity and engagement, and then concludes that the specific role and impact of institutional investors, particularly given some of the recent corporate governance failures, will require further consideration going forward. This should ensure the continued alignment of all stakeholders and assist in making the necessary improvements to the overarching governance framework and attendant culture. Originality/value This study is a part of a special issue that looks at the contribution of the King reports to governance globally.


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (6) ◽  
pp. 1313-1337
Author(s):  
Ambareen Beebeejaun ◽  
Jushveer Koobloll

Purpose “Shareholder activism works when shareholders understand something about the characteristics of the business that the board doesn’t”. As complex the term shareholder activism may seem, it demonstrates a very simple phenomenon of how shareholder take control of a situation to turn it in their favor. The whole world has taken an activism “twist” where every person has a word to say. The same characteristic of the society is showcased in this paper where engagement of shareholder is questioned whether it helps to promote effective corporate governance. Given the fact that Mauritius has a rather low shareholder activism framework, this research aims to depict the international picture of the issue at different levels to reach a consensus with the local market. It was a major challenge as very little research has been conducted to accurately contrast shareholder activism with corporate governance. However, the international standards aim at giving a clear picture of how the shareholder activism actually functions. Design/methodology/approach The research has adopted a black letter approach by analyzing relevant laws and legislations governing corporate governance matters in Mauritius and the USA, Malaysia, France and South Africa. Thereafter, a comparative analysis was made between Mauritius laws and the aforementioned countries. Recommendations were then put forward on the subject matter which is shareholder activism. Findings Research has shown development in corporate governance alongside the increase in shareholder activism. However, these research studies fail to prove that the development is because of shareholder activism itself. In fact, it could be because of increase in corporate intellects, removal of trade barriers, sustainable corporate practices and many such changes that have affected the corporate market somehow. Hence, it is difficult to conclude, with certainty, that the driver of good corporate governance is, in particular, the phenomenon of shareholder activism. Nevertheless, many result of shareholder activism has demonstrated a rather positive impact on the ongoing of the corporate dealings and on a personal note, it can be said that shareholder activism is a domain where much research and development should be effected as it represents a promising improvement in the way corporations are governed. Originality/value The concept of shareholder activism is quite new to the Mauritius legislation. There has not been research done on whether shareholder activism, particularly, is the reason for corporate success or failure. In this light, this paper aims to analyze shareholder activism practices in other countries and puts forward recommendation in the Mauritius context which may be of use to stakeholders concerned.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 507-520
Author(s):  
Hairul Azlan Annuar

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to ascertain whether institutional investors in Malaysia faced limitations when they are involved in the corporate governance of their investee companies. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative approach, consisting of a series of interviews with senior investment managers of different type of institutional investors, was chosen. In total, 18 interviews were conducted over a period of two months, which is thought to sufficiently provide the answers to the research purpose. Findings The interviews revealed there are difficulties in monitoring all investee companies due to lack of time and resources. Traditional measures such as company financial performance and dividend policy, continued to be favored and rigorously monitored. The overdependence on hard criteria may be a result of a culture of overly rewarding beneficiaries and a lack of expertise in being involved in specialized company areas such as strategy. Strict regulations hamper effort to be more involved in governing investee companies. Research limitations/implications The research used interviews and generalization may become an issue. In addition, access to many managers depended on recommendations, and the respondents are selected to represent the different types of institutional investors. Originality/value Investigation into factors that may limit institutional investors’ involvement in corporate governance in Malaysian public listed companies, especially from a more qualitative viewpoint, is lacking. In addition, this paper advances the understanding of shareholder activism by adding to the literature by exploring the issue in a specific emerging markets context.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carine Girard ◽  
Stephen Gates

