Challenging a Money Doctor: Raúl Prebisch vs Sir Otto Niemeyer on the Creation of the Argentine Central Bank

2018 ◽  
pp. 55-79
Author(s):  
Florencia Sember
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
The Creation

scholarly journals The Extent of Possibility of Applying a Mode of Financing Services and Benefits in Libyan Banks

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
International Journal of Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh Studies
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Good Alternative ◽  
Personal Finance ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Analytical Approaches ◽  
Year 2013

Law no. 1 of the year 2013 issued by the Central Bank of Libya has caused a challenge for Libyan banks because this law has prevented all Libyan commercial banks from providing personal loans with interest (riba) at a time when there was no existence of Islamic banking activities. This problem called for finding a suitable alternative for personal financing. An alternative would be the creation of financing services and benefits based on Shari`ah rules. Therefore, this research aims to study the conditions and work mechanisms for the mode of financing services and benefits and the possibility of employing it as a source of personal finance in Libyan banks. This research uses descriptive and analytical approaches. The study has arrived at a number of findings. The most important of them are: it is possible to implement the mode of financing services and benefits as a source of personal finance to meet the needs of customers, and this mode has the characteristics that qualify it to be a good alternative for personal loans.

scholarly journals Monetary Policy for a Bubbly World

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Asriyan ◽  
Luca Fornaro ◽  
Alberto Martin ◽  
Jaume Ventura
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Frictions ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy ◽  
Future Value ◽  
Money Creation ◽  
The Creation

Abstract What is the role of monetary policy in a bubbly world? To address this question, we study an economy in which financial frictions limit the supply of assets. The ensuing scarcity generates a demand for “unbacked” assets, i.e., assets that are backed only by the expectation of their future value. We consider two types of unbacked assets: bubbles, which are created by the private sector, and money, which is created by the central bank. Bubbles and money share many features, but they also differ in two crucial respects. First, while the rents from the creation of bubbles accrue to entrepreneurs and foster investment, the rents from money creation accrue to the central bank. Second, while bubbles are driven by market psychology, and can rise and fall according to the whims of the market, money is under the control of the central bank. We characterize the optimal monetary policy and show that, through its ability to supply assets, monetary policy plays a key role in the bubbly world. The model sheds light on the recent expansion of central bank liabilities in response to the bursting of bubbles.

scholarly journals The Privacy Cost of Currency

2021 ◽  
pp. 403
Author(s):  
Karin Thrasher
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Digital Age ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
The State ◽  
Financial Data ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Right To Privacy ◽  
The Public ◽  
Civil And Political Rights ◽  
The Creation

Banknotes, or cash, can be used continuously by any person for nearly every transaction and provide anonymity for the parties. However, as digitization increases, the role and form of money is changing. In response to pressure produced by the increase in new forms of money and the potential for a cashless society, states are exploring potential substitutes to cash. Governments have begun to investigate the intersection of digitization and fiat currency: Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDC”). States have begun researching and developing CBDCs to serve in lieu of cash. Central banks are analyzing the potential for a CBDC that could be made available to the public and serve as a substitute for cash by providing an alternate, safe, and robust payment instrument. However, the greatest attribute of cash is that it protects purchaser anonymity. Fully eliminating cash, without a substitute that safeguards anonymity, would undermine privacy of individuals. The creation of a CBDC in response to the potential cashless society raises the question whether the anonymity previously provided by cash must be safeguarded by the state. This note posits that a central bank in a cashless society must opt for the token-based form of CBDC, which provides the most privacy to individuals. States that choose an account-based CBDC will be in violation of fundamental international privacy principles. This note begins by drawing the crucial distinction between account-based and token-based currencies. Then, this note argues that the broad right to privacy in the digital age is inclusive of personal financial data; this data is subject to the lawful and arbitrary standards of article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Applying the ICCPR framework, it becomes abundantly clear that the privacy of individuals must be protected, even in the rapidly changing landscape of payments in the digital age.

