An incentive mechanism for the negotiation of green supply chain

Author(s):  
Fang Yu ◽  
Yongsheng Yang ◽  
Chun Zhang ◽  
Daofang Chang
2013 ◽  
Vol 804 ◽  
pp. 370-377
Author(s):  
Ding Yue Zhang

For a two-echelon supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and one supplier, the incentive mechanism is designed for the supplier to reduce the production cost of green intermediate products by the manufacturer. It is proposed under the situation of asymmetric information on the endeavor level of supplier to promote the initiative of suppliers technology R&D. The design process of the incentive mechanism in the face of moral hazard problems is discussed by the manufacturer. It indicates that the manufacturer can adopt linear incentive payment according to different periods of producing and marketing. The results manifest that the proposed incentive mechanism will promote the supplier's efforts on R&D as far as possible and make the profits of the members Pareto improvement distinctly. The paper affords great guidance on operating decisions for the green supply chain at initial stages of the green market.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 9090
Author(s):  
Jungeun Lee ◽  
Hye-Young Joo

The purpose of this study is to determine whether the support of top management significantly improves the level of environmental collaboration with participating companies upstream and downstream of the green supply chain and the impact on environmental performance. The results of the empirical analysis of 301 companies that are establishing a green supply chain are as follows. First, top management’s support positively affects the level of collaboration with suppliers and customers in the green supply chain. Secondly, support from top management has a direct impact on the company’s environmental performance. Thirdly, the environmental collaboration of participating companies partially plays a mediation role between the support of top management and the environmental performance. This study has significance in that it analyzes the theoretical mechanism of top management’s support for environmental collaboration with participating companies, leading to environmental performance, and draws implications.


Symmetry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zilong Song ◽  
Shiwei He ◽  
Baifeng An

This paper investigated, for the first time, the game and coordination of a dual-channel, three-layered, green fresh produce supply chain, with regard to its economic, social, and environmental performance. Considering that the market demand is dual-channel priced and sensitive to the degree of greenness and the freshness-level, four game models, under different scenarios have been established. These included a centralized scenario, a decentralized scenario, and two contractual scenarios. The equilibrium solutions under the four scenarios were characterized. From the perspective of a sustainable development, the economic, social, and environmental performance of the supply chain was analyzed. To enhance the supply chain performance, two contract mechanisms were designed and the conditions for a multi-win outcome were obtained. Accordingly, many propositions and management implications were provided. The results showed that, (1) compared to the centralized supply chain case, the performance of the decentralized supply chain case is inferior; (2) in addition to increasing the concentration of the supply chain decisions, the two contracts proposed can effectively coordinate the green supply chain and improve its sustainable performance; and (3) the performance of the supply chain is positively driven by the consumers’ sensitivity to greenness degree and the freshness level of fresh produce. This paper fills a research gap and helps the participants of the channel recognize the operational decision principle of a complex green supply chain, in order to achieve a higher and a long-term sustainable-development performance.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document