Do Managers Influence their Pay? Evidence from Stock Incentive Plans in an Immature Market Economy

Author(s):  
Huihui Yang ◽  
Anlin Cheng
2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 70-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Zattoni

Traditionally, stock incentive plans have been used by American companies for two primary purposes: as tools of corporate governance to align the interests of top managers and shareholders, and to motivate managers to maximize shareholders’ value. Recently, just as the misuse of stock option plans is the subject of scathing criticism, such plans are seeing widespread dissemination in several European countries. Empirical studies conducted by both consulting companies and management scholars outline the increasing diffusion of stock incentive plans designed by European companies and the main features of these plans. The characteristics of the process through which they are designed and of the equity incentives implemented raise the concerns of investors and academics about the ability of such plans to align managers’ interests to shareholders’. Since stock incentive plans were created and developed in the Anglo-Saxon capitalistic system, the last part of the paper reviews the reasons why firms should set up these plans. The aim is to ascertain whether European companies have good reasons to create SIPs and if the features of the incentive plans designed by these executives are consistent with achieving these goals. To answer these questions, a theoretical model is presented to provide a framework for designing stock incentive plans that are tailored to the characteristics of the company, specific aims it wishes to pursue, and the relative institutional environment.


2016 ◽  
pp. 63-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Buzgalin ◽  
A. Kolganov

The authors, basing on a critical analysis of the experience of planning during the 20th century in a number of countries of Europe and Asia, and also on the lessons from the economics of "real socialism", set out to substantiate their conclusions on the advisability of "reloading" this institution. The aim is to create planning mechanisms, suited to the new economy, that incorporate forecasting, projections, direct and indirect selective regulation and so forth into integral programs of economic development and that set a vector of development for particular limited spheres of what remains on the whole a market economy. New planning institutions presuppose a supersession of the forms of bureaucratic centralism and a reliance on network forms of organization of the subject and process of planning.


2018 ◽  
pp. 142-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. F. Baranov ◽  
V. A. Bessonov

The transition of the Russian economy from plan to market is considered at a qualitative level. The analysis of economic dynamics in the transformation paradigm is conducted. The main stages of the transition process are discussed. Bonuses and costs due to the transition to market economy are considered. The reasons for the outstripping growth of well-being as compared to the growth of output are discussed. The signs of exhaustion of the potential of factors ensuring an abnormally high rate of recovery and accompanying welfare growth are discussed. The conclusion is made that the transformational recovery has been completed. The Russian economy has moved to the stage of development with relatively low growth rates of output and welfare, typical for stable (nontransition) economies.


2005 ◽  
pp. 41-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Yegorenkov ◽  
E. Kazakova ◽  
M. Starodubtseva

The phase model of market economy is suggested in the article. It is formalized in the cubical equation The equation takes into account the imperfections of competition and the fact that consumer goods are produced with the help of means of production. Transitions from the imperfect competition to the perfect one and visa versa yield qualitative status change of market economy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22
Author(s):  
Kamal Dib

Lebanon, a multi-confessional state, is undergoing a deep socioeconomic change that could trigger a review of its constitutional arrangement. The tiny republic on the Mediterranean was born in 1920 as a liberal democracy with a market economy, where the Christians had the upper hand in politics and the economy. In 1975, Lebanon witnessed a major war that lasted for fifteen years, and a new political system emerged in 1989, dubbed the Ta’ef Accord. The new constitutional arrangement, also known as the “second republic,” transferred major powers to the Muslims. Under the new republic, illiberal policies were adopted in reconstruction, public finance, and monetary policy, coupled with unprecedented corruption at the highest levels. On 17 October 2019, the country exploded in a social revolution which could precipitate the death of the second republic or the demise of the country as another victim of predator neoliberalism.


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