Ex Post Settling Up in Cash Compensation: New Evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 2283-2318
Author(s):  
Ana Albuquerque ◽  
Bingyi Chen ◽  
Qi (Flora) Dong ◽  
Edward J. Riedl
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
Cash Compensation ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Settling Up

Is CEO Cash Compensation Punished for Poor Firm Performance?

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 1065-1093 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth W. Shaw ◽  
May H. Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Bonus Pay ◽  
Cash Compensation ◽  
Earnings Performance ◽  
Settling Up ◽  
Ceo Bonus

ABSTRACT: Leone et al. (2006) conclude that CEO cash compensation is more sensitive to negative stock returns than to positive stock returns, due to Boards of Directors enforcing an ex post settling up on CEOs. Dechow (2006) conjectures that Leone et al.’s (2006) results might be due to the sign of stock returns misclassifying firm performance. Using three-way performance partitions, we find no asymmetry in CEO cash compensation for firms with low stock returns. Further, we find that CEO cash compensation is less sensitive to poor earnings performance than it is to better earnings performance. Thus, we find no evidence consistent with ex post settling up for poor firm performance, even among the very worst performing firms with strong corporate governance. We find similar results when examining changes in CEO bonus pay and when partitioning firm performance using earnings-based measures. In sum, our results suggest that CEO cash compensation is not punished for poor firm performance.

Ex-post evaluation of the R&D tax incentive law in Chile

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3/4) ◽  
pp. 337-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristian Mardones ◽  
Natalia Madrid Becerra
Keyword(s):  
Tax Credits ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Wide Margin ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Tax Incentive ◽  
Post Evaluation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
The Impact ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Positive Effect

PurposeThis study carries out an ex - post evaluation of the Research and Development (R&D) Tax Incentive Law in Chile.Design/methodology/approachA subset of data from the 9th Innovation Survey is chosen, specifically those that were available for the years 2013 and 2014. Then, differences in differences (DID) and matching with differences in differences (MDID) techniques are used to identify the impact of this policy.FindingsThe results obtained allow us to affirm that the use of the R&D Tax Incentive Law had some positive but very low effects on some components of expenditure for innovation. Also, the positive effect of the tax credits on the total expenditure for innovation identified with MDID disappears when only firms that know the R&D Tax Incentive Law are used as a control group.Originality/valueThis work provides new evidence to evaluate innovation policies in Latin America, focusing on tax credits that have been much less studied than subsidy programs. Specifically, it is concluded that there is still a wide margin to improve and reformulate the R&D Tax Incentive Law in Chile.

Strategic Anticipation and En Banc Oversight Procedures in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-401
Author(s):  
Joshua A. Strayhorn
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Courts Of Appeals ◽  
Lower Court ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Adoption And Implementation ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Impact ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Circuit Courts ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Courts of Appeals must ordinarily convene en banc to overturn circuit law. However, roughly half of the circuit courts have adopted an alternative, less costly procedure, the informal en banc, where three-judge panels may overturn precedent with approval of the full circuit. This article leverages variation in adoption and implementation of this institution to analyze the implications of ex post oversight mechanisms for ex ante panel decision making. The evidence suggests that the informal en banc substantially reduces the impact of ideology on panel decision making, providing new evidence that lower court judges strategically alter their behavior in anticipation of potential override by circuit colleagues.

scholarly journals In Pursuit of Balance: Randomization in Practice in Development Field Experiments

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 200-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Bruhn ◽  
David McKenzie
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiments ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Ex Post Analysis

We present new evidence on the randomization methods used in existing experiments, and new simulations comparing these methods. We find that many papers do not describe the randomization in detail, implying that better reporting is needed. Our simulations suggest that in samples of 300 or more, the different methods perform similarly. However, for very persistent outcome variables, and in smaller samples, pair-wise matching and stratification perform best and appear to dominate the rerandomization methods commonly used in practice. The simulations also point to specific recommendations for which variables to balance on, and for which controls to include in the ex post analysis. (JEL C83, C93, O12)

Do Boards Exercise Discretion to Reduce Costly Ex Post Settling Up?

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana M. Albuquerque ◽  
Bingyi Chen ◽  
Flora Dong ◽  
Edward J. Riedl
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
Settling Up

Compensation Committees' Treatment of Earnings Components in CEOs' Terminal Years

2011 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 231-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark R. Huson ◽  
Yao Tian ◽  
Christine I. Wiedman ◽  
Heather A. Wier
Keyword(s):  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Earnings Components ◽  
Cash Compensation ◽  
Flow Through ◽  
Administrative Expenditures ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Compensation Function ◽  
Compensation Committees

ABSTRACT Compensation committees face special difficulties when setting pay in the last years of a CEO's tenure. For example, incentives to manipulate earnings for the purpose of enhancing earnings-based compensation are greater in CEOs' terminal years. We predict that compensation committees are aware of these incentives and adjust the relative weights placed on earnings components in the cash compensation function to mitigate the problem. Consistent with our prediction, we find that in CEOs' terminal years, positive changes in discretionary accruals receive significantly less weight than other income components in determining cash compensation. This provides new evidence that not all gains flow through to compensation. We also find that in non-terminal years, managers' compensation is partially shielded from the negative effects of selling, general, and administrative expenditures (SG&A), but this effect reverses in the terminal period, consistent with the compensation committee discouraging investment in legacy assets by outgoing CEOs. Overall, our findings suggest that compensation committees treat components of earnings differently when setting pay in the terminal period. JEL Classifications: M41; J33.

scholarly journals Personal Self-Regulation and Regulatory Teaching to predict Performance and Academic Confidence: new evidence for the DEDEPRO ModelTM

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (34) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesús De la Fuente ◽  
Fernando Justicia ◽  
Paul Sander ◽  
Maria Cardelle-Elawar
Keyword(s):  
Self Regulation ◽  
Academic Confidence ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Post Facto ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Estudiantes Universitarios

Introducción. Los modelos 3P y DIDEPRO predicen relaciones interactivas entre variablespresagio-  proceso-producto a través de la enseñanza y el aprendizaje autorregulado. El Modelo  DIDEPRO ha establecido diferentes posibilidades de interacción entre las de autorregulación  del alumno y de la enseñanza reguladora. El objetivo de esta investigación empírica fue validar  un modelo racional de cuatro tipos de interacción.Método. La muestra estuvo formada por 765 estudiantes universitarios de dos universidades  del sur de España. Se utilizó un diseño ex post-facto. La recolección de datos se obtuvo a partir  de tres instrumentos validados, en dos momentos temporales diferentes: Escala de Autorregulación  (SRQ), la Escala para la Evaluación del Proceso de Enseñanza-Aprendizaje  (ATLP -S) y la Escala de Comportamiento de Confianza Académica (ABC). El rendimiento  académico se evaluó a través de la nota media final de cada materia. Fueron utilizados diferentes  análisis multivariantes y un modelo causal empírico que ofrece evidencia de las relaciones  postuladas. Resultados. Ofrecen evidencia de cuatro tipos de interacción constante y modelo causal  empírico, dando así una confirmación significativa del modelo racional propuesto. Como se  había predicho, la más significativa de estas interacciones fue la autorregulación del estudiante  con la instrucción reguladora. Conclusión. El mejor tipo de interacción es alta autorregulación personal con un proceso de  enseñanza-aprendizaje altamente regulador, produciendo un alto rendimiento y la confianza  académica.  

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