scholarly journals European Banking Union – an institutional analysis

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-75
Author(s):  
Barbara Majewska-Jurczyk
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
European Central ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Creation

Aim: The Banking Union is an important step towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union. The strengthening of the European banking system has become a topic of debate since the 2008 crisis when it became clear that stability and security of the system security may require increased supervision over operations conducted. The Banking Union was created to avoid the situation that taxpayers are first in line to pay for bailing out ailing banks. The Banking Union consists of three pillars: 1) the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which centralizes supervision of European banks around the European Central Bank, 2) the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which the main purpose is to ensure the efficient resolution for recapitalization failing banks, and 3) the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), which is still unfinished. The creation of the Banking Union is accompanied by a remarkable transfer of sovereignty to the European level. This article aims to provide an overview of the changes unfolding across the Banking Union from a law and economics perspective and to explain the role of the European Central Bank in supervision over the banking system, which is different from the policy of controlling prices through determining the level of interest rates and keeping inflation under control.   Design/Research methods: The analysis of the functioning Banking Union is based on the review of literature and analysis of reports and legal acts.   Findings: The Banking Union supports financial integration in the EU by implementing a common set of rules and a common supervisory and resolution mechanism. The creation of the Deposit Insurance Scheme is likely to contribute to the protection of banks and consumers in case of a potential future crisis. The author argues that the European Central Bank as a supervisor of the financial market should create a second supervisory body, which would significantly strengthen the system and allow the ECB more efficiently fulfill its task as chief supervisor.

The Brazilian Development Bank

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luiz Ricardo Cavalcante
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
National Development ◽  
Capital Formation ◽  
Theoretical Background ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Development Bank ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Favorable Conditions

This chapter discusses the role played by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) based upon a survey of its costs and benefits reported in the literature. It provides some theoretical background for the creation and the existence of development banks, using this background to support a brief discussion about the long-term context that marked the bank’s evolution as well as the contemporary issues concerning its role in the Brazilian economy. The author argues that a national development bank such as the BNDES contributes to increasing capital formation, as it provides credit at more favorable conditions to selected projects. However, the author also argues that the presence of the BNDES loans forces the Central Bank to raise interest rates to a level that otherwise would be lower.

scholarly journals Economic Recovery from the Argentine Great Depression: Institutions, Expectations, and the Change of Macroeconomic Regime

1999 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerardo Della Paolera ◽  
Alan M. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Great Depression ◽  
Gold Standard ◽  
Macroeconomic Policy ◽  
Economic Recovery ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
The Creation

Did macroconomic interventions make any contribution to Argentina's revovery from the Great Depression? Macroeconomic policy deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. Fiscal policy was conservative. Monetary policy became unorthodox after 1931, when the Caja de conversión began rediscounting to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflation. This change predated the creation of the central bank in 1935. A wider literature links the interwar depression in the core to flaws in the gold standard, and active monetary policy to escape from defaltion and slump; our work extends this idea to the periphery.

Clearinghouse Membership and Deposit Contraction during the Panic of 1907

2000 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon R. Moen ◽  
Ellis W. Tallman
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
New York City ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
York City ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Perceptions Of Risk ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Demand Deposits ◽  
The Creation

Was clearinghouse membership a key factor mitigating withdrawls from intermediaries during the Panic of 1907? Analyzing balnace-sheet information on institutions in New York and Chicago, we find ecidence that clearinghouse memebers had institutions in New York and Chicago, we find evidence that clearinghouse members had smaller contractions in demand deposits than did nonmembers. New York City trusts, isolated from the clearinghouse, were subject to heightened perceptions of risk, and suffered large-scale withdrawals because they were outside of the clearinghouse and therefore much less prepared to withstand large-scale depositor runs. We suggest that this aspect of the Panic of 1907 helped to forge support for the creation of a U.S. central bank.

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