Tunneling of Ultimate Controlling Shareholders in Pyramidal Ownership Structure

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhang Lan ◽  
Ma Zhong ◽  
Yu Chong
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Pyramidal Ownership

Pyramidal Ownership Structure and Firms’ Audit Fees

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shangkun Liang ◽  
Xiangqin Qi ◽  
Fu Xin ◽  
Jingwen Zhan
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Pyramidal Ownership

Controlling Shareholders: Issues and Challenges for Shareholders’ Empowerment in Directors’ Remuneration in Corporate Malaysia

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shanthy Rachagan ◽  
Aiman Nariman Mohd Sulaiman
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Current Reform

AbstractCurrent reform concerning directors’ remuneration relies on improving legal rules and self-regulation to minimise expropriation of minority shareholders. These have prominently focussed on empowering shareholders. Nonetheless, it is unclear as to the extent these reform proposals are compatible within the concentrated shareholding structure. Some of the reforms taking place in developed countries are suited for dispersed shareholding structure and thus transplanting them to emerging economies with concentrated shareholders may be ineffective. Malaysia poses an interesting case study, especially to countries with similar ownership structure as the concentrated shareholding structure raises different agency problems. The issue of protection of minority shareholder rights and the prevention of abuse of the controlling power by paying excessive remuneration to the executives is therefore a subject of due consideration in Malaysia and countries with similar shareholding structures. This article recommends that Malaysia and other emerging countries look into encouraging limited shareholder empowerment in tandem with laws.

scholarly journals Estrutura Piramidal de Controle, Emissão de Duas Classes de Ações e Desempenho Financeiro das Empresas Brasileiras

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 555 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lelis Pedro Andrade ◽  
Aureliano Angel Bressan ◽  
Robert Aldo Iquiapaza
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Pyramidal Structure ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Pyramidal Ownership ◽  
Dual Class Shares ◽  
Dual Class

This study aims to identify whether there is a relationship between dual class shares issuance, pyramidal ownership structure and firms’ financial performance in the Brazilian market. To this end, univariate tests and panel data analysis were applied in a sample for the 2000 to 2012 period. The results indicate that there is a significant and negative relationship between dual class shares issuance and firm’s financial performance, regardless of whether there is a pyramidal ownership structure in firm. In other hand, we find positive effects from pyramidal structure on the firm’s financial performance, conditioned that there is no dual class shares issuance, and also on the absence of an excessive number of levels until the ultimate controlling shareholder in the pyramidal structure. These evidences suggest that the voting power matters to improve firms’ financial performance; and that there are benefits and costs from pyramidal ownership structure in Brazilian firms.

scholarly journals Controlling shareholders and corporate valuation in Brazil

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-141
Author(s):  
Ricardo P. C. Leal ◽  
Andre Carvalhal da Silva
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Valuation ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure, valuation and performance of Brazilian companies. The results show that large shareholders keep control while holding only a small fraction of cash flow rights. The evidence also indicates that non-voting shares and pyramiding are the main devices set to entrench the large controlling shareholder. There is some evidence that firm valuation and performance are negatively related to voting concentration, and that foreign-owned firms perform the best while government-owned firms perform the worst.

scholarly journals The Effect of Managerial Share Pledges on the Cost of Debt

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (6) ◽  
pp. 617-650
Author(s):  
Soonhong Park ◽  
Hyeon Sook Kim ◽  
Byungkwon Lim
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Risk Premium ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Managerial Risk ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Relationship

