Introduction the Logic of Social Cooperation for Mutual Advantage – The Democratic Contract

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dario Castiglione
2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 252-270
Author(s):  
Amy Sargeant

The article addresses debates around the introduction of commercial television in Britain, conducted in Parliament, lobby groups, the advertising trade press and broader cultural commentary. It notes that the boundaries between these interest groups were porous. The article refers to sample advertisements produced by agencies in anticipation of the 1955 launch of ITV in London and other regions thereafter, setting advertisers' initial caution against the bullishness subsequently checked by the 1962 report of the Pilkington Committee. ‘Americanisation’ is identified as a recurrent theme of anxiety, and advertising as a symptom of it, prompting complaints on both sides of the Atlantic. Many of the production strategies anticipated experimentally in the 1950s are with us still, as are concerns regarding differentiation of advertisements from programme content, advertisements' target audiences and commodities advertised on television. For legislators and advertisers alike, print media provided a model for imitation more often than did cinema. Competition between old and new platforms for advertisements – then as now – is identified as an opportunity for mutual advantage rather than displacement.


Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

This chapter argues that distributive justice is institutionally based. Certain cooperative institutions are basic: they are necessary for economic production and the division of labor, trade and exchange, and distribution and consumption. These background institutions presuppose principles of justice to specify their terms, allocate productive resources, and define fair distributions. Primary among these basic institutions are property; laws and conventions enabling transfers of goods and productive resources; and the legal system of contract and agreements that make transfers possible and productive. Political institutions are necessary to specify, interpret, enforce, and make effective the terms of these institutions. Thus, basic cooperative institutions are social; they are realizable only within the context of social and political cooperation—this is a fixed empirical fact about cooperation among free and equal persons. Given the nature of fair social cooperation as a kind of reciprocity, distributive justice is primarily social rather than global in reach.


Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

Chapter 8 explores the Austere and Hybrid Responses to the problem of error. The two types of response are described in both ideal and non-ideal versions. Both are found wanting, but the Austere Response emerges as best. Codes endorsed by the Austere approach cannot be shown to meet the “goal-oriented” desiderata of maximizing social welfare, facilitating social cooperation and long-range planning, or guaranteeing the occurrence of the ideal pattern of actions. But Austere-endorsed codes do satisfy the conceptual desiderata for “usable” moral theories in the core (but not the extended) sense of “usability.” They are usable despite the agent’s false beliefs, and they provide agents with the opportunity to live a successful moral life according to the modest conception of this life. This chapter concludes that the only remedy for the problem of error is an Austere code containing a derivative duty for agents to gather information before acting.


Legal Theory ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Ira K. Lindsay

ABSTRACT Two rival approaches to property rights dominate contemporary political philosophy: Lockean natural rights and egalitarian theories of distributive justice. This article defends a third approach, which can be traced to the work of David Hume. Unlike Lockean rights, Humean property rights are not grounded in pre-institutional moral entitlements. In contrast to the egalitarian approach, which begins with highly abstract principles of distributive justice, Humean theory starts with simple property conventions and shows how more complex institutions can be justified against a background of settled property rights. Property rights allow people to coordinate their use of scarce resources. For property rules to serve this function effectively, certain questions must be considered settled. Treating existing property entitlements as having prima facie validity facilitates cooperation between people who disagree about distributive justice. Lockean and egalitarian theories endorse moral claims that threaten to unsettle property conventions and undermine social cooperation.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Georg Kanitsar

Peer punishment is widely lauded as a decentralized solution to the problem of social cooperation. However, experimental evidence of its effectiveness primarily stems from public good structures. This paper explores peer punishment in another structural setting: a system of generalized exchange. In a laboratory experiment, a repeated four-player prisoner’s dilemma is arranged either in a public good structure or in a circular network of generalized exchange. The experimental results demonstrate that the merits of peer punishment do not extend to generalized exchange. In the public good, peer punishment was primarily altruistic, was sensitive to costs, and promoted cooperation. In generalized exchange, peer punishment was also altruistic and relatively frequent, but did not increase cooperation. While the dense punishment network underlying the public good facilitates norm enforcement, generalized exchange decreases control over norm violators and reduces the capacity of peer punishment. I conclude that generalized exchange systems require stronger forms of punishment to sustain social cooperation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benoît De Courson ◽  
Daniel Nettle

AbstractHumans sometimes cooperate to mutual advantage, and sometimes exploit one another. In industrialised societies, the prevalence of exploitation, in the form of crime, is related to the distribution of economic resources: more unequal societies tend to have higher crime, as well as lower social trust. We created a model of cooperation and exploitation to explore why this should be. Distinctively, our model features a desperation threshold, a level of resources below which it is extremely damaging to fall. Agents do not belong to fixed types, but condition their behaviour on their current resource level and the behaviour in the population around them. We show that the optimal action for individuals who are close to the desperation threshold is to exploit others. This remains true even in the presence of severe and probable punishment for exploitation, since successful exploitation is the quickest route out of desperation, whereas being punished does not make already desperate states much worse. Simulated populations with a sufficiently unequal distribution of resources rapidly evolve an equilibrium of low trust and zero cooperation: desperate individuals try to exploit, and non-desperate individuals avoid interaction altogether. Making the distribution of resources more equal or increasing social mobility is generally effective in producing a high cooperation, high trust equilibrium; increasing punishment severity is not.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 564-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman J. Padelford

Economic and social cooperation through the United Nations seems destined to face new challenges and alternatives in the coming years as a result of the changed composition of the United Nations membership, the increased bargaining power of the African, Asian, and other states seeking economic and technical assistance, and the precedent of UN operations in the Congo.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document