Purpose This paper aims to demonstrate that state shareholders are confronted with contradictory logics leading to institutional contradictions that activist shareholders can exploit. The competing logics of the state as shareholder and their impact on corporate governance and shareholder activism offer fertile grounds for research advances in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs). Design/methodology/approach Through an extensive literature review of state ownership, institutional contradictions and shareholder activism, this paper analyzes two case studies involving the French State as shareholder. Findings In the French context, these two cases illustrate how institutional contradictions result in opportunities for shareholder activism. By focusing on the institutional contradictions of the state shareholder, this investigation suggests a need for experimental research to observe how shareholder activists adapt to each institutional change in CMEs. This experimentation can help policymakers to avoid creating additional conditions that shareholder activists can exploit. Research limitations/implications This focuses only on France and its state shareholdings. To generalize results, studies of other CMEs and state shareholders are needed. Practical implications Policymakers should consider all legislative proposals for their potential to deviate from corporate governance practice by experimenting with them in a laboratory setting. Shareholder activists can compare state shareholders’ actions against the state’s legislation to emphasize institutional contradictions that counter minority shareholders’ rights. Originality/value This research is the first to analyze how the state as shareholder can exploit its competing logics to resist against shareholder activism and support management or to become itself a shareholder activist.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (23) ◽  
Author(s):  
Si Chul Kim ◽  
Hyo Jung Lee

Here, we report the draft genome sequence of Pseudorhodobacter sp. strain E13, a Gram-negative, aerobic, nonflagellated, and rod-shaped bacterium which was isolated from the Yellow Sea in South Korea. The assembled genome sequence is 3,878,578 bp long with 3,646 protein-coding sequences in 159 contigs.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Krenn

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to explain under what circumstances firm-level adoption of codes of good corporate governance will more likely be superficial rather than substantive in nature. The article contains lessons for any agency or country that attempts to implement deep and lasting changes in corporate governance via codes of good corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach – The article reviews the literature on compliance with codes of good corporate governance and develops a conceptual model to explain why some firms that have formally adopted a code of good governance decouple this policy from its actual use. Findings – Decoupling in response to the issuance of codes of good corporate governance will be more attractive to firms and also more sustainable under the following conditions: firms’ compliance costs are relatively high firms’ costs of outright and visible non-compliance are relatively high and outsiders’ compliance monitoring costs are relatively high. Originality/value – The article contributes to the debate on compliance and convergence and provides policymakers with a conceptual framework for assessing the likelihood of successful regulatory change in corporate governance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 939-964
Author(s):  
Mohammad A.A Zaid ◽  
Man Wang ◽  
Sara T.F. Abuhijleh ◽  
Ayman Issa ◽  
Mohammed W.A. Saleh ◽  
...  

Purpose Motivated by the agency theory, this study aims to empirically examine the nexus between board attributes and a firm’s financing decisions of non-financial listed firms in Palestine and how the previous relationship is moderated and shaped by the level of gender diversity. Design/methodology/approach Multiple regression analysis on a panel data was used. Further, we applied three different approaches of static panel data “pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect.” Fixed-effects estimator was selected as the optimal and most appropriate model. In addition, to control for the potential endogeneity problem and to profoundly analyze the study data, the authors perform the one-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. Dynamic panel GMM specification was superior in generating robust findings. Findings The findings clearly unveil that all explanatory variables in the study model have a significant influence on the firm’s financing decisions. Moreover, the results report that the impact of board size and board independence are more positive under conditions of a high level of gender diversity, whereas the influence of CEO duality on the firm’s leverage level turned from negative to positive. In a nutshell, gender diversity moderates the effect of board structure on a firm’s financing decisions. Research limitations/implications This study was restricted to one institutional context (Palestine); therefore, the results reflect the attributes of the Palestinian business environment. In this vein, it is possible to generate different findings in other countries, particularly in developed markets. Practical implications The findings of this study can draw responsible parties and policymakers’ attention in developing countries to introduce and contextualize new mechanisms that can lead to better monitoring process and help firms in attracting better resources and establishing an optimal capital structure. For instance, entities should mandate a minimum quota for the proportion of women incorporation in boardrooms. Originality/value This study provides empirical evidence on the moderating role of gender diversity on the effect of board structure on firm’s financing decisions, something that was predominantly neglected by the earlier studies and has not yet examined by ancestors. Thereby, to protrude nuanced understanding of this novel and unprecedented idea, this study thoroughly bridges this research gap and contributes practically and theoretically to the existing corporate governance–capital structure literature.


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