We examines whether share pledges by controlling shareholders influence a firm’s cost of debt. We also investigate whether the relationship between share pledges and the cost of debt stems from the managerial risk-taking incentives or pursuing the private benefits of controlling shareholders. We make three major findings. First, we find the cost of debt is higher in firms with share pledges than in firms without share pledges. Furthermore, we identify a positive relationship between the cost of debt and the level of share pledges. Second, we find that there is no increased corporate financial leverage or investment activities in firms with share pledges. Finally, our empirical evidence demonstrates that the positive relationship between share pledges and cost of debt is more pronounced for lower foreign institutional investor stakes or higher controlling shareholders ownership. Overall, the results indicate that share pledges by controlling shareholders negatively affect the cost of debt. However, the effect of share pledges on the cost of debt is differently influenced by a firm’s ownership structure. Our findings suggest that share pledges induce stockholder-bondholder conflict, and the bondholder requires more risk premium due to the decrease of firm value.

scholarly journals The Effect of Pyramidal Ownership Structure to the Financing Policies and Firm Value in Indonesia: Cronyman as Moderating Variable

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Hety Budiyanti ◽  
Suad Husnan ◽  
Mamduh Hanafi
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Sample Selection ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Financing Policies ◽  
Final Sample ◽  
Pyramidal Ownership ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

The research to examine the effects of ownership structures on financing policies and firm valuation. The populations are all listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange for period of 2013 and 2015. The sample selection technique used purposive sampling and resulting in a final sample of 72 listed firms. Empirical tests are conducted using multiple regressions and two stages least squares regression to test the simultaneous relationship between ownership structure, financing policies and firm value. The estimated results provide support for the hypotheses proposed that the separation of cash flow rights and control rights have led the use of excess leverage among pyramidal companies to preserve ultimate owner’s control. However, we failed to find a significant relationship between firm’s leverage and firm’s value. The conclusion is the simultaneounity relation between ownership structure, leverage and firm value appear that only the ownership structure significantly related with leverage and firm value. Also firm value and leverage ownership impact the ownership structure. Meanwhile, leverage does not appear to have a significant relation with the firm value, or the other way around.

scholarly journals Controlling shareholders, performance and risk taking of Tunisian listed firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 222-231
Author(s):  
Taher Hamza
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Size Number ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The Impact

We investigate the effects of ownership structure, as an internal control mechanism of agency problem, on corporate governance. We focused specially on the impact of the size, number and type of blockholders on the performance and the risk-taking of the Tunisian listed companies during the period 2001-2004. The descriptive analysis highlights, absence of ownership-control discrepancy, high ownership concentration, low management stock-ownership and the presence of two or three large blockholders with significant difference of the block share size between the first and the other controlling shareholders. The main result of our study indicates that the presence of controlling shareholders affect performance and risk-taking and play an important role in corporate governance. However, we assume that the control contest of the leading shareholder is not conclusive but indicate a form of coalition and agreement effect to share private benefits.

scholarly journals Ownership structure and corporate governance code: The case of family business enterprises in Germany

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 382-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Weissenberger-Eibl ◽  
Patrick Spieth
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Family Businesses ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Business Enterprises ◽  
And Control

Ownership of corporations in Germany is today highly concentrated in the hands of families and other companies. Theses ‘insider’ systems often result in core conflict tends to be between controlling shareholders and sometimes between strong stakeholders and weak minority shareholders. The aim of this paper is to research the characteristics of ownership and control in family business and point out the role of Family Business Governance in securing an appropriate control of the owning families. The authors give suggestions how to implement the German Governance Code recommendations in family businesses.

Institutional Reforms and the Effects of Family Control on Corporate Governance

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yung-Chih Lien ◽  
Chia-Chen Teng ◽  
Shaomin Li
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Family Governance ◽  
Pyramidal Ownership ◽  
Firm Governance

According to the institution-based view of corporate governance, firm-governance efficiency is influenced by the institutional environment in which the firm operates. In this study, we examine how firms under a family-governance system adapted to institutional reforms over time. The results of the analysis indicate that institutional reforms reduce firm dependence on family governance and eliminate the negative effects on performance exerted by a controlling family’s pyramidal ownership structure. We also find that institutional reforms foster external corporate governance by domestic institutional investors. In conclusion, our study shows that institutional reforms alter the essence of family firm governance.

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